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Abstract
This dissertation is a story about the divisions that characterize the mass public.
Specifically, it explores how Americans think about politics, and, in particular, how
citizens connect their attitudes, beliefs, and, vitally, ideological identity to their partisan
affiliation—a phenomenon known as sorting. Practically, this project proceeds in two parts.
In Part 1, I investigate the nature of partisan sorting in the mass public. Chapter 2 reviews
the extant scholarly literature regarding partisanship and ideology, or the raw materials of
sorting. Drawing on this research, I operationalize two types of sorting in Chapter 3 and
compare how different measurement protocols affect the characterization of public
opinion. This distinction culminates in Chapter 4, which provides a series of empirical tests
that justify partitioning sorting into identity- and policy-based constructs.
The second part of this dissertation is devoted to the study of identity-based
sorting. Chapter 5 takes up the question of why individuals’ identities converge and
conveys that sorting is related to asymmetric perceptions of out-group dissimilarity rather
than relative perceptions of between-group differences. Chapter 6 explores how this sorting
affects compromise. I discover that, even in the absence of consistent policy preferences,
identity sorting is sufficient to decrease an individual’s willingness to accept
bipartisanship. Finally, Chapter 7 examines how identity sorting alters the decisional
criteria that voters utilize to select political candidates. Here, I show that sorting produces
a disconnect between the perceived and objective ideological congruence between voters
and their preferred candidate. Sorting, then, is a sufficient condition for pushing citizens
toward more extreme candidates—even when individuals’ issue preferences suggest that
their “best” candidate is considerably more moderate.
Taken as a whole, this dissertation both refines the extant logic of sorting and
pushes this research into new territory. In demonstrating that identity-based sorting
constitutes a unique and particularly powerful political phenomenon, I reveal why concern
over the systematic coherency of mass opinion is, perhaps, misplaced. Instead, it is this
identity sorting that contributes to the intemperate and polarized atmosphere that
characterizes the state of American politics.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Sort (sôrt) v. 1. To arrange systematically in groups; separate according to type,
class, etc.
-Oxford Dictionary
“We are increasingly moving toward two entirely separate Americas, a liberal
one and a conservative one.”
-Chris Clizza1

1.1

Introduction

Americans are divided. Among the indicators that bear witness to the extent of their
disunity, a sampling of recent headlines is particularly striking. The New York Times argues
that “Polarization is dividing American society, not just politics.”2 The Washington Post
writes that “Urban and rural America are becoming increasingly polarized.”3 Apparently,
neither gastronomical fare, “Americans just as polarized on food as they are on politics,”4
nor sports “Our polarized nation interprets one 84 Lumber Super Bowl ad two completely
different ways,”5 have remained unsullied. Taking these divisions into account, the
Scientific American aptly titles this state of affairs, “The hyper-polarization of America.”6
The election of Donald J. Trump to the United States Presidency has amplified
these divisions—indeed, for only the fourth time in the country’s history, the results of the
popular vote didn’t match the Electoral College one. Yet, while Time Magazine’s byline
for their annual “Person of the Year” story captures this milieu, describing Donald Trump
as “President-elect of the divided States of America,” what do these divisions really
portend?7 Is the mass public deeply and intractably divided on the major issues of the day?
1

www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2014/07/28/America-really-is-twodifferent-political-countries-these-days
2
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/12/upshot/polarization-is-dividing-american-societynot-just-politics.html
3
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/2016-election/urban-rural-voteswing/
4
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/gmos-organic-foodpoll_us_5840761be4b09e21702d7190
5
http://www.forbes.com/sites/willburns/2017/02/08/our-polarized-nation-interprets-one84-lumber-super-bowl-ad-two-completely-different-ways/#2fcbd9438e29
6
https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/guest-blog/the-hyper-polarization-of-america/
7
http://time.com/time-person-of-the-year-2016-donald-trump/
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Or, could it be, according to yet another headline, that “Americans aren’t polarized, just
better sorted?”8
This dissertation is a story about the divisions that characterize the mass public’s
political preferences. Specifically, it explores how Americans think about politics, and, in
particular, how citizens connect their attitudes, beliefs, and, vitally, group memberships to
their partisan affiliation—a phenomenon known as sorting. Much has been written recently
about sorting and, by extension, polarization, and, yet, the two concepts are frequently
misunderstood and, worse, thoroughly muddled in their application. Breaking from the
work of Levendusky (2009) in The Partisan Sort, this project provides a new investigation
into the nature of sorting within the mass public. Over the coming chapters, I outline the
first cohesive theoretical and empirical justification for disaggregating the sorting of the
mass public into separate issue- and identity-based domains. While the relationship
between attitudes and partisan memberships is modest, it is the sorting of political identities
that has had profound effects on the transformation of American politics. Building on this
distinction, I present a new account of when and under what circumstances sorting occurs
and why identity sorting, in particular, has serious ramifications for American politics.

1.2

Sorting and the coherency of public opinion

For a vast majority of the 20th Century, the mass public was not particularly adept, much
less principled, at enunciating its political preferences (Achen and Bartels, 2004; Cohen,
Noel and Zaller, 2004; Snyder and Stromberg, 2010). During the era of the first systematic
studies of public opinion, scholars observed that politics was not only a remote concept for
much of the electorate, but that individuals’ political preferences were often shallow,
vague, and inconsistent. Although the average person could generally identify and
differentiate between the parties, individuals struggled to convey particular or unique
features about them. In fact, in perhaps the most important work from this period, The
American Voter, Campbell and his colleagues (1960) found evidence that less than six
percent of their interviewees used ideological labels “liberal” or “conservative” to describe
the American political parties.

8

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/01/21/americans-arentpolarized-just-better-sorted/?utm_term=.454eb4ba2ae8
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Converse’s (1964) subsequent inquiry into the mind of the American citizen
buttressed these findings. He estimated that less than 10 percent of individuals grounded
their political decisions in any sort of substantive ideological preferences, while a paltry
two percent of people utilized he described as “constrained” thinking, or the ability to
logically connect and extrapolate attitudes across separate issue areas. Although it was true
that particular events occasionally captured individuals’ attention to the extent that they
developed meaningful opinions, their political attitudes, when subjected to further
empirical scrutiny, were largely idiosyncratic and only weakly related to those of political
elites. In other words, it was impossible to claim “that the mass public shares ideological
patterns of belief with relevant elites at a specific level any more than it shares the abstract
conceptual frames of reference” (Converse 2000, pg. 34).
This lack of coherent ideological thinking within the electorate dovetailed with a
meaningful decline in differences between party elites during the 1960s and 1970s, a period
noted for its unique legislative bipartisanship. As both the Republican and Democrat
Parties embraced postwar liberalism, the share of liberal Republicans and conservative
Democratic legislators reached historic levels (Brady, Han, and Pope, 2007).9 While
perhaps advantageous for the production of policy in that gridlock, which stymies
legislation, was comparatively low, both scholars and political observers lamented that this
ideological convergence by elites had severe, negative implications for the wider party
system itself (Broder, 1972; APSA Task Force, 1950). According to Nie, Verba, and
Petrocik (1976) in The Changing America Voter, the issues of the day had ceased to
correspond with party positions. In the absence of perceived distinctions between the
parties, citizens began to disengage and dealign from them (Clarke and Suzuki, 1994).
Such ideological naiveté and partisan disinterest, however, were relatively shortlived (Wattenberg, 1981; Lewis-Beck et al., 2008). By the late 1990s, a new partisan voter
had manifested (Miller and Shanks, 1996; Bafumi and Shapiro, 2009)—one that was not
only more ideological than its forebears, but whose issue preferences were more strongly
rooted within a liberal-conservative framework (Baldassarri and Gelman, 2008). By taking

9

Theriault (2008) reports on the breadth of this overlap in the 93 rd Congress: better than
90 percent of Republicans were more liberal than the most conservative Democrat, while
about a third of Democrats were more conservative than their liberal Republican
counterparts.
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positions on matters of public policy that corresponded to those preferred by their party,
partisans had sorted (Levendusky, 2009).
At its core, the concept of sorting reflects the ordering or coherency of individuals’
preferences—long a central interest in studies of public opinion. In fact, while scholars
have puzzled over the stability (Feldman, 1988; Lenz, 2012) and consistency of
individuals’ political attitudes (Sniderman and Bullock, 2004; Achen, 1975; Zaller and
Feldman, 1992), the ordering of preferences within belief systems has received special
consideration (Converse, 1964, 2000; Zaller, 1992; Kinder and Kalmoe, 2017). Why this
interest? Aside from academic curiosity in the nature of mass opinion, there are serious
implications regarding whether or not a mass public’s preferences adhere to some sort of
overarching framework. As Feldman (2003, pg. 478) ominously warns, “Politics doesn’t
seem to “work” without some structure that allows broad sets of policies to somehow go
together. And democratic representation may depend on people having some
understanding of that structure.” Indeed, a lack of such coherence is troubling for wellestablished theories of political representation and electoral choice, which demand that
citizens’ ideal preferences can be arrayed within a common dimensional space (Gerber and
Lewis, 2004). If citizens’ preferences are effectively nonideological or only weakly tied to
a particular party, then the representational fit between citizens and legislators is likely to
be poor and voting a quasi-random exercise (Downs, 1957; Enelow and Hinich, 1984).
Yet while Americans’ political preferences are not known for the quality of their
structure (e.g. Myers, Lupton, and Thornton, 2015; Kinder and Kalmoe, 2017), the fault
lines that demarcate Republicans and Democrats have crystallized over the previous two
decades (Pew, 2014). Recent polling, for example, indicates that the political values that
separate Democrats from Republicans segregate them into historically-divided “liberal”
and “conservative” groups—by 2014 the share of persons who expressed ideologicallyconsistent opinions across a range of issues including the environment, foreign, and the
scope of government had doubled from only 10 years previous (Pew Research Center,
2014). In turn, the scholarly attention to the coherence of public opinion has shifted from
the interdependence of political beliefs—which has, perhaps, always been difficult to
expect from the average, politically-disinterested citizen—to the extent to which
ideological preferences simply map onto partisan affiliation (i.e. partisan sorting).
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In part, the scholarly interest in sorting has grown because this concept represents
something of a common middle ground between warring interpretations of mass opinion
that simultaneously present the public as both principled and intractably divided
(Abramowitz and Saunders, 2008) and strikingly moderate (Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope,
2006).10 On the one hand, scholars find that Americans respond differently toward scandal
(Blais et al., 2010), economic events (Bartels, 2009; Popescu, 2013), and disregard factual
information based on partisan affiliation (Nyhan and Reifler, 2010)—even preferring their
family members not intermarry with individuals belonging to opposing political groups
(Kandler, Bleidron, and Riemann, 2012). On the other hand, the distribution of aggregate
ideological identification and policy attitudes within the mass public has remained
relatively consistent, stable, and moderate over time (Fiorina and Abrams, 2008; Kinder
and Kalmoe, 2017). In the words of a recent Pew Research Center report, “The way that
the public thinks about poverty, opportunity, business, unions, religion, civic duty, foreign
affairs, and many other subjects is, to a large extent, the same today as in 1987” (2012, 17).
Remaining agnostic about the extremity of citizens’ attitudes, the conventional
conceptualization of sorting simply implies that there is greater matching between ideology
and partisanship. On this point, there is broad agreement. Yet, this consensus masks two
acute problems. First, extant research confuses consistency among political attitudes and
identities (e.g. Levendusky, 2009). Why is this distinction important? Identities are critical
to how an individual thinks and evaluates, providing the “perceptual screen” through which
the larger socio-political environment is filtered (Campbell et al., 1960). These group
memberships are fundamentally different from the particularistic views, attitudes, or values
that individuals possess, which are often diverse and uncorrelated to the symbolic
ideological self-concept (Conover and Feldman, 1981; Malka and Llekes, 2010, pg. 180).
Conceptualizing sorting as some sort of omnibus concept that simultaneously accounts for
both of these facets—as prior research does—is similarly problematic.
Second, the interpretation of what sorting conveys remains a significant point of
conflict. For some, sorting is a fundamental component of the narrative that the mass public

One point of agreement, however, is that “social” polarization, or the degree to which
individuals negatively rate their political opponents relative their own party, not only exists
but has meaningfully increased (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes, 2012; Mason, 2015;
Hetherington, 2001).
10
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has become more polarized (Abramowitz and Saunders, 2008). For others, it stands as the
primary evidence that polarization has not occurred (Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope, 2010).
Still others have taken a more nuanced view that sorting represents a facet of mass
polarization, but that sorting might occur without a concomitant increase in the extremity
of mass attitudes (Baldassarri and Gelman, 2008; Garner and Palmer, 2011).

1.2.1

Defining sorting

In order to qualify these claims, let us begin with a fresh depiction of sorting. Conceptually,
sorting reflects the systematized arrangement of things by some predetermined criterion.
Partisans might sort by geographical location (Bishop, 2008; Mummolo and Nall, 2016),
for example, or within their social relationships (Huber and Malhotra, 2017). Here,
however, I am primarily concerned with sorting as a behavioral phenomenon in which
attitudes, values, beliefs, and identities can be categorized according to the criterion of the
ubiquitous left-right ideo-political framework. Within the two-party political landscape of
American politics, this organizational scheme of “left” and “right” conveniently
demarcates liberals from conservatives and Democrats from Republicans, respectively,
such that sorting occurs when one’s liberal-conservative preferences converge with
partisanship (Levendusky, 2009).
Although I will discuss the elements that comprise this sorting in greater detail in
Chapters 1 and 2, it is appropriate for now to quickly establish working definitions of these
terms for clarity’s sake. Beginning first with partisanship, it is well-established that partisan
identification encompasses an individual’s political self-concept (Green and Schickler,
1993; Green 1999; Huddy, Mason, and Aaroe, 2015). Drawing on decades of socialpsychological research dating back to the early Michigan studies (Campbell et al., 1960),
this perspective conveys that a partisan identity not only reflects profound psychological
attachments to a particular party, but “helps the citizen locate him/herself and others on the
political landscape” (Campbell et al., 1986, pg. 100). In other words, partisanship provides
the formal organizational moorings that spatially orient individuals within the political
landscape.
Attempting to define the corresponding, though more nebulous concept of
“ideological preferences,” however, is more complicated. There is nothing particularly
immutable about ideology; rather, it is the product of social forces, elite strategy, and
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colloquial use by elites (Ellis and Stimson, 2012). Leaving aside for a moment the older
literature’s treatment of “ideology” as a systematized belief system (i.e. Converse, 1964),
I am interested in both ideological identity—psychological attachment to ideological
groups—and the particular attitudes and beliefs that otherwise comprise this system—what
are commonly referred to as policy preferences. While the former explicitly adopt the
labels liberal and conservative, the latter are “ideological” in the sense that they can be
characterized according to a liberal-conservative scheme that characterizes their realistic
use by political commentators, elites, and even citizens themselves.11
For our purposes, individuals are sorted when their policy preferences fall to the
“right” (“left”) of moderate and they profess to be a Republican (Democrat).12 Conversely,
if an individual’s partisanship is incongruent to these attitudes, say, a Democrat who is prolife or prefers limiting government spending, then this person is “unsorted” on these
particular partisanship-policy pairings. By aggregating together the many possible
partisanship-policy dyads that an individual might possess, we can envision a continuum
that ranges from completely unsorted on one end, where partisanship bears an inverse
relationship to the ideological character of an individual’s preferences, to fully-sorted on
the other end, where there is full congruence between partisanship and these sentiments.13
But how does this sorting differ from polarization? To better illustrate the potential
differences between these concepts, Figure 1.1 provides a series of helpful diagrams. Panel
A portrays a hypothetical, heterogeneous distribution of an electorate, wherein individuals
are split into different partisan groups (vertical bars) across ideological categories (arrayed
along the x-axis).

Put another way, these “ideologies are the shared framework of mental models that
groups of individuals possess that provide both an interpretation of the environment and a
prescription as to how that environment should be structured” (Parsons, 1951, pg. 24).
12
Presumably, it is also possible for Independents / moderates to be “sorted,” insofar as
these neutral categories match, although this is a much less consequential form of
matching.
13
But what about persons who identify as “Independent” and “moderate” in their partisan
and ideological affiliation? By the definitional criteria employed here, such individuals
would be as “sorted” as partisans with matching and strong ideological preferences (perfect
overlap). By ignoring gradations in the strength of these constructs, past research
effectively treat respondents with weak (if not “neutral”) orientations the same as those
with “strong ones.” This problematic aspect is a further justification for moving beyond
this simple “matching” criterion.
11
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A: Hypothetical population;
neither sorted nor polarized

B: Sorted, but not polarized
population
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Notes: Each panel represents hypothetical electorate, where the sum of all
respective bars in a panel total 100 percent of persons in population.

Figure 1.1. Hypothetical Distribution of Ideology by Partisanship

This population is neither particularly sorted nor polarized; individuals are more
or less evenly split among the three categories of political affiliation and are evenly
distributed across the various ideological categories. Panel B illustrates how this population
changes if it becomes sorted, but not polarized. Here, the distinguishing feature of a sorted
but not polarized population is that the population of independents remains, even as the
categorization of partisans into the correct ideological groups increases markedly. In other
words, the overall population of partisans does not change; instead the distribution of
partisans in the “correct” ideological category changes. Whereas polarization implies that
individuals have become more extreme in the distribution of their political or ideological
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preferences, sorting merely implies that the composition of individuals’ preferences is, in
the parlance of an older literature, “constrained” (Converse, 1964). However, while sorting
can occur without individuals becoming tangibly more extreme in their partisan
orientations, what happens if the proportion of party identifiers remains constant, yet the
strength of those attachments increase? This question highlights the difficulty and, indeed,
the confusion generated by artificially prying such matching (sorting) apart from the
distribution (extremity, polarization) of the survey response.
Unlike Panel B, Panel C portrays an electorate that is starkly polarized but not
well-sorted. This is polarization without any attendant matching between partisanship and
ideology. Here, the lack of Independent identifiers conveys that individuals have fled the
neutral core of political affiliation such that the population has polarized into two distinct
and separate groups, yet these partisan groups are not marked by matching ideological
preferences. In other words, there is little sorting. This type of scenario is probably unlikely
for obvious reasons: what generates deeply-divided partisans if not ideology? Thus, Panel
D illustrates both a sorted and polarized population, wherein the population of individuals
are completely split between the Democratic and Republican parties who are,
consequently, correctly divvied up between the correct, corresponding ideological groups.
This is the scenario in which the starkest political divisions are observed, where individuals
not only flock toward the parties but become “correctly” ideological in the process.
Which of these portrayals faithfully depicts the shape of mass public opinion in
America? In a vacuum, such as this, it is perhaps easier to differentiate between contrived
examples of sorting and polarization than in practice. It is clear that, on some level, these
two phenomena are inherently, if not intimately, related—it would be a very odd population
indeed that was polarized but not sorted. This is perhaps why Fiorina (2012, 2) notes that
“Of all the misconceptions associated with discussions of political polarization, none is
more common than the confusion between party sorting and polarization.” In part, this
confusion is the probably the result of a lack of terminological precision—Levendusky
(2009) notes that “party polarization” is sometimes used interchangeably with “sorting,”
even though “polarization” implies a change in the extremity of an individual’s views while
sorting does not. To recover some sensibility in this debate, and to decipher the shape of
Americans’ preferences, let us turn to outlining a definition of sorting that speaks to these
concerns.
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1.2.2

What is the extent and nature of sorting?

While Fiorina (2012) notes that the two processes of sorting and polarization are not
mutually-exclusive, the existing literature struggles to fully explicate the relationship
between these concepts. Hazarding the risk of pedantry, a major problem with a firm
distinction between sorting and polarization rests on the fact that the extant literature
essentially dichotomizes individuals’ partisan and ideological preferences to identify
whether an individual is sorted. As Levendusky (2009, pg. 44-45) writes, a citizen is sorted
“when his position is on the same side of moderate as that of his national party elites—a
sorted Democrat takes a liberal position; a sorted Republican takes a conservative one.”
Yet this seems to be a gross simplification regarding the true nature of one’s preferences.
In fact, individuals identify as “strong” or “weak” ideologues and hold opinions that
similarly range in strength—in other words, they vary in the degree to which they identify
as a liberal or a conservative and the degree to which they support, for example, expanding
government spending or supporting access to abortion.
This is not a purely semantic distinction. We could sort attitudes like laundry,
differentiating between liberal and conservative responses as if we were parceling lights
from darks, but this inevitably loses a great deal of interesting variation within these
responses. For instance, this scheme cannot differentiate between the matching of “weak”
and “strong” ideological preferences to an individual’s partisanship. Instead a Republican
who possesses weak conservative preferences across, say, the extent of government
spending and the provision of public healthcare, is considered as “sorted” as a Republican
who espouses extremely conservative opinions across those items, respectively. Yet if
variation within these preferences exists, then an appropriate conceptualization of sorting
should not only capture simple categorization but also the strength of those attendant
relationships, more faithfully capturing the extent to which a person is sorted.
Ironically, when scholars have traditionally spoken of political sorting as a
phenomenon in which partisanship and ideological preferences converge, they are
speaking about the extent to which these concepts are correlated—implying as much a
difference of degree as kind—even though the prevailing specification of sorting does not
account for such variation.14 Indeed, as Levendusky (2009, pg. 4-5) writes, “sorting is a
14

Although research examining partisan-ideological sorting does account for the strength
of these identities (e.g. Mason, 2015; Davis and Mason, 2015), it doesn’t theorize why
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changing correlation between partisanship and ideology, so that in a sorted electorate party
and ideology are more closely related (more correlated) than in an unsorted electorate.”
Yet this is a fundamentally different type of sorting than the definition of sorting found in
The Partisan Sort, which treats sorting as simply correctly-matched political preferences
without a compensatory notion of how well-matched those concepts actually are.
A second example illustrates this shortcoming, and, in the process, reveals another.
Recalling from Figure 1.1 that a sorted population needn’t be a “polarized” one, we would
expect a well-sorted population of partisans to resemble a horseshoe in the distribution of
their attitudes. Figure 1.2 introduces two items from the American National Election
Studies 2012 Time-Series survey, defense spending preferences and ideological selfidentification, to help illustrate how very different conclusions can be drawn about the
extent of sorting based on this measurement distinction. As Panels A and B indicate, there
is a noticeable “V” shape to the distribution of these responses. Republicans generally favor
increasing defense spending (conservative response), while Democrats prefer decreasing
such spending (liberal response); similarly, Republicans overwhelmingly identify as
conservatives and Democrats as liberals. In other words, it appears that citizens are
reasonably, if not similarly, sorted on these items.
Yet the discretization of responses to these “ideology” items hemorrhages
substantive information about their true relationship to partisanship. As Panel C illustrates,
the modal category of partisans’ defense spending preferences is actually the neutral,
midpoint response “keep spending the same.” Further, the vast majority of correctly-sorted
preferences cluster around this midpoint of the scale—partisans may manage to espouse
the correct response, but this relationship is weak (fewer than 10 percent of Republicans
and Democrats comprise the strongest category of “correct” preferences).
Panel D, like Panel C, illustrates that the simple expression of sorting-as-matching
obscures meaningful variation in how partisans are distributed across liberal-conservative
identity. However, a different portrait of sorting emerges here in that the distribution of
partisans across liberal-conservative identification is essentially bimodal, where responses
are skewed more toward the extremes than middle. Further, relative defense spending
attitudes, higher rates of sorting on ideological identity exist. Although there is not a perfect
these distinctions are important or consider how they shape sorting across policy
preferences.
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“V” shape to the distribution of responses—the existence of which would be indicative of
sorting and polarization—both the fit between partisanship and ideological identity is
stronger than defense spending preferences.
A: 3-Category defense spending

B: 3-Category ideology
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Notes: Partisan groups aggregate “strong,” “weak,” and “leaner” categories of identification.

Figure 1.2. “Ideology” by Partisanship, 2012 ANES Time-Series
The benefit of conceptualizing sorting in the terms of Panels C and D is twofold.
First, these illustrations convey that Americans are not particularly “polarized” in their
responses to survey items tend to only modestly skew toward the distributional extremes.
Second, by extension, they indicate that individuals are not uniformly sorted on different
types of ideological preferences. If Fiorina (2012, pg. 3) is correct in asserting that “sorting
is more often a compositional phenomenon—rather than change their views, the categories
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to which people belong change,” then the relationship between liberal-conservative and
partisan identification may be qualitatively different than the connection between policy
attitudes and partisanship.
Why is it problematic that the prevailing theoretical and empirical
operationalization of sorting has traditionally weighted ideological self-identification
equivalent to attitudinal ideological preferences? Because it conflates, in the parlance of
Ellis and Stimson (2012), a symbolic, or identity-based, form of ideology with an
operational, or attitudinal-based, one. This is a vital distinction. They write that
symbolic ideology is a representation of how citizens
think about themselves: whether they consider their views
to be liberal, conservative, moderate, or something else.
Operational ideology is grounded more explicitly in
concrete decisions, what citizens think the government
should or should not be doing with respect to important
matters of public policy (2012, pg. 11).
Although these concepts are closely intertwined at the elite level—conservative elites
support conservative policies, and liberal elites, liberal ones (McCarty, Poole, and
Rosenthal, 2006; Lupton, Myers, and Thornton, 2015)—at the individual level, “it is
another matter entirely” (Ellis and Stimson, 2012, pg. 11; see also: Kinder and Kalmoe,
2017; Hill and Tausanovitch, 2015). If individuals’ attitudes do not conform to a
unidimensional framework (e.g. Feldman and Johnston, 2014), then this absence of
systematic ordering has implications for the relationship between ideology and partisan
identity. In particular, sorting on ideological attitudes (i.e. policy preferences) ought to be
distinct from sorting on ideological identity (i.e. the categories to which people belong).

1.3

Outline of the dissertation

This dissertation proceeds in two parts. In Part 1, I build on the foregoing discussion of
problems with the prevailing understanding of partisan sorting. In doing so, I show that
identity- and issue-sorting constitute two unique facets of the socio-political features that
divide Americans. Chapter 1 reviews the extant scholarly literature regarding partisanship
and ideology, or the raw materials of sorting. Drawing on this research, I operationalize
two types of sorting in Chapter 2 and compare how different measurement protocols affect
the characterization of public opinion. I find that the extent to which individuals are sorted
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is much more modest than the proportion of individuals who merely match ideology to
partisanship. Although the popular description of sorting is that “Americans are
increasingly sorted into think-alike communities that reflect not only their politics but their
demographics” (Pew, 2016), this sorting is—in many ways—more superficial than many
realize. Finally, Chapter 3 provides a series of empirical tests that justify partitioning
sorting into identity- and policy-based constructs.
The second part of this dissertation is devoted to the study of identity-based
sorting, with a particular focus on the antecedents and consequences of this phenomenon.
Given that political identities are the fundamental constructs from which Americans reason
and navigate the political environment, understanding the nature of sorted identities is a
pressing concern for both theoretical and practical reasons. Chapter 4 takes up the question
of why individuals’ identities converge. Prior research posits that elite cues generate greater
matching between partisan and ideological preferences—that is, elite polarization causes
mass sorting. However, while the underlying spatial model of politics employed in this
logic is intuitive, two problems plague this account. First, different cues shape different
forms of sorting. Second, group memberships bias individuals’ understanding of where
parties and their policy approaches fit within ideological space. These biases figure
prominently into the calculus of sorting: I find that sorting is related to asymmetric
perceptions of out-group dissimilarity rather than relative perceptions of between-group
differences.
Chapter 5 explores how this sorting affects compromise. While amicable
intergroup communication is vital to both civil political discourse and to political
compromise, identity sorting creates demands on the extent to which individuals are
willingness to compromise. These findings, however, come with a caveat: well-sorted
Republicans are much less likely than well-sorted Democrats to believe that compromise
is an important and desire quality in principle. Fascinatingly, however, when compromise
is operationalized as the extent to which individuals are willing to concede concessions to
the “other side,” these differences between citizens with left- and right-leaning identities
disappear. Further, and perhaps alarmingly, I discover that, even in the absence of
consistent policy preferences, identity-sorting is sufficient to decrease an individual’s
propensity to belly-up to the bargaining table. These findings help explain both the
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consequences of tribal political identities and why sorting poses a particularly acute
problem for democratic exchange.
Finally, Chapter 6 examines how identity sorting alters the decisional criteria that
voters utilize to select political candidates. Presenting survey-takers with different
depictions of candidates in policy space, I show that sorted individuals eschew proximately
“optimal” candidates in favor of more extreme ones. In effect, while persons who exhibit
high levels of sorting perceive that they are choosing ideologically-proximate candidates,
there is a significant disconnect between perceived and objective ideological congruence.
Sorting, then, is a sufficient condition for pushing citizens toward more extreme
candidates—even when individuals’ issue preferences suggest that their “best” candidate
is considerably more moderate. These findings help explain how sorting, in turn,
exacerbates elite polarization. The well-sorted citizen behaves in ways that generate
representational extremity, even as he or she possesses a mixed of inconsistent preferences.
Taken as a whole, this dissertation both refines the extant logic of sorting and
pushes this research into new territory. In demonstrating that identity-based sorting
constitutes a unique and particularly powerful political phenomenon, I reveal why concern
over the systematic coherency of mass opinion is, perhaps, misplaced. Politics largely
trades on the power of symbolic information (Achen and Bartels, 2016), which often
obscures the type of nuance needed to fully comprehend and solve complex socio-political
problems. If symbolic cues generate identity sorting, and identity sorting, in turns,
endangers commitment to deliberative democratic exchange and increases the
attractiveness of extremist representation, then scholars might consider shifting a focus on
the (lack of) systematic constraint that constitutes the average citizen’s belief system and
instead scrutinize the tribal, group-based divisions that reduce compromise and amplify
rigid political behavior. It is this sorting that contributes to intemperate and polarized
politics.
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Chapter 2: The Raw Materials of Sorting
“Politics doesn’t seem to “work” without some structure that allows
broad sets of policies to somehow go together.”
- Feldman (2003, pg. 478)

2.1

Introduction

The study of sorting has been described as “an investigation of how voters align their party
identification and ideological beliefs over time” (Levendusky, 2009, pg. 7). This is
unquestionably true. However, the study of sorting also involves the study of both
partisanship and ideology—separately and jointly. In other words, to understand the
contours of the mass public’s sorting, it is necessary to understand the complexity of these
constructs.
In fact, while the scholarly interpretation of partisanship as a durable set of
emotional attachments has withstood almost sixty years of inquiry, the study of ideology
has puzzled and frustrated scholars. In particular, the exact relationship between
individuals’ various policy attitudes and identification as a liberal or conservative is murky.
Attitudes and identities are interlinked, yet they reflect different aspects of the cognitive
and psychological processes that underscore an individual’s political preferences.
Problematically, the prevailing sorting literature has ignored warnings that these
forms of ideology are not interchangeable (e.g. Conover and Feldman, 1981; Malka and
Llekes, 2010; Devine, 2015). Levendusky’s (2009, pg. 4) work represents the single
comprehensive text on partisan sorting in American politics, and his treatment of ideology
is emblematic of this point. He writes that
I focus here on indicators of ideology—respondents’
liberal-conservative self-identification and their issue
positions on a variety of different policies. While there is
some controversy about the self-identification measure in
the literature (Conover and Feldman, 1981), I use it here
as a summary indicator of the respondent’s outlook on
politics (for similar uses, see Zaller, 1992; Hetherington,
2001; Sniderman and Carmines, 1997). Using both
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measures together will allow me to demonstrate that
sorting is not simply an artifact of a particular measure.
Yet, the conceptual, much less empirical, expression of sorting is very much the product
of these underlying indicators. While there is some overlap between ideological selfidentification and issue-based ideology, a growing body of work conveys that these are
distinct facets of ideology (Malka and Llekes, 2010; Devine, 2015)—that these facets of
ideology are not so similar that they can be exchanged as substitutes or even treated as
direct analogs. This disconnect is consequential for understanding the shape and scope of
sorting in that the relationship of partisanship to these various “ideological” elements may
not be uniform. Taking these differences seriously, this chapter provides the theoretical
framework that justifies splitting sorting into identity- and issue-based constructs.

2.2

What is partisanship?

The canonical view of partisanship as a social-psychological construct is rooted in the early
work of Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes’ (1960, pg. 143) work in The American
Voter, which conceptualized partisan identification as “an affective attachment to an
important group object in the environment.” This emotional affinity for a party was
described as both durable and encompassing, and, to the extent that these preferences were
socialized in the home, partisan identification was presumably stable over the course of an
individual’s lifetime.15 Only a serious event of extraordinary intensity might shake the
fixity of this support.
This interpretation, which stylizes partisan affiliation as exogenous to policy
preferences, has occasionally been challenged on the grounds that partisanship ought to be
construed as a summary set of (cognitive) evaluations of the parties (Fiorina, 1981). In this
case, citizens function as good Bayesians who update their partisanship according to
experiential evidence (Achen, 1989; Gerber and Green, 1998). Thus, partisanship is not so
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Lost in the ensuing years, however, Campbell and colleagues (1960) did warn against
caricaturizing partisanship as exclusively emotional ties. They noted that while
partisanship appeared to influence attitudes more than attitudes influenced partisanship,
this finding was conceivably restricted to the time-period of inquiry and not necessarily
generalizable beyond that narrow window (1960, pgs. 133-135).
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much an “unmoved mover” or “perceptual screen” that filters information, but a running
tally of judgments without independent causal significance.16
Be that as it may, the generally accepted, if not hegemonic, interpretation of
partisan identification is deferential to the Michigan school’s original formulation of this
concept as a vested, emotional attachment (Lewis-Beck et al., 2008; Bartels, 2002; Huddy,
Mason, and Aaroe, 2015). In particular, recent scholarly work has returned to the groupbased qualities of partisanship, arguing that these psychological affinities for parties can
be interpreted through the lens of social identity theory (Greene, 1999; Huddy, Mason, and
Aaroe, 2015).17 Social identities involve the incorporation of a particular group
membership into an individual’s self-concept, what Tajfel (1981, pg. 255) describes as the
combination of group membership “together with the value and emotional significance
attached to membership.” The foundations of social identities are prominently driven by a
need for positive distinctiveness where one’s own group is favorably prioritized relative an
out-group in such a way that members are motivated to protect or advance their own party’s
status.18 Unlike belonging to a club to which an individual might pay yearly membership
dues and little else, this membership includes “an awareness of similarity, in-group
identity, and shared fate with others who belong to the same category,” which has
“pervasive effects on what people think and do” (Klandermans, 2014, pg. 5). In other
words, a social identity is a highly valued group membership that structures how people
think about and behave within their immediate environment (Huddy, 2013).
16

Yet even this approach has received its share of criticism for expecting too much out of
a single, uni-dimensional measure. “45 years ago a single indicator called party
identification was commissioned to perform too many tasks,” writes Johnston (2006, pgs.
339-340), and “…it does seem clear that real heterogeneity—beyond that of direction and
intensity—is being shoehorned into a single procrustean indicator.” Weisberg’s (1981)
work was an attempt to reconcile some of these issues, but has mostly lost in the scrum
over whether issues or group attachments underscore partisanship.
17
In fact, Campbell and colleagues understood partisanship as a form of group attachment
not unlike various racial or religious groups, a depiction that Greene (1999) notes was years
ahead of its time.
18
These motivations may have some evolutionary basis. Evolutionary psychologists stress
the necessity of group coordination for basic activities like child-rearing, group defense,
and even the production of basic goods (Sidanius and Kurzban, 2013). Within this
perspective, the internalized attachment to a particular group evolved as a functional
necessity for survival. In a post-material context, where safety and the availability of goods
are no longer concerns, however, the psychological benefits of belonging to a group are
perhaps sufficient conditions for the continued relevance of such memberships.
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For many citizens, partisanship fits this description. Not only do partisans intensely
favor group members over non-group members (Iyengar, Sood, and Llekes, 2012; Mason,
2015), but partisan identification strongly biases how individuals interpret information
(e.g. Bartels, 2002; Leeper, 2014; Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus, 2013; Iyengar and
Westwood, 2014). Further, because elections are competitions that produce significant
material and psychological benefits to participants, individuals engage in behaviors
consistent with and on behalf of their group—behavior consistent with the expectations of
social identity theory. Huddy, Mason, and Aaroe (2015), for example, provide
experimental evidence that this sociological interpretation of partisanship explains such
behaviors better than a purely psychological model. Much like the passionate fan who
cheers their favorite team in the heat of a competition, partisans’ internalized sense of
partisan identity is intimately related to their group’s victories and defeats; it is personal,
rooted deeply within an individual’s subconscious (Theodoridis, 2013).
This understanding of partisanship as a social identity complements the
conceptualization of parties as groups whose central or primary motivation is the
accumulation of power. Schumpeter (1942) argues that the classic (Burkean) stylization of
parties as groups of individuals bound together by common principles is naïve.
Acknowledging that parties will, of course, espouse certain principles that will be vital to
their success in much the same way a department store’s success is related to certain brands,
he argues that the department store can no more be defined in terms of its individual brands
than a party might be defined in light of its particular principles. Instead, a “party is a group
whose members who propose to act in concert in the competitive struggle for political
power” (1942, pg. 238). This dissertation proceeds on the assumption that this competitive
struggle for power feeds into the group-based nature of partisanship; that what it means to
be a Republican and Democrat is not so much contingent upon what the parties stand for,
but that these orientations ultimately comprise more primal attachments.19 Thus,
partisanship reflects how individuals think of themselves as a “Democrat,” “Republican,’
or “Independent” (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler, 2002, pg. 137).20
19

Still, this is not to say that partisanship contains no basis in issue preferences. Rather,
this interpretation merely suggests that the average citizen conceptualizes partisanship in
terms of group affiliation rather than issue-based preferences.
20
There is some question of whether or not unaffiliated partisans—“independents” and, to
a lesser extent, independents who “lean” toward one of the parties—might conceptualize
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Still, if this form of group identity provides locational information that helps
citizens place themselves and other actors within the political landscape (Campbell et al.,
1986, pg. 100), then the positions that distinguish parties from each other should not be
entirely irrelevant to understanding why individuals choose to affiliate with a given party.
Thus, while “it would be naïve to suggest that either at the time of its inception or at the
time of election, the members of a party are bound together solely by the force and
rationality of an ideological stance,” it is also the case that “political parties tend to
rationalize the existing interests of groups or classes supporting them and articulate issues
in ideological terms…they play the game of power in the name of an ideology” (Ashraf
and Sharma, 1983, pg. 89). Understanding how individuals think about and conceive of
these stances and, ultimately, connect them back to their partisan identity, lies at the heart
of understanding sorting and is the task to which we now turn.

2.3

What is ideology?

Classic democratic theory is demanding of citizens. It requires them to pay close attention
to current events, to engage in political discussion and debate with their peers, and,
ultimately, to participate in electoral processes (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, 1954).
These requirements impose a substantial informational burden on the average person.
Rationally choosing a candidate or party to support not only demands that citizens possess
some basic knowledge about political processes, figures, and policy of the day (Delli
Carpini and Keeter, 1996), but that individuals possess sincere or orderable preferences
(Downs, 1957). Accompanying the latter requirement is the implication that the relation of
an individual’s preferences to each other is bound or organized by some unifying principle
or paradigmatic criterion (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, 1954; Converse, 1964).21
Ideology is the embodiment of those preferences.
Yet this idealized notion that individuals’ preferences are meaningfully structured
has been the subject of serious debate. Sociological approaches to the study of ideology

their independence from the Republican and Democratic Parties as its own from of identity.
But without clearly delineated group boundaries, much less group goals, it is difficult to
see how relevant independent identity might be for politics.
21
These demands are perhaps too great for the average citizen, however, whose return on
this investment is low. Schattschneider (1960) argues that this “problem” lies more with
the unrealistic expectations of classic democratic theory than with an apathetic public.
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allege, for example, that there is little organizational structure among specific beliefs (e.g.
Converse, 1964, 2000), while psychological perspectives tend to stress that the origins of
these preferences are often self-generated and only tenuously related to abstract political
ideas (e.g. Lane, 1973; Jackson and Marcus, 1975). Yet despite their differences, “these
two perspectives share a common concern with the question of whether people think
ideologically” (Conover and Feldman, 1984, pg. 95).
Ideology has been, and probably remains, one of the most ubiquitous—though
elusive—concepts in modern political discourse. Sartori (1969, pg. 398) describes the
frustrating opaqueness of ideology, writing that “the growing popularity of the term has
been matched, if anything, by its growing obscurity,” eventually concluding that “the word
ideology points to a black box.” Elsewhere, Mullins (1972) reflects on the ambiguous usage
of ideology and a seeming lack of an agreed-upon definition of its basic properties by
theorists and scientists alike. Converse’s lament that “a term like ‘ideology’ has been
thoroughly muddled by diverse uses” (1964, pg. 3) was perhaps more prescient than he
realized.22
Nevertheless, these definitional difficulties have not prevented the concept of
ideology from becoming a central component in the study of public opinion and political
behavior (Lee, 2009). How, then, should we understand this concept? Let us begin with a
simple definition of ideology as a benign organizing device that reflects the systematic
composition of interconnected values and beliefs (Knight, 2006; Gerring, 1997).
Traditionally, the various components that give this framework its structure are stylized
according to a hierarchical system of ordering, “bearing some loose resemblance to the
vertical line that might be pursued downward through an organization or political
movement from the narrow cone of top leadership, through increasing numbers of
subordinate officials” (Converse, 1964, pg. 2). This is not to say, however, that ideology is
rooted in strict syllogistic reasoning, where attitudes are deterministically linked to other
attitudes across value domains. Instead, the logic of ideology is sufficiently broad account
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In part, this confusion is the result of the divide between critical and value-neutral
approaches to the study of ideology, or the difference between a embracing a “critical, even
judgmental tone in describing and analyzing ideologies” and adopting a more value-neutral
position that can be indiscriminately used to describe any particular belief system of
attitudes and ideas (Jost, Federico, and Napier, 2009, pg. 309).
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for some countervailing preferences, although “ideologies must not repeatedly violate their
canons of sensibility” (Mullins, 1972, pg. 510).
Obviously, these frameworks are not value-neural. Parsons (1951, pg. 24, italics
mine) describes ideologies as “the shared framework of mental models that groups of
individuals possess that provide both an interpretation of the environment and a
prescription as to how that environment should be structured.” More recently, Krochick
and Jost (2010, pg. 146) write that ideology is a “socially shared belief system about how
society should conduct itself (and how it conducts itself at present).” In this way, ideology
reflects the underlying structure of beliefs inasmuch as it communicates the particular
character that they take, which reflects Freeden’s (1998) description of ideology as a
configuration of political concepts that decontests the indeterminate meanings that
inherently characterize such terms, enabling the construction of meaningful political
worlds.
Taken together, then, it is possible to conceptualize ideology as both the structural
framework of an individual’s worldview and as a normative blueprint relating to 1) the
appropriate allocation of power, and 2) the ends such power might be utilized to achieve
preferred goals. Put another way, ideology has been used to describe both the shape or
structure and, simultaneously, the character of one’s beliefs. This is a subtle, but perhaps
overlooked distinction that may be responsible for some amount of the confusion related
to this concept. As ideology relates to this project, however, I am less interested in the
interrelationship of attitudes inasmuch as I am concerned with how an individual’s liberalconservative preferences fit within left-right political space relative partisanship. Thus, in
this application, ideology is treated as a blanket term that embodies an individual’s beliefs,
attitudes, and sense of group identity within the liberal-conservative framework.23

2.3.1

The liberal-conservative conflict

In its contemporary American use, ideology reflects conflict among two countervailing
political perspectives embodied in the concepts “liberal “and “conservative,” which
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It should be noted, of course, that other ideologies exist—many even within the more
general liberal-conservative framework. For now, however, simplicity is our guide and this
distinction is the quantity of interest. When speaking about liberal-conservative identity or
attitudes, I qualify “ideology” with the associated term.
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juxtaposes philosophical differences in approaches to social change and the distribution of
economic goods within a single “left-right” dimension (Jost et al., 2009).24 Historically,
this conflict dates back at least as far as the French Revolution, where liberalism conveyed
support for freedom from state intervention in social and economic domains and opposition
to the influence of the monarchy, Church, and aristocracy, conservatism reflected, if not
outright support, then cautious skepticism over dismantling those monarchical, religious,
and aristocratic institutions (Davies, 1996). In modern American political discourse,
however, these relationships are essentially inverted: the promotion of free markets and
minimal government is now associated with conservative approaches to governance and
the protection of governing institutions with liberalism.
At present, the terms “progressive,” “system change,” and “equality” are often
associated with the “left,” while terms like “system maintenance,” “order,” and
“individualism” are connected to the “right.” In American political discourse, the liberalconservative distinction is often used interchangeably with this left-right understanding of
political concepts. While a full accounting of the historical development of ideology in
America is beyond the scope of the present project (for a historical overview, I point
interested readers to Noel’s (2013) excellent book, Political Ideologies and Political
Parties in America), the purpose of the following section is to present the culturallystandard summaries of these concepts in order to contextualize how ideology matches with
to partisanship in the modern American political context.

American liberalism
In the aftermath of the Great Depression, it was proposed that institutions could redress
collective action problems associated with complicated social and economic dilemmas.
Government, according to then-President Franklin Roosevelt, was the principal agent
responsible for redressing these problems. Thus, he framed his New Deal programs in the
verbiage of “liberal” priorities, so chosen for the word’s positive connotations—free from
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More specifically, whereas liberalism conveyed support for freedom from state
intervention in social and economic domains and opposition to the influence of the
monarchy, Church, and aristocracy, conservatism reflected, if not outright support, then
cautious skepticism over dismantling those monarchical, religious, and aristocratic
institutions (Davies, 1996).
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any link to concepts like fascism, socialism, and communism that were both threatening
and unpopular in the mind of the public (Rotunda, 1986). According to Roosevelt (1941)
as new conditions and problems arise beyond the power
of men and women to meet as individuals, it becomes the
duty of Government itself to find new remedies with
which to meet them. The liberal party insists that the
Government has the definite duty to use all its power and
resources to meet new social problems with new social
controls.
These sentiments enjoyed great initial success in their implementation, forming the
backbone of the New Deal and Great Society programs, but, over time, the general
popularity of this assemblage of philosophical ideals waned. In fact, Stears (2007, pg. 87)
writes that “following decades of racial tension, student unrest, rising crime, and profound
difficulties in international affairs, explicitly liberal political ideals found few adherents.”
Nevertheless, these liberal ideals have played important long-term roles in shaping matters
of public policy: a plurality of Americans have long-preferred various government
interventions in the economy (Ellis and Stimson, 2012).25
At its core, modern American liberalism proposes that the assistance of the state is
central to shaping and promoting the welfare of a citizenry, drawing much of its intellectual
material from egalitarian principles. In terms of social policy, liberals have prioritized
freedom from coercion or intrusion on private decision-making. Often, this has centered
on maintaining a healthy separation of church and state insofar as liberals have resisted the
pressures that organized religion exert on matters of social policy. In particular, liberals
have advocated for fewer restrictions on matters of women’s health, including access to
birth control and abortion. Further, their sensitivity to the rights of disadvantaged groups
often leads them to advocate for special legal protections of African American’s, women’s,
and LGBTQ rights.
Economically, this egalitarianism conveys that success should not be governed by
the circumstances of birth, but by the application of one’s talents and abilities. Although
American social life is perhaps not as deeply stratified by class as other countries, liberals

25

There is obvious bleed-over between American liberalism and the more general
conception of, say, Lockean liberalism, which underscores modern democratic
governance itself.
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generally hold the position that an individual’s accomplishments in life are nevertheless
governed by the lottery of birth. Government, then, is viewed as a tool to utilize in evening
this unequal playing field (rather than the private sector). Specifically, government ought
to act in the economy in a variety of ways, to permit collective bargaining, to ensure a
minimum wage, and to guarantee that benefits such as old age pensions and health care
insurance are available to all. Moreover, because these programs are expensive, liberals
endure greater taxation to secure these services. Finally, while liberals support the premise
of the free market, governmental regulation is viewed as the appropriate brake on private
economic power that might, if left unchecked, be used to secure unfair benefits by
corporations and the rich. Thus, the government’s role is “to regulate the economic
environment to prevent such abuses” (Ellis and Stimson, 2012, pg. 4).

American conservatism
The concept of conservatism was somewhat slower to develop than its liberal counterpart
in American political discourse, even as Roosevelt and his supporters employed the term
as a mild rebuke throughout the 1930s (Rotunda, 1986). This negative usage didn’t stick,
however, and literary critic Lionel Trilling (1950, pg. ix) would later surmise that “it is the
plain fact that nowadays there are no conservative or reactionary ideas in general
circulation.” In fact, it wasn’t until the late 1950s that conservatism developed any real bite
as an intellectual alternative to the prevailing hegemony of public liberalism; in turn, it
took Goldwater’s presidential candidacy in 1964 to bring conservatism into the mainstream
and Reagan’s campaigning and presidency in the 1980s to crystalize what is now
recognizable as modern American conservatism.26
Three prominent strains of preferences can be traced throughout much of the
history of the conservative movement (Gross, Medvetz, and Russell, 2011). In his book,
The New American Right, Daniel Bell (1955, pg. 47-48) laid the foundation for a form of
social conservatism that “sought to impose older conformities on the American body
politic.”27 On a tangible level, this social conservatism emphasized that private citizens,
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It is worth noting, however, that this modern conservatism is perhaps dimensional, as
well, including derivatives like paleo- and neo-conservatism.
27
Perhaps less charitably, his approach ostensibly boiled down to an attempt to “stuff a
rapidly changing American society back into the box of a white, theologically
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families, and even communities were better judges of appropriate social norms than the
federal government, although the irony of this preference for traditional social life is that
it still required a strong federal government to enforce this version of social order.28
A second strand of influence within conservatism deals with the particular
influence of the Christian right, which imbued public conservatism with a moral quality
that is separate from a simple opposition to progressive social trends. Thorne (1990, pg. 8)
writes that “all contemporary American conservative thinkers hold two fundamental ideas:
a certain view of human nature and a certain conception of…moral order.” Although this
comity between religion and conservatism was a later development than the more general
suspicion of social progressivism outlined above, by the late 1980s, evangelicals had
imbued conservatism with a particular vision of moral and, therefore, social, order
(McGirr, 2001). Their influence ranged from attempting to ban the teaching of evolution
and sex education in schools to opposition movements over same-sex marriage, abortion,
and gambling to their support for the death penalty (see Blee and Creasap, 2010 for an
excellent review).
Finally, conservatism is associated with limited governmental interference in the
marketplace. While conservatives take seriously the notion of equal opportunity, they
generally argue that reducing inequality is best achieved with an open market rather than a
regulatory government (Friedman and Friedman, 1990). Ellis and Stimson’s (2012, pg. 6)
describes these economic preferences thusly: “free markets, whatever excesses they might
have, are seen as the single greatest pathway to long-run economic growth and prosperity,
and government intervention in them stifles both innovation and the ability of a citizenry
to allocate resources in a way that it sees fit.” Thus the policies preferred by conservatives
are generally designed to minimize the footprint of government on the activities of the
marketplace, informing a preference for private insurance, low government spending (with
the exception of defense spending), and lower taxes.

conservative, small-town vision of the good” (Gross, Medvetz, and Russell, 20xx, pg.
328).
28
This resistance to change also carried certain racial connotations, although the extent to
which this informs modern conservatism is heavily debated (Ansell, 2001). In particular,
it is difficult to separate how ostensibly nonracial values—like the appropriate role of
government—might be tinged with antiracial affect (Hutchings and Valentino, 2004).
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2.3.2

The dimensionality of ideology

Given these brief sketches of the stereotypic qualities of liberal and conservative ideology
outlined above, it seems theoretically parsimonious to juxtapose the labels liberal and
conservative as conceptual foils that could be arrayed as opposite intellectual approaches
within a single ideological continuum. Certainly this approach has historical roots. In a
1938 “fireside chat,” FDR intoned
Be it clearly understood, however, that when I use the
word “liberal,” I mean the believer I progressive
principles of democratic, representative government... the
opposing or conservative school of thought, as a general
proposition, does not recognize the need for Government
itself to step in and take action to meet these new
problems.
In fact, President Barack Obama’s more recent claim that “There’s not a liberal America
and a conservative America—there’s the United States of America” notwithstanding,
differences between liberals and conservatives can be observed across a variety of policy
domains (Jost et al., 2009).29 Yet there is, perhaps, a problem with this portrayal of
liberalism and conservatism as conceptual opposites in that this approach implicitly
assumes that liberals and conservatives share the same perceptual frameworks, where the
single difference separating these ideological approaches is that “their view is from
opposite sides of the field” (Conover and Feldman, 1981, pg. 619). Is this a reasonable
assumption? Does a single dimension adequately describe, much less guide, the mass
public’s preferences where liberals and conservatives are simple proscriptive opposites?
The answer to these questions is complicated and depends upon one’s level of
inquiry. A uni-dimensional, liberal-conservative framework does guide elite preferences.
Since the late 1960s, the voting behavior of Congressional legislators has exhibited limited
dimensionality, effectively reducing conflict to a single “liberal-conservative” dimension
(Poole and Rosenthal, 1997; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, 2006). More recently,
Lupton, Myers, and Thornton (2015) find evidence that this single dimension adequately
structures highly sophisticated Congressional delegates’ political preferences.
There is limited evidence, however, that the mass public thinks in these
distinctions. Converse (1964), for example, concluded that liberal-conservative-thinking
29

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A19751-2004Jul27.html
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was perilously low throughout the mass public. Elsewhere, Weisberg and Rusk (1970) find
that “social” issues like marijuana use, abortion, and the Equal Rights Amendment, which
crept into the political agenda during the 1970s, did not, at least initially, fit into the liberalconservative spectrum. Moreover, a growing body of work in both political science and
psychology conveys that this one-dimensional framework insufficiently captures the
significant heterogeneity within the mass public’s ideological beliefs (Feldman and
Johnston, 2014). Consider, for instance, the finding that individuals’ ideological selfdescriptions can be functionally independent of their actual policy preferences. It is odd
that individuals who self-identify as conservatives would prefer, on balance, liberal policy
preferences, yet this discordance is precisely what Ellis and Stimson (2012) observe. This
dovetails with research that indicates that citizens impose varying substantive
interpretations the liberal-conservative spectrum (Zumbrunnen and Gangl, 2008), that
economic and social preferences are often independent or distinct (Layman and Carsey,
2002; Rokeach, 1973; Feldman and Johnston, 2014; Duckitt, 2001), and that mass attitudes
are, more generally, characterized by a general lack of constraint among issue positions
(Myers, Lupton, and Thornton, 2015).30
This is not to say, however, that individuals’ attitudes are uninterpretable or do not
conform to any particular pattern. In fact, while Feldman and Johnston (2014) present
considerable evidence that there is enormous heterogeneity among citizens’ ideological
preferences, they find that a multidimensional solution to the structure of ideology
partitions individuals into coherent groups. Like Conover and Feldman (1984) and, more
recently, Moskowitz and Jenkins (2004), they argue that the reductionist tendency to
squeeze policy preferences into a simple linear continuum runs the risk of misrepresenting
how individuals actually think in practice. Instead, it appears that individuals’ attitudes are
at least minimally governed by a two-dimensional approach that only modestly relates to
the condensed, bipolar liberal-conservative continuum.31 In other words, the terms liberal
30

Zaller (1992) and Zaller and Feldman 19xx) offer that individuals may not hold fixed
attitudes at all; rather, survey responses are a mix of ambivalence and, occasionally,
opposing attitudes whereby individuals sample whatever information is most easily
accessible (i.e. top-of-the-head considerations).
31
Still, this not to say that the liberal-conservative framework is an anachronism. A robust
body of findings has demonstrated the usefulness and remarkable reliability of the liberalconservative ideological framework over time (Alford, Funk, and Hibbing, 2005; Bobbio,
1996; Jost et al., 2008; Baldassarri and Gelman, 2008).
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and conservative may be parsimonious theoretical foils, but, empirically, the mass public’s
attitudes may only weakly fit within this one-dimensional framework.

2.4

Disentangling ideology for the study of sorting

After more than fifty years of research on ideology, scholars remain frustrated at the lack
of resolution in the debate over 1) whether mass preferences conform to a general, idealized
spectrum, and 2) whether these preferences are related to each other in any systematic way.
This has not been for lack of trying (see Jost et al., 2009 for a review). There have been a
variety solutions targeted at resolving these issues, ranging from Achen’s (1975)
sophisticated work on instability in individuals’ survey responses vis-à-vis the reliability
of the survey instruments themselves to more recent work using latent empirical
approaches to identify dimensionality in ideology (Moskowtiz and Jenkins, 2004; Ellis and
Stimson, 2012; Feldman and Johnston, 2014; Claussen et al., 2015). Still, the lack of clear
consensus on the character of ideology has recently provoked the conclusion that “there is
little to be gained by rehashing a debate that has still not been resolved after more than 50
years of political science research” (Carmines and D’Amico, 2015, pg. 210).
Although this frustration is understandable, I disagree with its conclusions. The
implications of the extant body of work on ideology present some difficulty for the study
of sorting for an obvious reason: the criterion on which sorting is based—the left-right
ideo-political framework—is inherently one-dimensional, yet the components that
comprise sorting may not share this limited dimensionality. If these issues cannot be
resolved, then sorting, which literally relies on a one-dimensional, left-right classificatory
scheme, is a poor, if not irredeemable, approximation of the extent to which ideological
preferences do, much less ought to, map onto partisanship.
Thankfully, however, we need not throw the baby out with the bathwater, as a
number of solutions to address the complexity of ideology within the context of sorting are
available. Recent research that questions the suitability of the liberal-conservative
ideological framework notwithstanding, the left-right model of ideological structure has
“parsimony on its side and has fared surprisingly well in terms of theoretical utility and
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empirical utility” (Jost et al., 2009, pg. 310).32 Yet there is a key distinction between facets
of ideology that has serious implications for the study of sorting: ideological identity is
more strongly related to partisanship than is issue-based ideology—perhaps because while
liberal-conservative identity is effectively one-dimensional, liberal-conservative attitudes
are not.
In fact, ideological self-descriptions and the attitudes that populate belief systems
are not interchangeable concepts.33 While most contemporary samples of American survey
respondents convey that ideological self-identification within the liberal-conservative
space is reliably correlated with a varied range of policy preferences—including
preferences for decreased (increased) social welfare spending, progressive (traditional)
cultural-moral stances on issues like same-sex marriage and abortion, and decreasing
(increasing) the size and strength of the military (Malka and Llekes, 2010)—this does not
mean that liberal-conservative identity is a mirror-image concept of liberal-conservative
ideology. Specifically, even though the traditional understanding of the liberalconservative labels assumes that ideological self-identification is the product of issue
orientations or preferences, much of the mass public may not associate these terms with
issue-based meanings (Klingemann, 1979; Levitin and Miller, 1979; Conover and
Feldman, 1981).34 The classic example of this disconnect can be observed in the “symbolic-
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An immense literature demonstrates that the validity of ideological labels is high,
reliably predicting partisanship (citation), electoral choice (citation), news consumption
preferences (citation), and even elective affinities (citation).
33
The meaning of ideological self-identification has puzzled scholars. As Conover and
Feldman (1981 , pg. 621) ponder, if this concept is not issue oriented, that is, if issues are
only weakly related to why individuals choose to associate themselves with these groups,
then “what is the meaning associated with ideological labels?” On the one hand, ideological
identity shares some relationship to partisanship. Levitin and Miller (1979) note that
ideological self-identification seems to be some comment on the parties and their positions,
yet, on the other hand, ideology exerts independent force on behavioral outcomes relative
to partisan identification. Whatever commonality these items share, the question of their
shared nature remains.
34
Abramowitz and Saunders’ (2006) work is emblematic of the approach that holds that
issue attitudes are intimately related to ideological self-identification. Analyzing
Cronbach’s Alpha coefficients that account for coherence among policy issue attitudes
common to NES surveys and liberal-conservative self-placements, they find that these
items have become more internally consistent over time. But this work remains agnostic
on the point of whether issue attitudes or ideological self-identification are derivative from
the other.
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operational paradox,” which implies that Americans’ overwhelming favor the conservative
ideological label in spite of holding policy preferences that are, on balance, liberal (Ellis
and Stimson, 2012; Free and Cantril, 1967). Although symbolic ideology, the particular
ideological group with which individuals may align, is clearly related to their constellation
of particular issue attitudes, what has been termed operational ideology, a growing body
of research argues that these concepts should be analyzed separately on their own merits
(Conover and Feldman, 1981; Levitin and Miller, 1979; Popp and Rudolph, 2011; Devine,
2015; Mason, 2016).
One explanation for the meaning of ideological identification is to conceptualize
this response as a symbolic group attachment. Put another way, ideological identification
as a liberal or conservative is a powerful symbolic attachment to a particular group that
orients group members to their surroundings. Drawing again on social identity literature,
which notes that in-group identification, intergroup differentiation, and in-group bias result
from defining oneself as a group member, liberal-conservative identity should motivate
individuals to generate strong positive and negative feelings toward those individuals who
do not belong to their chosen ideological family. Roccas and Brewer (2002, pg. 50)
describe this process as one in which individuals “come to perceive themselves more as
the interchangeable exemplars of a social category than as unique personalities.”
Ideological self-identification, then, can be defined in light of these social or expressive
functions rather than particularistic attitudes. In other words, self-categorization as a
“liberal” should constitute a social identity where an individual’s self-perception as a
liberal draws from the shared experiential similarity with in-group members and as a point
of collective difference with those persons who identify with other ideological groups (e.g.
conservatives; e.g. Devine, 2015).
Separate this symbolic form of ideology, issue-based ideology reflects the beliefs
and dispositions that generate concrete choices regarding the appropriate role of
government (Ellis and Stimson, 2012). This is ideology as conventionally construed when
individuals talk about ideological position-taking and is emblematic of the many
considerations that individuals hold when they think about politics. They are what Erikson
and Tedin (2003, pg. 64) describe as a “set of beliefs about the proper order of society and
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how it can be achieved.”35 This is an elegant description in theory, but, in practice, the
operationalization of issue-based ideology is a great deal more complex in that does not
conform to uniform standard of a one-dimensional scale like that of elites. Instead, issuebased ideology appears to be something of a potpourri of countervailing or cross-pressured
preferences that only weakly convey a semblance of organization according to the
traditional understanding of the left-right continuum (Treier and Hillygus, 2009).
In light of these distinctions, theorizing about, much less measuring, sorting
requires greater attention to the underlying complexity of ideology. I propose that a better
way of considering the extent to which Americans’ ideological preferences match to
partisanship requires separating the relationship of between these two facets of ideology
and partisanship. In the next chapter, I begin to build the empirical case that shoehorning
both forms of “ideological” preferences into the calculus of sorting is a misguided approach
to measuring sorting. Drawing on the distinctions laid out in this chapter, I will argue that,
at least minimally, sorting should be broken into two separate components: an issue-based
form of sorting, which reflects the degree to which particular policy preferences overlap
with the partisan orientation, and a symbolic form of sorting, that accounts for the
convergence between ideological and partisan identity.

35

Any discussion of issue-based ideology must ultimately account for the quality of
attitudes found in opinion surveys. The idealized conception of public opinion
communicates that individuals hold well-founded, carefully constructed opinions about a
variety of socio-political phenomena. This description, however, is tenuous given
longstanding realities about low levels of political knowledge (Delli Carpini and Keeter,
1996), sophistication (citation), and psychological tendencies that allow citizens to
simultaneously hold both negative and positive dispositions toward attitude objects
(Lavine, Johnston, and Steenbergen, 2012; Zaller and Feldman, 1992). Approaching issuebased ideology from a dispositional perspective, that is, examining whether latent domains
structure opinions, releases researchers from holding a priori expectations about the
quality, character, and relationship among survey-based attitudes.
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Chapter 3: Defining Identity- and Issue-based Sorting
Sorting is a changing correlation between partisanship and ideology, so that, in
a sorted electorate, party and ideology are more closely related (more correlated)
than in an unsorted electorate.
~Levendusky, The Partisan Sort36

3.1

Introduction

The raw materials of sorting are a mix of evaluations, attitudes, and symbolic identities,
and, as the previous two chapters indicate, quantifying the extent to which partisanship has
converged with ideology requires taking these complexities seriously. Compositionally,
extant research relies on a simple expression of sorting: “conservative” responses to policy
questions and ideological identification are matched to identification with the Republican
Party, while “liberal” responses to these items are matched to Democratic Party affiliation.
The more items that fit into the appropriate partisan “bin,” the greater the sorting that must
exist. This approach is certainly an important part of the sorting calculus; correct
classification of terms is vital to the composition of sorting. Yet, focusing solely on
matching without also accounting for the distribution of opinion hemorrhages valuable
information about the extent to which individuals’ underlying attitudes and identities are
“extreme,” thereby blunting the insights that sorting can offer about the character of public
opinion—a key feature that lies at the heart of the larger debate regarding mass
polarization.
In this chapter, I argue that prior work on sorting suffers two serious
shortcomings—one theoretical, the other, empirical—and outline an approach to
measuring sorting that addresses these issues. Our first task is to recover the meaningful
variation that is lost when we treat the concept of sorting as a relationship between discrete
quantities. In effect, past work on partisan sorting treats the independent, leaning-partisan
who possesses extreme and consistent ideological preferences as empirically identical to
the strong partisan who possesses weak, though consistent, ones (c.f. Levendusky, 2009).

36

Levendusky (2009, pg. 4-5).
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The problem with collapsing this variation should be obvious in that it confounds values
that are theoretically distinct yet treated as empirical analogs.37
Concurrent to addressing these measurement issues, our second task in this chapter
is to disaggregate partisan sorting into identity- and policy-based constructs.38 As I have
alluded, the pivotal criteria for making this distinction hinges on the multifaceted nature of
ideology. Departing from The Partisan Sort’s approach, I argue that it is possible to
construct a measure of policy-based sorting to complement the identity-based one utilized
elsewhere (e.g. Mason, 2015; Davis and Dunaway, 2016).39 These concepts, while related,
are not mere analogs. In the next chapter, I empirically defend this line of reasoning, but,
for now, my goal is simply to outline the composition of these forms of sorting.
Finally, I conclude with a brief discussion about how the approach to quantifying
sorting outlined in this chapter offers insights into the disconnect between warring
interpretations of mass polarization. On the face of it, the narrative that the American mass
public is and has become more sorted over time is accurate. However, accounting for the
underlying extremity of both partisan and ideological preferences paints a less dramatic, if
not conclusive, portrait of mass opinion. While Americans are more likely to match their
partisanship to their ideological preferences, the extent to which the mass public has sorted
is modest. Thus, the common ground that sorting represents in the fight over whether
attitudes have become more or less extreme is not quite the panacea that scholars
sometimes suggest. If anything, convergence among the mass public’s preferences in the
aggregate remains, on balance, quite superficial.

3.2

Identity-based sorting

At its core, identity-based sorting reflects the integration between two forms of political
identities, the partisan and ideological self-concepts. As individuals become “better”
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Further, extending the data utilized by Levendusky (2009) by two additional election
cycles, I show that the predicted growth in sorting across a variety of issues has not
happened for half of the issues analyzed.
38
I use the terms “issue sorting” and “policy sorting” interchangeably.
39
While some research has examined identity sorting on its own merits (e.g. Mason, 2015;
Davis and Dunaway, 2016), issue-sorting has received virtually no attention outside of
Levendusky’s (2009) original work. Further, no research explicitly juxtaposes these two
concepts to examine their relationship to each other.
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sorted, their political identities move into alignment within left-right space, where
Democrats identify as liberals and Republicans, conservatives. In this section, I first discuss
the prevailing operationalization of partisan and ideological identities before specifying the
mathematical expression that captures how these identities combine.

3.2.1

Liberal-conservative ideological identity

Symbolic ideology, or liberal-conservative identification, is a “representation of how
citizens think about themselves: whether they consider their views to be liberal,
conservative, moderate, or something else” (Ellis and Stimson, 2012, pg. 11).40 While there
are a number of approaches to understanding the nature of this self-description, recent
research argues that ideological identity reflects a form of social identity (Devine, 2015).41
Within social psychology, an identity comprises conceptualizing the self as a member of a
particular category, a process termed “self-categorization” (Terry, Hogg, and White, 2000;
Turner, 1991). A given identity exists at a certain place and time and is, at least partially, a
function of the cultural and discursive contexts that are unique to that time and place
(Huddy, 2001). For example, “categorizing oneself as a “‘conservative’ will…constitute a
social identity when one’s self-perception as conservative is experienced as a point of
similarity with other ingroup members and as a point of collective difference with outgroup
members” (Malka and Llekes, 2010, pg. 160). In this telling, the particular meaning of the
ideological self-concept conveys an emotive, symbolic attachment to a particular
ideological group.
When pollsters ask individuals to report on the nature of their ideological selfconcept, however, the survey item often used to capture their responses does not explicitly
frame ideological affiliation in terms of these group-based attachments. Instead,
individuals are simply asked to place their views within a spectrum or scale ranging from
“liberal” to “moderate” to “conservative” (one could be forgiven, then, for treating
This self-reflection might be objectively “accurate” in the sense that the many things an
individual believes actually comport with this label, but, as I have previously noted, it is
possible for this self-concept to be functionally independent of issues.
41
Although this is not to say that this label is wholly devoid of policy-based meaning.
These labels are not merely rhetorical devices, but do probably reflect some sort of
“summary” of one’s underlying policy preferences. That said, for the average politically
unknowledgeable and disinterested citizen, the quality of the issue content of these labels
is debatable (Malka and Llekes, 2010).
40
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responses to this question as a “summary evaluations” rather than an indication of a unique
form of social identity). Be that as it may, I will later demonstrate that these responses
exhibit properties associated with social identities, even though the instrument is somewhat
vague. Within this response set, left-leaning orientations comport to lower values and
higher values conservative ones, ranging from “extremely liberal,” coded 1, to “extremely
conservative,” coded 7.42
40
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Figure 3.1. The Traditional Measurement of Ideological Identification

Figure 3.1 depicts the distribution of responses to the traditional liberalconservative self-placements within the 1984-2012 ANES Time-Series surveys. Strikingly,
the modal response category for this survey question is “moderate,” although pooling all
“liberal” and “conservative” responses together indicates that a plurality of the mass public
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While this response set is more or less continuous, Treier and Hillygus (2009) go so far
as to argue that ideological self-identification should be operationalized as a nominal rather
than an ordinal variable. In their estimation, moderates are not wholly moderate, which
gives a false impression about the directionality or mixture of their preferences. Be that as
it may, this ordinal response format is almost universally utilized.
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identifies with one of the two major ideological groups.43 However, it is worth noting that
there are few individuals who readily identify with the ideological extremes compared to
the more modest categories—an observation that immediately casts some suspicion on
claims that the mass public is ideologically “extreme.”

3.2.2

Partisan identification

As the prior chapter suggests, partisan identification has been simultaneously
conceptualized as both an evaluative orientation in that it compromises a generalized and
enduring response to an object (Petty and Cacioppo, 1981) and as a form of group
attachments (Campbell et al., 1960). These are not necessarily mutually-exclusive
interpretations (Greene, 2002), but the measurement of partisanship does introduce some
amount of ambiguity as to the nature of what, precisely, scholars’ measurement tools are
picking up when they attempt to quantify an individual’s partisan attachments.
Nevertheless, it appears to be the case that the traditional approach to measuring
partisanship “is better suited to measuring partisanship as group belonging than as an
attitude” (Greene, 2002, pg. 174), if for no other reason that it explicitly asks individuals
to first categorize themselves as a group member. This step is a critical component of the
general social identity approach to measuring group identities in that such selfcategorization is vital to uncovering group membership (Tajfel, 1978).
The traditional measurement of partisanship utilizes a branching set of survey
items that first ask respondents whether they consider themselves to be a “Democrat,”
Republican,” or an “Independent.” If individuals select one of the two party offerings, they
are then asked to identify how strongly they feel about those group ties (this is where the
“Michigan” measurement strategy muddies the water between group identity and
evaluative attitude). For those individuals who first selected Independent identification, a
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Perhaps not unsurprisingly, the actual framing of these questions is important to the
responses given. Robinson and Fleishman (1988) find widespread evidence of “house
effects” in the measurement of the liberal-conservative self-concept, noting that, while
varying the number of response categories does not necessarily alter the observed ratio of
liberals to conservatives, the middle response category does see systematic movement
depending on how polling firms describe the midpoint of this scale and whether they give
respondents the option of selecting “haven’t thought much about this,” or “don’t know”
responses.
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follow-up question asks whether these respondents “lean” toward one of the parties.44
These persons are classified as “partisan leaners,” while those who do not deviate from
Independent identification are treated as “pure” Independents.
Values on this seven-category partisanship item range from 1, “strong Democrat,”
to 7 “strong Republican.” Figure 3.2 portrays the distribution of these responses within the
1984-2012 ANES Time-Series. Democrats comprise the plural group with which
individuals associate. Unlike the more normal distribution of ideologues presented in
Figure 3.1, the proportion of partisans in the varying categories of partisan strength tends
to increase as we transition from weaker identities to stronger ones. Finally, note that
relatively few individuals identify as pure Independents.
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Figure 3.2. The Traditional Measure of Partisanship
3.2.3

Constructing a measure of identity-based sorting

To construct a measure of identity sorting, I first construct a measure of overlap between
partisan and ideological identification. I then take the product of the resulting overlap term
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From a practical standpoint, these leaners are not that dissimilar to regular—and even
strong—partisans (Keith et al, 1986).
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and the “strength” of the two identity items used to generate that value (c.f. Mason, 2015).
To generate the overlap between identities, we simply subtract a respondent’s score on
ideology from their score on partisanship and take the absolute value of the resulting
number to account for the degree to which a person’s preferences are matched.
𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑎𝑝 = 𝑎𝑏𝑠(𝑃𝐼𝐷 − 𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑂)

(1)

Empirically, if partisanship and ideology are scored on seven-point scales, ranging from
low values (left-leaning: Democrat, liberal) to high ones (right-leaning: Republican,
conservative), then complete overlap or perfect “sorted-ness” computes to zero—for
example, scoring a seven on ideology (i.e. extremely conservative) minus a score of seven
on partisanship (i.e. “strong Republican) yields a score of zero. Conversely, a person who
exhibits extraordinarily low overlap would yield a high value according to this equation:
subtracting the value 1 on partisanship (i.e. “strong Democrat”) from the value 7 on
ideology (i.e. “extremely conservative”) produces a score of 6 . To reclaim a more sensible
ordering of these values, we simply reverse-order them and then add “1” to these scores so
that perfect overlap takes the highest value (7) and the least overlap the smallest value (1).45
Having accounted for the extent of overlap between identities, we should now
account for the extremity of them. To do this, we will multiply the overlap score by the
“strength” of these attachments, which requires folding the identity varaibles at their
midpoint. Here, the moderate / Independent categories take the value of 1, weak
identification the value 2, moderate identification, 3, and, finally, strong group attachments
a value of 4. After multiplying the overlap score by these strength values, I then rescale the
measure of sorting to range from 0 to 1. Thus, this final score represents the degree of the
overlap between an individual’s identities multiplied by the strength or extremity of both
of those items.
𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑎𝑝 × 𝑃𝐼𝐷 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ × 𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑂 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ

(2)

I add “1” to these scores because multiplying the value “0” by the forthcoming strength
measures will naturally constrain all scores to a value of 0. If an individual scores a 0 as a
function of strong, countervailing preferences, we are unable to recover the effects of the
strength of those constituent preferences because multiplying a value of 0 by any integer
will remain 0.
45

39

Figure 3.3 displays the distribution of sorting scores, overlaid with three examples
of different configurations of partisan and ideological identities. The scale is anchored by
those persons who classify themselves as “pure” Independents and “pure” ideological
moderates (0). As values increase, a number of things occur: 1) identities transition from
neutral to one-sided, be that Republican (Democrat) or conservative (liberal), and 2) the
correspondence or overlap between identities increases. Middling values, then, are
indicative of moderately strong and cross-cutting identities (e.g. conservative Democrat),
while higher values convey very strong and matching identities (e.g. conservative
Republican). Unlike the discrete measure popularized by Levendusky (2009) in the
Partisan Sort, which scores matching identities as “1” and all other combinations “0,” this
coding scheme is theoretically sensible across empirical values and produces a metric of
sorting that fully expresses the different combinations that these identities may take.

Source: ANES Time-Series, 1984-2012
Notes: Variables have been rescaled to range from 0 (unsorted) to 1 (perfectly sorted).

Figure 3.3. Distribution of Identity-based Sorting Scores
With these distinctions in mind, Figure 3.4 illustrates a comparison between the
proportion of respondents whose ideological identity matches their partisan one, matchingonly, and the identity sorting variable described above. On the face of it, individuals have
become much more likely to appropriately match their ideological and partisan identities
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over time. From 1984 to 2012, the matching of liberal-conservative identity to partisanship
within the mass public grew more than 20 percent. This is an impressive increase, but,
when contextualized against the fuller identity sorting measure, it should be clear that this
sorting is more modest when we account for the underlying distribution of the constituent
items. From 1984 to 2000, sorting on ideology waffles back and forth around the value
0.25 and peaks in 2008. By 2012, identity sorting has increased by about 10 percent relative
the starting value in 1984, which is less than half the change observed across matchingonly item. The cautious conclusion that we might draw, then, is that while identity-based
sorting has increased over time, a matching-only approach to sorting overstates the strength
of the relationship between partisan and liberal-conservative identities.
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Notes: Estimates weighted by population weights. Solid vertical line indicates
where data in Levendusky (2009) ends.

Figure 3.4. Identity-based Sorting over Time
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3.3

Issue-based sorting

Peeling away liberal-conservative identity away from the omnibus sorting index found in
extant research, we are now left with a series of issues that include respondents’ attitudes
toward the government provision of healthcare, the scope of government and defense
spending, the role of government in providing jobs and aid to minorities, rates of legal
immigration, and the propriety (legality) of abortion and same-sex marriage. Taken
together, these items contribute to a form of ideology that is “grounded more explicitly in
concrete decisions, what citizens think the government should or should not be doing with
respect to important matters of public policy” (Ellis and Stimson, 2012, pg. 11). In other
words, these are the particular beliefs, attitudes and opinions that populate the network of
an individual’s belief system. In this section, I turn to considering how we might apply the
logic of sorting outlined above to create a complimentary (and novel) type of sorting rooted
in the extent to which individuals’ policy opinions are matched to their partisanship.
Although I have made the case that partisanship can be conceptualized as an
identity-based construct, and, therefore, that it should enjoy a special or unique relationship
to ideological identity, there is a sizeable literature that argues that party affiliation is more
appropriately construed as a summary evaluation of one’s political preferences—or that, at
minimum, the cognitive content shared between partisanship and ideology is similar (Sharp
and Lodge, 1985). In this telling, partisanship functions as a running tally of how the parties
perform, an instrumental attachment of sorts rooted in the ideological proximity of an
individual to their ideal party. As Fiorina writes (1981, pg. 84), partisanship can be
described as a “running tally of retrospective evaluations of party promises and
performance.” This account places particular importance on the connection between
partisanship and issues, bolstered by recent work that finds that partisanship now contains
a stronger issue-based foundation than previous years (Bafumi and Shapiro, 2009;
Abramowtiz, 2010). Thus, we might still observe robust sorting on issues even after
purging ideological identity from such a metric.
Operationalizing a policy-based approach to sorting is relatively straightforward
using the ANES Time-Series issue placements because the response sets for those items
resemble the same seven-category ones that comprise both ideological identity and
partisanship. In this case, we wish to first account for the overlap between an individual’s
partisan affiliation and their issue preference on a given policy issue. Because both

42

partisanship and the individual issues are measured using seven-category, ordinal scales,
the values of which can be roughly interpreted as ranging from liberal to conservative
responses, generating a measure of overlap requires simply adhering to the coding scheme
outlined in the previous section. We then simply multiply this overlap value (eq. 3) by the
strength of the issue attitude and partisanship (eq. 4).46 In each respective section, I
juxtapose the resulting issue sorting score with a matching only one that merely reflects
whether the policy preference is correctly-matched to the respondent’s partisanship, coded
1, or not, coded 0.

3.3.1

𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑎𝑝 𝑛 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦 = 𝑎𝑏𝑠(𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 − 𝑃𝐼𝐷 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡)

(3)

𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒 𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑛 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦 = 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑎𝑝 × 𝑃𝐼𝐷 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ × 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ

(4)

Sorting on individual issues

There are a number of policy issues that we might examine in the pursuit of constructing
an issue-based form of sorting, limited only by the content included in survey
questionnaires. Customarily, however, the ANES Time-Series surveys have routinely
featured only a limited number of policy issues over a sufficiently long duration of time.
Six policy items, however, have been regularly included on these surveys dating back to
1984. They include perspectives on aid to minorities, the provision of government
healthcare, whether the government should guarantee citizens jobs, abortion, and defense
and social welfare spending.
Aid to blacks / minorities
I begin with the question of whether government ought to offer targeted aid to African
Americans. This question was intended to capture whether or not individuals believe that
government assistance is needed to counterbalance prevailing inequalities that exist among
certain minority racial groups. Rooted in the legacy of Civil Rights era policy changes, the

An alternative approach to operationalizing “issue sorting” includes building an Item
Response model that computes a latent, policy-based form of ideology. This is more or less
the approach Ellis and Stimson (2012) take in constructing their “operational” ideology
term. For the sake of parity and parsimony, I simply use the measurement scheme outlined
above.
46
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policy debate over the question of affirmative action within the mass public has remained
divisive, even though elected officials periodically claim that the mass public is staunchly
opposed to race-conscious government programs (Steeh and Krysan, 1996).47
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Figure 3.5. Issue sorting on “Aid to blacks and minorities”

47

Like any question that taps into a sensitive matrix of economic, social, and even religious
material, the phrasing of language used to capture preferences related to affirmative action
matters a great deal. Steeh and Krysan (1996) assemble a great range of data from varying
polling firms that indicate that couching this question in terms of quotas in both
employment and admissions settings produces variation in positive responses to the
question of affirmative action compared to more generalized phrasing regarding “aid” to
blacks and minorities. However, because the overarching support for these policies is low,
any movement at all within this narrow band is nontrivial.
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In the mid-1980s, the ANES began fielding a version of an affirmative action item
that asked individuals to place themselves along a seven-category scale that ranges in the
degree to which individuals think that government should intervene to redress these
inequalities. Specifically, the question put to respondents is worded as follows: “Some
people feel that the government in Washington should make every effort to improve the
social and economic position of blacks…others feel that the government should not make
any special effort to help blacks because they should help themselves. Where would you
place yourself on this scale, or haven’t you thought much about it?”48
The solid dark line in Figure 3.5 depicts how responses to this policy question
match to partisanship. This illustration reveals that matching on this item has increased
modestly over time. In the early 1980s, roughly 40% of individuals conveyed responses to
this question that were matched correctly to partisanship. Although sorting on such aid
varies considerably, 2004 represents the high watermark for matching on these responses.
Turning to the measure of issue sorting, a similar upward trend manifests, although the
actual amount of sorting on this issue is markedly superficial. A more direct comparison
between the change in sorting over time communicates that the issue-based measure of
sorting increases roughly 7 percent compared to about six-and-a-half percent for the
discrete term. Interestingly, this is the only issue on which the change in issue sorting
surpasses the change matching, a finding that is perhaps related to the racialization of this
policy by the Obama presidency (e.g. Tesler, 2012).

Government healthcare
Public debate on the issue of whether government should provide healthcare dates as far
back as the mid-1800s.49 Support for the issue moved to the center of the modern policy

48

The exact wording of this variable (VCF0830) can be found in the CANES codebook
(see:
http://www.electionstudies.org/studypages/anes_timeseries_cdf/anes_timeseries_cdf_cod
ebook_var.pdf).
49
As a component of the broader progressive movement, reformers pushed to improve
social conditions of the working class through the provision of social insurance, but,
without a strong working class consciousness, support for these measures was relatively
low. Combined with stiff opposition to nationalized insurance programs from doctors,
interest groups (specifically, the American Medical Association [AMA]), labor groups,
insurance companies and the wider business community, the efforts of progressives up
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agenda, however, in the aftermath of FDR’s death and Truman’s subsequent elevation to
the Presidency. Although Truman supported shifting state-administered systems of health
care toward a national one, a brief Democratic majority in Congress wasn’t enough to push
legislation through the House of Representatives, stymied, in part, by the American
Medical Association and Republicans’ characterization of a national health system as
“socialist.” With the growth in Cold War tensions over socialism, the mere whisper that a
broad, government-funded health insurance program might reflect socialist programming
was enough to doom the passage of any such proposal. These fault lines remained largely
intact over the next fifty years, preventing any meaningful movement toward a nationalized
system of health insurance through at least a half-dozen presidencies. Eventually, Bill
Clinton’s Administration would come close to seeing universal coverage extended to
Americans, but it was not until 2010 that President Barack Obama and Congressional
Democrats passed the Affordable Care Act through a use of procedural rules to extend
medical and insurance benefits to millions of previously-uncovered Americans.
Unsurprisingly, public attention to the issue of whether government or the private
sector should provide health insurance has waxed and waned considerably over time, even
as little actual legislative progress occurred. The ANES has surveyed respondents on this
issue as far back as the early 1970s, but, here, we pick up the issue in 1984. The verbiage
of this survey item has evolved subtlety over time, but is generally specified as follows:
“There is much concern about the rapid rise in medical and hospital costs. Some people
feel there should be a government insurance plan which would cover all medical and
hospital expenses for everyone…Others feel that medical expenses should be paid by
individuals through private insurance plans. Where would you place yourself on this scale,
or haven't you thought much about this?”50 Possible responses to this item are anchored
by two opposing perspectives: at the left-leaning or liberal end, a preference for
government health insurance; on the right-leaning or conservative end, a preference for a
completely privatized system of insurance.

through the early 1940s largely failed to move the needle on support for government
intervention in the provision of health insurance.
50
The exact wording of this variable (VCF0806) can be found in the CANES codebook
(see:
http://www.electionstudies.org/studypages/anes_timeseries_cdf/anes_timeseries_cdf_cod
ebook_var.pdf).
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Figure 3.6 illustrates that the matching of respondents’ attitudes to partisanship has
steadily risen from 1984 to 2012, although when we account for overlap and strength, this
change looks less impressive. While the raw overlap between partisanship and insurance
attitudes has increased almost 14 percentage points over time, the change in issue sorting
is roughly 50% less than that estimate. In other words, while respondents are more likely
to give an ideologically-correct answer to this survey item, the strength of sorting on this
item is modest.
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Figure 3.6. Issue sorting on “Provision of health insurance”
Government provision of jobs
The question of whether the government should offer jobs to its citizens juxtaposes whether
individuals prefer a more expansive federal government, where government provides work
to jobless citizens and maintains basic standards of living, or whether individuals believe
that prosperity and employment are best left to an unencumbered private sector. Proponents
of government intervention generally believe that government, broadly construed, can play
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a fundamental role in shaping social and economic inequalities by providing marketplace
assistance in the form of vocational training, public service employment, institutional
training, or even job creation and placement programs. Over time, a number of programs
that encompass the practical manifestation of this approach have been legislated through
Congress, including the Civilian Conservation Corps, the Works Progress Administration,
and, more recently, the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act program.
Conversely, detractors of these policies and programs argue that they are a violation of
certain principles that guarantee an open and free marketplace and freedom from the type
of coercive governmental regulation that ostensibly accompanies the former approach.
Instead of providing net increases in job creation and employment, this perspective conveys
that “new governmental jobs will instead attract individuals who are already employed in
the public economy, but at lower rates of pay than the new positions being devised by
government” (Wanniski, 1978, pg. 84).
Support for either of these perspectives is measured through a survey item that
juxtaposes governmental intervention relative personal responsibility as these concepts
relate to the provision of jobs. In the ANES, this question is usually operationalized as:
“Some people feel that the government in Washington should see to it that every person
has a job and a good standard of living. Others think the government should just let each
person get ahead on his/her own…Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't
you thought much about this?”51
On balance, Figure 3.7 reveals that matching on this item has remained largely
static over time, decreasing during certain presidential cycles (2000) and increasing during
others (2004). The full measure of issue sorting reveals a similar pattern insofar sorting on
this item has either remained constant (2008) or actually fallen slightly (2012) in recent
years. Given the unstable nature of the economic environment throughout these years,
which covered the worst major economic recession since the Great Depression, sorting on
this item probably fell as those individuals feeling the impact of job loss and employment—
who were otherwise Republicans—selected slightly more liberal preferences on this item.

51

The exact wording of this variable (VCF0809) can be found in the CANES codebook
(see:
http://www.electionstudies.org/studypages/anes_timeseries_cdf/anes_timeseries_cdf_cod
ebook_var.pdf).
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Turning to the issue sorting measure, which accounts for the strength of these attitudes, we
see a somewhat similar pattern. Be that as it may, the extent to which individuals are sorted
on the provision of jobs only increased by about two percent from 1984 to 2012, about 50
percent less than the change in discrete sorting over the same period.
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Source: 1984-2012 ANES Time-Series
Notes: Estimates weighted by population weights. Y-axis is interpreted differently
for the different variables. For “matching-only” estimates, y-axis conveys
percentage of people correctly matching policy to PID. For “issue-sorting,”
estimate conveys mean value (on scale ranging from 0 to 1). Solid vertical line
indicates where data in Levendusky (2009) ends.

Figure 3.7. Issue sorting on “Government provision of jobs”

Federal spending
The size and scope of federal spending is one of the bread and butter issues of American
public policy, and has generated a sizable academic literature (e.g. Cook and Barrett 1992;
Gillens, 1999; Jacoby, 1994, 2000; Soroka and Wlezien, 2010). Although the scope of
federal spending is ultimately tied to budgetary appropriations, it is rarely connected back
to the question of the taxes necessary to provide for programmatic spending. In fact, as is
often the case when the question is placed before respondents, the item effectively asks
individuals about their preferences for spending divorced from the realities of how that
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spending will be paid for. This is, of course, the ironic twist to attitudes toward spending,
which Citrin (1979) famously describes as “wanting something for nothing.”
In general, the American citizenry reliably supports the federal government
providing social goods and services. As Faricy and Ellis (2014, pg. 56-57) write, “[t]the
idea the government should play a role in providing housing for the poor, pensions for the
elderly, education for all children, and a variety of other social benefits is popular with the
public, even among Republicans and Conservatives.” Yet while the public tends to support,
on balance, a government that pursues some modest amount of “redistribution” (e.g. Page
and Jacobs, 2009), individuals still tend to hold rather negative opinions of the government.
In fact, while there is a commitment to social spending for the aforementioned groups, the
public holds intuitively countervailing preferences for a leaner and small government (Ellis
and Stimson, 2012).
The ANES Time-Series surveys approach the question of government spending by
juxtaposing two perspectives. One end of a seven-category response set is anchored with
“Some people think government should provide fewer services, even in areas such as health
and education, in order to reduce spending.” On the other end of the spectrum is the
statement “Other people feel that it is important for the government to provide many more
services even if it means an increase in spending.”52 Respondents are then asked to pick a
value between those two points that best represents their feelings toward the provision of
government services and spending.
Figure 3.8 illustrates that matching between policy attitudes and partisanship has
gradually increased over time, while the change in issue sorting is effectively flat. Further,
the estimates actually seem to diverge after 2004—although the raw overlap between
partisanship and issue positions increases, once we account for the underlying extremity of
these components, we observe issue sorting actually decreases. Table 1 buoys this visual
presentation by presenting the percentage change in these concepts over time. Here, we
observe that matching increases roughly nine percent from 1984 to 2012, while issue
sorting only increased by about three percent.

52

The exact wording of this variable (VCF0839) can be found in the CANES codebook
(see:
http://www.electionstudies.org/studypages/anes_timeseries_cdf/anes_timeseries_cdf_cod
ebook_var.pdf).
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Figure 3.8. Issue sorting on “Government spending”
Defense spending
The United States’ armed forces are unparalleled, but a mighty military does not come
cheap. In fact, the United States spends more money on its military than the next fifteen
countries…combined. And even though the United States’ population is only roughly five
percent of the global population, it produces almost 50 percent of the world’s total military
expenditures (Thompson, 2010).53 Over the previous decade, defense spending has
increased more than 100 percent, a higher rate of transfer than even the monies allotted to
the military complex during the height of Reagan’s presidency during the Cold War. In
other words, defense spending is higher today than at any other time since the Second
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Whence does this money come? Military spending is a component of the discretionary
budget, or the money that Presidential Administrations and Congress have direct oversight
over and must act to spend each year (as opposed to mandatory spending, or monies that
are spent to remain in compliance with laws already on the books, e.g. social security,
Medicare, debt payments, etc.).
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World War—even as the overall economy contracted. To put this output into perspective,
the Pentagon spends more money on warmaking activities than all 50 states together spend
on health, education, and welfare.
While federal spending is easy to classify within the liberal-conservative
framework, public attitudes toward defense spending somewhat resist this left-right
classification. While it is true that opinions toward defense spending should be related
toward perspectives on government spending, public attitudes toward defense expenditures
bedevil such simple comparisons. Instead, the mass public generally appears to support
defense spending on balance, although there is no real broad consensus among ordinary
Americans regarding whether the federal government spends too little, too much, or just
about the right amount on military spending. Baretls (1994, pg. 497) provides some
evidence that even in light of major geopolitical upheaval in the aftermath of the Cold War,
“both the level and the structure of defense spending preferences among the least informed
60 percent of the public have changed only marginally.”54 The ANES Time-Series surveys
measure attitudes toward defense spending by asking respondents to place themselves
along a seven-category continuum ranging from “Some people believe that we should
spend much less money for defense” to “Others feel that defense spending should be
greatly increased.”55
Figure 3.9 shows variation in sorting on this item over time. There is a general
downward trajectory for both matching and issue sorting until 2004, at which point the
proportion of individuals correctly matching policy to partisanship increases. Ostensibly,
this change was the result of Republicans becoming better sorted as the Iraq and
Afghanistan Wars reached a crescendo. However, in the intervening years since 2004, we
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However his postulation that the downward inertia of a willingness to spend more money
on defense among the informed might reduce the scope of such spending has not borne
out—military spending has proven remarkably resilient even in the face of a modest
aggregate preference to reduce it, perhaps because of its connection to the militaryindustrial business complex or the subsequent explosion of defense spending in the wake
of 9/11.
55
The exact wording of this variable (VCF0843) can be found in the CANES codebook
(see:
http://www.electionstudies.org/studypages/anes_timeseries_cdf/anes_timeseries_cdf_cod
ebook_var.pdf).
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observe a decrease in matching and issue sorting. In the aggregate, changes in sorting are
effectively nonexistent.
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Figure 3.9. Issue sorting on “Defense spending”
Abortion
The issue of abortion is one of the most singularly divisive issues of social policy in modern
political discourse, which asks “What role should the federal government play in
determining whether, if not when, a woman is allowed to willingly terminate a pregnancy?”
The question over the legality of abortion is inextricably linked to Roe v. Wade, in which
the Supreme Court ruled that the right to privacy provided by the 14 th Amendment’s due
process clause extended to a woman’s reproductive choices, with one important caveat—
the state has a legitimate interest in balancing both the health of a woman against protecting
the potentiality of life. This logic was further refined in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, where the Court attempted to explicitly demarcate the
conditions under which the state had a compelling reason to disallow terminating a
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pregnancy. Eschewing the trimester template originally established by Roe v. Wade, which
stipulated the state could regulate abortion in the third trimester of pregnancy, Planned
Parenthood v. Casey determined that viability could occur as early as 24 weeks, and, thus
that the government (state) has a compelling reason to reject allowing the termination of a
pregnancy beyond that point.
In light of these developments, surveys generally measure public opinion on
abortion by juxtaposing the perspective that abortion should never be allowed with a series
of responses that vary the permissibility of abortion under certain circumstances and
culminating with a response that communicates that abortion access should be effectively
unrestricted. The ANES Time-Series’ method for capturing individuals’ attitudes toward
the issue of abortion fits this approach and provides four categories that respondents may
select: 1) By law, abortion should never be permitted, 2) The law should permit abortion
only in case of rape, incest, or when a woman’s life is in danger, 3) The law should permit
abortion for reasons other than rape, incest, or danger to the woman’s life, but only after
the need for abortion has been clearly established, and 4) By law, a woman should always
be able to obtain an abortion as a matter of personal choice.56
Given that abortion is coded using this four-category scheme, operationalizing
both a discrete and continuous measure of sorting on this issue demands a bit of creativity
in arraying these values so that they fit the seven-category scheme of partisanship. Here, I
array the two more permissive response categories of abortion attitudes at values 1 and 3,
respectively, the most restrictive category of abortion at 5, and the response that abortion
should never be legal at 7. For the purposes of creating a “matching” item, Democrats
match to values 1 and 3 and Republicans 5 and 7.57 Measuring issue sorting follows the
basic template provided in the previous section: I calculate an overlap score between
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One drawback to this approach is that it does not ask respondents about viability related
to the duration of the pregnancy; still, this template provides substantially more information
than simply asking respondents whether they identify as “pro-choice” or “pro-life.” The
exact wording of this variable (VCF0837 & VCF0838) can be found in the CANES
codebook (see:
http://www.electionstudies.org/studypages/anes_timeseries_cdf/anes_timeseries_cdf_cod
ebook_var.pdf).
57
Readers may balk at matching extremely limited abortion provisions to Republican
identification, but a nontrivial proportion of Republicans would allow for the termination
of a pregnancy in extreme circumstances, such as when a mother’s life is in real danger.
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abortion attitudes and partisanship. Folding the abortion responses in half provides two
categories of “strength” which are then multiplied by this overlap term and partisan
strength
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Source: 1984-2012 ANES Time-Series
Notes: Estimates weighted by population weights. For “matching-only” estimates,
y-axis conveys percentage of people correctly matching policy to PID. For “issuesorting,” estimate conveys mean value (on scale ranging from 0 to 1). Solid
vertical line indicates where data in Levendusky (2009) ends.

Figure 3.10. Issue sorting on “Abortion”

Figure 3.10 presents the average amount of matching and issue sorting on abortion
over time. There is a clear increase in the amount of sorting across both measures, although
the increase in the extent to which individuals are sorted on abortion is less extreme than
we might expect. From 1984 to 2012, issue sorting has increased by about six points. This
is about 40 percent less than the change in the simple overlap between abortion issue
preferences and partisanship.

3.3.2

Constructing a measure of issue-based sorting

Having developed and reviewed separate measures of matching-only and issue sorting
across a variety of individual policy questions, I now turn to creating an index of issue-
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based sorting that reflects the total sorting across these various policy items. In theory, this
composite variable should reflect a type of cohesiveness within an individual’s ideological
worldview in that this item encompasses the extent to which an individual is able to make
connections or abstractions between their partisanship and many policy preferences. The
aggregate measure of issue sorting presented in Figure 3.11 accounts for both the overlap
between partisanship and ideological preferences and the extremity (or strength) of these
items. Combining the separate policy sorting items together results in an index that ranges
that also ranges from 0 to 1 (see eq. 5).
∞

∑ 𝑓(𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒 𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 )

(5)

𝑛𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦

As scores transition from minimum (0) to maximum values (1), not only does overlap or
“sorting” increase, but so, too, does the extremity of these underlying considerations. In
other words, this variable more appropriately accounts for Independents with moderate
views, “confused” partisans whose attitudes appear to be the function of simple random
selection, cross-pressured partisans with a variety of strong views, and sophisticated, strong
partisans with highly-consistent opinions.
Figure 3.11 contextualizes how issue sorting within the mass public has changed
over time relative a matching-only approach. According to a minimalist specification of
sorting in which attitudes and partisanship need only match, there does appear to be robust
issue sorting within the mass public—even beyond the levels observed by Levendusky
(2009). For all the debate over the distribution of mass opinion over time, sorting on a
series of multifaceted policy issues seems to have occurred. If the relationship between
partisanship and ideological preferences conveys the quality of public opinion, then this
finding suggests that moderate coherence within mass opinion exists.
Figure 3.11 contextualizes how issue sorting within the mass public has changed
over time relative a matching-only approach. According to a minimalist specification of
sorting in which attitudes and partisanship need only match, there does appear to be robust
issue sorting within the mass public—even beyond the levels observed by Levendusky
(2009). For all the debate over the distribution of mass opinion over time, sorting on a
series of multifaceted policy issues seems to have occurred. If the relationship between
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partisanship and ideological preferences conveys the quality of public opinion, then this
finding suggests that moderate coherence within mass opinion exists.
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Source: 1984-2012 ANES Time-Series
Notes: Estimates weighted by population weights. For “matching-only” estimates,
y-axis conveys percentage of people correctly matching policy to PID. For “issuesorting,” estimate conveys mean value (on scale ranging from 0 to 1). Solid
vertical line indicates where data in Levendusky (2009) ends.

Figure 3.11. Issue sorting over time
However, as we turn our attention to the measure of issue sorting, this conclusion
is somewhat tempered. Notice that the predicted values for this variable stay relatively flat,
occasionally increasing in some years (e.g. 1994, 2004) only to significantly decrease in
others (e.g. 2000, 2012). In fact, from 2004 to 2012, sorting has not appreciably changed,
even as congressional legislators have become increasingly polarized. This is not at all
what we would have expected according to the traditional account of sorting, and it draws
into relief the notion that public opinion is characterized by both heterogeneity and
(relative) moderation. Indeed, Table 3.1 presents a summary of these very changes.
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Table 3.1. Changes in various measures of sorting over time, 1984-2012
Discrete
Issue
sorting
sorting
Government spending
+8.9
+3.1
Defense spending
+1.4
-0.7
Percent ∆
Aid to blacks
+6.6
+7.0
from 1984
Abortion
+10.1
+6.3
to 2012
Government healthcare
+13.5
+5.8
Government jobs
+4.2
+2.1
Avg. percent ∆ in sorting
+7.45
+3.93
Source: 1984-2012 ANES Time-Series
Notes: Percent change is value of sorting metric in 2012 less value in 1984.

3.4

Conclusion

The extent to which individuals have become more sorted over time pales compared to
changes in discrete sorting. Individuals may be more skilled at matching partisanship and
ideology in 2012 than they were some 30 years previous, but this connection is appreciably
weak. Further, the rate of change in sorting across identity and issue sorting over time is
muted relative changes in the simple matching of ideology to partisanship. This finding is
consistent with a robust literature that persuasively argues that ideological constraint does
not describe the cognitive capabilities of the mass public (e.g. Converse, 1964; Zaller,
1992; Lupton, Myers, and Thorton, 2015).
This evidence offers some caution for scholarly (Levendusky, 2009) and popular
depictions of sorting (Pew, 2014), which allege that this phenomenon is a prominent feature
of public opinion—“what has happened in the United States,” argues Morris Fiorina, “is
not polarization, but sorting.”58 This is true. The American public has become better sorted
over time.
Yet, the data presented here show very little evidence of extremity in the extent to
which individuals are sorted. In other words, there is little evidence for what is traditionally
understood as mass polarization. Thus, when we correct the discrete measure of sorting to
more appropriately account for Independent persons and the underlying strength of mass
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https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/06/23/americans-havenot-become-more-politically-polarized/
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preferences, even the degree to which the mass public appears “sorted” is lower than
expected. If anything, convergence among the mass public’s preferences in the aggregate
has been and continues to be quite modest. Further, the alleged benefits of elite
polarization—more citizens who align their preferences to match those of their party’s
(Levendusky, 2010)—have not necessarily borne the expected proverbial fruit.
Polarization within Congress has reached all-time highs (voteview.com), yet, according to
a matching-only approach to sorting, the mass public is not appreciably better at matching
ideology to partisanship in 2012 relative 2004. It seems that there is a limit to the upper
threshold of how individuals connect their ideology to their partisanship. Whatever
expected “benefits” of such elite polarization exist, they have somewhat run their course.
Still, there are a number of questions that remain after the presentation of this
descriptive data. The careful reader may wonder whether these constructs are statistically
independent, mere clones, or, perhaps, instead, two sides of a common coin. In the next
chapter, I present a series of analyses that demonstrate why and how these forms of sorting
are related, though distinct facets of partisan sorting.
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Chapter 4: Partisan Sorting: Are Identity- and Issue Sorting Two Sides
of the Same Coin?
…all measurement is theory testing. Therefore, measurement always constitutes
a tentative statement about the nature of reality.
~Jacoby (1999, pg. 271)

4.1

Introduction

As the prior chapter outlines, the justification for disaggregating partisan sorting into
identity- and issue-based constructs is grounded in conceptual differences between liberalconservative identity and liberal-conservative policy preferences. This chapter, in turn,
presents an empirical case for this distinction and proceeds in three parts. First, I explore
the relationship between identity and policy sorting. I find that, while the correlation
between these forms of sorting has increased in the aggregate, there is little systemic
evidence at the individual level to suggest that individuals’ policy attitudes become more
or less well-matched to partisanship over time. In contrast, however, I show that citizens’
liberal-conservative and partisan identities exhibit signs of convergence as time passes.
Second, I investigate how political acumen or knowledge is related to sorting.
Because sorting utilizes “left-right” space as its organizing criterion, successfully
navigating this ideological dimension should, at minimum, shape how individuals think
about their preferences in relation to their partisan affiliation. In particular, I explore the
connection between what individuals know about this space—where the parties and their
policies “fit” in the left-right dimension—and sorting. Predictably, a grasp of such
information exerts differentiated effects on identity and policy sorting.
Finally, in order to emphasize differences between identity and policy sorting, I
explore how these two forms of sorting differ in their capacity to shape group-based
affinities. A core finding in social psychology conveys that group attachments are tied to
the extent to which an individual’s in-group is narrow or restrictive. When an individual’s
preferences are cross-cutting, or do not overlap, tolerance toward members of other groups
is generally higher than when an individual does not belong to a diverse set of groups
(Roccas and Brewer, 2002; Brewer, 1999)—i.e. when an individual is unsorted. I find,
however, that the prevailing operationalization of partisan sorting mispredicts such
tolerance. Even in the absence of a series of highly-consistent policy preferences, moderate
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levels of identity-based sorting are a sufficient condition for observing severe levels of
ideological biases.
Taken together, this evidence draws the arguments of the prior chapters into sharp
relief. While identity and policy sorting are not orthogonal, they nevertheless represent
separate facets of partisan sorting. As a result, any account of the ongoing sorting of the
American mass public, to say little of predictive analyses that examine the effects of such
sorting on various political phenomena, must take these differences seriously.

4.2

Is all sorting, sorting?

To distinguish identity- from issue-based sorting, I begin by analyzing four simple,
bivariate relationships: 1) the correlation between liberal-conservative identity and policy
consistency, 2) the correlation between liberal-conservative and partisan identity, 3) the
correlation between policy consistency and partisanship, and, 4) the correlation between
identity and policy sorting. Beginning with Panel A in Figure 4.1, I present a jittered
scatterplot in which responses to ideological self-identification, arrayed on the x-axis, are
juxtaposed by “issue ideology” scores, arrayed on the y-axis.59 This latter variable is an
additive index of the policy items outlined in the previous chapter, which includes abortion,
social and defense spending, aid to minorities, healthcare, and employment preferences.
Remaining agnostic about the underlying dimensionality of these data, this measure of
“issue ideology” merely accounts for the consistency of opinions across these policy areas,
where liberal opinions take low and conservative opinions take high values. Thus,
individuals who espouse multiple very conservative or very liberal policy preferences
would be located at the respective liberal or conservative poles on the x-axis; individuals
who possess a heterogeneous configuration of policy preferences will be drawn toward the
center of this axis.

“Jittering” is merely a change to the proportion or “weight” of each observation within
the scatterplot so as to allow for maximum visual clarity. Without jittering, these panels
would likely appear as solid blocks of color.
59
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Source: 1984-2012 ANES Time-Series
Notes: Scatterplot estimates have been jittered to account for the sheer volume of responses.

Figure 4.1. Scatterplots of the relationship between ideology and partisanship

To the reader familiar with the ongoing measurement debate surrounding such
forms of “ideology,” there is some research that argues that individuals with strong
countervailing views are not “moderate” in the sense that their apparent moderation is
simply a feature of mathematical computation (Broockman, 2016; Ahler and Broockman,
n.d.). This seems logically correct insofar as moderation, according to a strict definition,
implies neutrality. However, in this application, I am not wholly concerned about whether
these persons are “true” moderates insofar as moderation represents neutrality or
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indifferent preferences. Instead, I’m only interested in testing whether this form of
attitudinal consistency is matched to ideological self-identification. As Panel A illustrates,
the relationship between these two concepts is modest (r = 0.45). The central category of
“moderate” self-identification on the y-axis indicates that there is significant heterogeneity
among the policy preferences of individuals who consider themselves to be ideologically
unaffiliated. In fact, these individuals are highly emblematic of the problem with treating
issue- and identity-based conceptions of ideology as analogues: a great many symbolic
ideologues, those persons who claim to be “liberal’ or “conservative,” possess sharply
countervailing views.60
Given this variation, it is likely that the relationship between partisanship and these
two forms of ideology should also vary. Moving to Panels B and C, I present two
scatterplots that depict the correlation between partisanship and issue ideology and
partisanship and liberal-conservative identity, respectively. Beginning with Panel B, it is
clear that issue consistency, again arrayed on the x-axis, fits rather poorly with partisanship,
arrayed on the y-axis. The correlation between the two variables is modest (r = 0.33),
conveying that the items share only about 11 percent of their variance. To illustrate the
heterogeneity among the policy preferences of partisans, let us consider those individuals
who classify themselves within the second strongest category of Democratic identification,
the second row of jittered estimates from the bottom. While these partisans tend to hold
somewhat liberal policy preferences, a modest proportion of individuals in this category
hold views that are, on balance, conservative-leaning. This variation should not necessarily
come as a surprise, however, given what we know about the tenuous coupling of selfprofessed ideological labels and particularistic beliefs (Converse, 1964; Sides, 2012; Ellis
and Stimson, 2012). Partisanship may partially embody a summary representation of policy
preferences, but it is rather weakly related to consistency within the organizational structure
of an individual’s policy attitudes. Simply, we observe less sorting among policy
preferences than we might otherwise assume.
Turning to Panel C, the relationship between ideological and partisan identification
is comparatively stronger (r = 0.47). Given that both ideological and partisan self-

At any rate, we could just as easily rename this axis’ midpoint “mixed” preferences as
opposed to “moderate.” And, indeed, a great deal of individuals who identify as extreme
liberals or conservatives appear to possess mixed policy views.
60
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identification are seven-category items, the graphic presents 49 separate spheres—one for
each categorical match between the various categories of partisan and ideological
identification. Light grey spheres contain fewer dots and represent categorical matches that
have low frequency; where fit between categories is high, the sphere is darker and appears
almost opaque. As Panel C illustrates, we observe that the correlation between these items
is positive. The upper-right and lower-left quadrants, which reflect correct and strong
matching between ideological and partisan identification, contain a significant proportion
of respondents.
If the extent to which partisanship and ideology are related to each other varies by
the type of ideology, then what is the relationship between these the two forms of sorting
as specified in the prior chapter? Panel D in Figure 4.1 plots the relationship between
identity and policy sorting. Here, we observe that a substantial proportion of estimates are
located in the bottom-left quadrant of this graphic, which conveys that a modest plurality
of individuals are unsorted across both their policy preferences and their chosen political
identities. Further, while the relationship between identity and policy sorting is positive
and moderately strong, it is not clear that simply being sorted across one’s political
identities is sufficient (or even necessary) for concomitant sorting across issue preferences.
Because Figure 4.1 encapsulates responses to all Time-Series surveys dating back
to 1984, it may be the case that the relationship between these forms of sorting is obscured
by pooling this data together. To this end, Figure 4.2 portrays the relationship between
issue and identity sorting over time by depicting the correlation coefficient for these items
at four-year intervals. The strength of their relationship decreases slightly after 1984, rises
in 1996, and then plummets in 2000. It rises sharply in 2004 only to dip precipitously again
in 2008. Finally, in 2012, the relationship between issue and identity sorting reaches its
peak within the 1984 to 2012 timeframe (r = 0.65). As the dotted fit line indicates, there is
a slight upward trend over time in the extent to which these concepts are related, yet these
estimates show some instability from one election to the next.
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Notes: Point estimates reflect Pearson’s product-moment correlation in a given
year, weighted using general population weights.

Figure 4.2. Correlation between identity- and issue-based sorting over
time

However, because the above data are cross-sectional, it is difficult to interpret
precisely how individual-level sorting changes from one point in time to another, much
less whether the correlation between these forms of sorting changes for individuals
between time periods. Ideally, we could look at how individuals’ political identities and
attitudes covary over a long duration of time to determine whether or not there is
convergence among them. Unfortunately, however, the panel data needed to test this
relationship is relatively limited. Still, two datasets can be utilized in creative ways to
explore these relationships.
The Youth-Parent Socialization Panel Study was a ground-breaking, decades-long
exploration of how individuals’ social and political preferences and behaviors varied over
time. Spanning the better part of 40 years, the study included four separate waves that
sampled, without replacement, the same group of American citizens from 1965 to 1997.
Fortuitously, the 1973, 1982, and 1997 waves included both the seven-category liberalconservative and partisan self-placement instruments necessary to observe how the
correlation between political identities developed over time. Table 4.1 reveals that the
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strength of the relationship between partisanship and liberal-conservative identity grows
over the course of the study. By 1997, the final wave of the study, the shared
correspondence between partisanship and ideology—a rough reflection of “sorting”—
almost doubles from the first wave in which these questions were first asked.

Table 4.1. Correlation between liberal-conservative and partisan selfplacement over 2nd-4th waves

Pearson’s r…
Liberalconservative
identity

Party ID
0.35
0.51
0.61

Year
1973 (2nd wave)
1982 (3rd wave)
1997 (4th wave)

Source: 1965-1997 Youth-Parent Socialization Panel Study
Notes: Entries constitute Pearson’s r correlation coefficient. Liberal-conservative
self-placement was not surveyed in the 1965 wave.

The rub with this data, however, is that the surveys did not include the needed
policy items to explore issue sorting. Thus, I turn to the 1992-1996 ANES Panel Study
provides the opportunity to observe changes in sorting among the same cohort of
individuals over a period of four years and, importantly, compare how issue and identity
sorting vary over time. To this end, Figure 4.3 presents a set of point estimates that illustrate
changes in identity and issue sorting from 1992 to 1996. I find that the average change in
issue sorting is a little less than one point, although the difference is not significant by
virtue of the confidence interval’s lower bound crossing the 0.00 threshold. However, the
change in identity-based sorting from 1992 to 1996 is statistically significant, representing
roughly an eight percent increase in sorting. Further adding an interesting wrinkle to the
claim that these forms of sorting are appreciably different, the Pearson’s correlation
coefficient between identity and issue sorting in 1996 is actually weaker (r = 0.21) than in
1992 (r = 0.33). Thus, while the correlation between identity- and issue-based sorting has
increased in the aggregate, the individual-level estimates imply that the passage of time
does not inevitably beget concomitant changes in the relationship between ideological
attitudes and identities and partisanship.
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Figure 4.3. Changes in respondent issue and identity sorting over time

4.3

The informational correlates of sorting

Having explored the compositional relationship between identity and policy sorting, the
data indicate that, while these items are clearly related, they constitute different facets of
the relationship between ideology and partisanship. One way of further teasing apart these
differences is to consider how the correlates of these forms of sorting differ. In particular,
if identity and policy sorting are only modestly related, then the information that structures
how individuals connect ideological and partisan preferences may differ, as well. In this
section, I consider how an individual’s ability to navigate and knowledge of the left-right
political space shapes the extent to which they are sorted.

4.3.1

Sorting and left-right space

An impressive body of literature demonstrates that at least one major ideological dimension
reliably structures political discourse across a variety of mature democratic contexts: the
generalized “left-right” continuum (e.g. Gross and Sigelman, 1984; Kroh, 2007). This axis
bifurcates political conflict into countervailing “left” and “right” spaces, which take their
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meaning from a variety of socio-cultural and economic forces (Inglehart and Klingemann,
1976). Conceptually, it is customary to interpret the left-right distinction as one that
juxtaposes equality, autonomy, and openness to change—emblematic of the “left”— with
the preservation of the status quo, the exercise of control, and a general tendency to resist
change—emblematic of the “right” (Piurko, Schwartz, and Davidov, 2011; Jost, Federico,
and Napier, 2009). While these are broad generalizations, this left-right scheme is an
elegant solution for simplifying and comparing complex, multilayered realities (Maier,
2007) and functions as an efficient mechanism through which citizens and elites
communicate (Fuchs and Klingemann, 1990).61
Still, the degree to which this space accurately embodies political conflict and
discourse varies across contexts. In fact, as Maier (2007, pg. 211-212) writes, “while
European or Anglo-American voters, observers, and even political actors themselves may
be happy to use the terms left and right, it is not always [clear] that they all share the same
meaning of the terms.” In locations where the left-right dimension is less salient, it is
generally the case that some other, well-established schema orients the dominant political
culture. In the United States, for example, the “liberal-conservative” dimension is the
prevailing scheme that structures such conflict. However, over time, the language of the
“left-right” ideological space has been increasingly overlaid onto this liberal-conservative
schema (Laponce, 1981; Conover and Feldman, 1981).62 As Jost and colleagues (2009, pg.
311) write, “it is becoming increasingly common to substitute ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’
for ‘left’ and ‘right,’ respectively.”
If the left-right ideological space serves a collective purpose, then it functions as a
symbolic frame of reference that orients individuals to political groups. Given the close
correspondence between the left-right and liberal-conservative spaces, successfully
navigating one space ought to be related to understanding the other and, by extension,
identity sorting (which is composed of such symbolic orientations). While this expectation
61

While it is true that elites generally employ these terms, Fuchs and Klingemann (1990)
demonstrate that a not insubstantial proportion of the mass public are able to understand
the meanings of “left” and “right,” although this is highly contingent upon education (this
matches other empirical findings that convey that politically-sophisticated individuals are
usually more adept at understanding these labels, e.g. Sniderman et al. [1991]).
62
Beginning in the early and mi-1970s, the terms “left” and “right” were increasingly used
to describe the symbolic distinction between liberal and conservative political approaches,
in part thanks to the Nixon and McGovern campaigns (Inglehart 1989, pg. 367).
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does not preclude a relationship between left-right orientations and issue-based sorting—
for example, left-right placements generally predict issue positions (Huber, 1989)—prior
research finds that “symbolic factors clearly played a more important role than issue
positions in determining the evaluation of ideological labels” (Conover and Feldman, 1981,
pg. 634). This research has two implications for the present study. First, successfully
understanding where the parties fit within this space ought to predict greater identity
relative policy sorting. Second, I expect that the effect of “correctly” understanding one’s
self-placement within this left-right scale should beget greater identity- relative issue based
sorting (in part, because this requires understanding the underlying logic of sorting in the
first place).

Operationalizing left-right ideological space
Because scholars of American politics are primarily interested in the liberal-conservative
ideological framework, survey instruments that capture how citizens think about the leftright dimension of politics are rare (unlike surveys in other parts of the West, where the
left-right ideological framework is the prevailing dimension that structures ideological
conflict). Fortuitously, however, the 2012 ANES Time-Series survey appended a series of
questions that capture this information as part of a module sponsored by the Cooperative
Study of Electoral Systems. Two separate questions ask individuals to place the Republican
and Democratic Parties in left-right space, while a third requests individuals to select where
their own political preferences fit within this continuum. Values for all three variables
originally span an 11-point continuum, ranging from 0 “left” to 10 “right.”
Figure 4.4 illustrates where respondents place the parties and themselves within
left-right space. Predictably, a majority of individuals associate the Republican Party with
the “right” label and the Democratic Party with the “left.” However, while the average
individual reliably understands where the parties fit within this space, there is still a modest
proportion of people who either a) do not perceive that the parties are very “extreme,”
much less b) are able to correctly place the parties at all.63 For purposes of analysis, I
Interestingly, the correlation between these placements and the traditional “liberalconservative” party placements is modest at best. The weighted correlation between
Democratic Party left-right and liberal-conservative placements is r = 0.45, while the
correlation between Republican Party placements is r = 0.38. Moreover, even among
sophisticates (respondents in the highest category of political knowledge), the correlation
63
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reverse-code the Democratic Party placements so that “left” (correct) responses correspond
to higher values; this allows them to exist in common space with Republican Party
placements in that higher values convey both “correct” and “more extreme” placements.
These variables are both rescaled to range from 0, “strong, incorrect placements,” to 1,
“correct, strong placements.”

Republican Party

Respondent self-placement
in left-right space

Democratic Party

18%

18%

16%

16%

40%

14%

14%

35%

12%

12%

30%

10%

10%

25%

8%

8%

20%

6%

6%

15%

4%

4%

10%

2%

2%

5%

0%

0%

0%
Left

Right

Left

Right

Opposite PID

Matches PID

Source: 2012 ANES Time-Series
Notes: For Panels 1 and 2, x-axis represents where respondents place individual in left-right space
prior to transformation into “correct” placements. In Panel 3, the x-axis conveys the extent to
which respondent’s own self-placement in left-right space matches partisan self-placement.
Estimates weighted according to population weights.

Figure 4.4. Left-right self and party placements

To construct an item that captures how successful individuals are at navigating this
left-right space, I begin by taking an individual’s self-placement within left-right space,
ranging from 0 (left) to 10 (right), and subtract the value (5). This transforms the original
values so that they range from -5 (left) to 5 (right). I then multiply a respondent’s score by

between these items is not substantially different. Presumably, these concepts are
overlapping insofar as they should both reflect an individual’s understanding of the
connection between ideological labels and the parties, yet it is difficult to claim that the
average person treats these labels as interchangeable.
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a three-category partisanship item that ranges from -1, “Democratic PID,” to 0 “pure
Independent,” to 1 “Republican PID.”64 This measurement strategy purges the left-right
valence from the resulting variable and instead reflects the extent to which an individual’s
left-right placement is correctly-matched to their partisanship—in effect creating an
alternative metric of “left-right sorting.” Values on this item are then rescaled so that it
ranges from -1 “extreme placement in left-right space, but incorrect match to partisanship,”
to 1, “extreme placement in left-right space that correctly matches to partisanship.”
The third panel in Figure 4.4 displays the distribution of this variable. Values to
the left of the scale’s midpoint reflect those individuals who chose an ideological label that
was opposite their partisanship, while values to the right of the midpoint, then, reflect those
persons who chose the label that correctly corresponded to their partisanship. The bellshaped distribution of responses indicates that individuals only modestly connect their
partisanship to these left-right placements. Not only do less than half of all respondents
place themselves “correctly,” with the largest proportion of individuals falling into the
modal, neutral mid-point, but most individuals who do place themselves correctly within
this space do not convey that their left-right self-concept is particularly strong.65 In fact,
less than 10 percent of all respondents place themselves at the extreme end of the left-right
spectrum and profess partisan attachments that match those ideological preferences.

Results
Table 4.2 presents a series of models that depict sorting as a function of left-right
placements and controls. In the first set of columns, I analyze how correct placement of
the parties and correct self-placement in left-right space contributes to “partisan sorting,”
a metric of sorting that accounts for how liberal-conservative identification and policy
attitudes match to partisanship. This variable closely resembles Levendusky’s (2009)
specification of sorting. The key difference, here, however, is that the underlying
components of this variable are all operationalized according to my definition of sorting
that accounts for both matching and extremity. This transition away from Levendusky’s
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I aggregate strong, weak and leaner partisans into the respective categories and assign
only “pure” Independents the value 0.
65
This is not dissimilar from how individuals answer the more traditional liberalconservative self-placement in that the modal category is almost always “moderate.”
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matching-only scheme is necessary to provide a fair test of the disaggregation of partisan
sorting into identity and policy components: in keeping the underlying measurement
strategy common across all items, I attempt to reduce confusion in interpreting the effects
of the covariates of interest on the dependent variable. Thus, the magnitude of any given
coefficient is roughly comparable across models.
In Model 1, I observe that, while correctly placing the Republican Party in leftright space is related to an increase in partisan sorting, placements of the Democratic Party
exert no discernible effect on this item. Recalling that these party placements vary from 0
to 1, a person who perceives that the Republican Party is maximally located toward the
“right” end of the left-right spectrum is 16 points more sorted than a person who
misperceived that Republicans were very “left.” Likewise, in Model 2, partisans who
correctly place themselves in left-right space are substantially more sorted than those who
selected the most extreme, incorrect label.
On its face, this evidence suggests that accurate placement on the political parties
in left-right ideological space is strongly related to an individual’s propensity to sort.
However, when we disaggregate issue from partisan sorting in Models 3 and 4, the
magnitude of these coefficients shifts precipitously. The effects of correct Republican Party
and respondent self-placements on issue sorting are roughly 60 and 30 percent smaller. To
what can we attribute these changes?
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Table 4.2. The effects of left-right ideological placements on partisan, issue, and identity
sorting
Partisan sorting
(issues + identity)
Issue sorting
Identity sorting
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Correctly place
Democrats in left0.01
----0.04
----0.11** ----right space
(0.03)
(0.02)
(0.03)
Correctly place
Republicans in left0.16** ----0.05*
----0.10** ----right space
(0.03)
(0.02)
(0.03)
Correctly place self
----0.19** ----0.12**
----0.25**
in left-right space
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.02)
Political knowledge
0.11**
0.09**
0.06** 0.05**
0.08** 0.05**
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.02)
(0.02)
Interest
0.10**
0.07**
0.12** 0.10**
0.17** 0.13**
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.02)
(0.02)
Evangelical ID
0.01
0.00
0.05** 0.05**
0.06** 0.05**
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
Education
0.08
0.07
-0.01
-0.02
0.06
0.04
(0.04)
(0.04)
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.04)
(0.04)
White
0.01
-0.01
0.00
-0.01
0.04
0.02
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.02)
(0.02)
Black
0.06*
0.09**
0.05** 0.08**
0.03
0.07**
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
Income
-0.02
-0.02
0.03
0.02
0.01
0.01
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.02)
(0.02)
Male
-0.04** -0.04** -0.02** -0.03** -0.02*
-0.03**
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
Age
-0.00** -0.00** -0.00
-0.00
-0.00
-0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Constant
0.26**
0.38**
0.15** 0.22**
-0.06
0.10**
(0.04)
(0.04)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.03)
2
R
0.06
0.11
0.08
0.13
0.13
0.25
N
4,935
4,972
4,926
4,972
4,521
4,559
Source: 2012 ANES Time-Series
Notes: *p<0.05, **p<0.01
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The answer lies in the relationship between these left-right placements and identity
sorting. Given the close correspondence between left-right and liberal-conservative
ideology, identity sorting should be especially sensitive to how individuals navigate
symbolic ideological space. Indeed, both sets of party and the individual self-placements
within left-right space exert sizeable effects on the extent to which individuals’ political
identities converge in Models 5 and 6.66 Not only is the size of the coefficients for the party
placements in the identity sorting models larger relative to those in the analyses of policy
sorting, but the effect of correctly placing oneself within left-right space on identity sorting
is even greater than the magnitude of the associated effect of those placements on partisan
sorting in Model 2.67
These differences, however, are easily obscured. In fact, partisan sorting
artificially overstates the relationship among partisanship, issue preferences, and the leftright space. Whatever images Americans conjure up when they think about ideology in
terms of “left” and “right”, the way in which they navigate this space informs connections
between ideology and partisanship in different ways. Simply, understanding the left-right
ideological dimension increases identity-based sorting considerably more than it does
sorting on issues.

4.3.2

Parties, issue positions, and sorting

The prior section indicates that sorting does not happen in a vacuum—some degree of
familiarity with the structure that gives ideology its meaning is a minimum informational
requirement for sorting to “work.” By extension, if an individual neither knows nor

66

Of additional note is the extent to which the data explain the total variance in the
dependent variable. Disaggregating partisan sorting into its constituent issue- and identitybased parts actually increases the total variance explained by the included covariates.
67
The careful reader may ask “But is the difference in the magnitude of these coefficients
across the issue and identity sorting models statistically significant?” Briefly, yes. To test
the equivalence between coefficients, we may use Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR),
which differs from other forms of simultaneous equation models in that SUR strictly
models exogenous regressors (Zellner, 1963). Further, because SUR treats the error terms
of each equation as if they are correlated, this modeling approach is suitable for testing
differences between these coefficients across forms of sorting, given that the latter terms
likely have correlated error terms. In the interests of brevity, full modeling results of these
analyses are not reported here, but we are able to reject the null hypothesis that the
coefficients reported in the two models are equal (χ2 = 146.22, p = 0.000).
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understands where the parties stand on a bundle of salient public policies, then it is unlikely
that that person would be able to logically connect their own preferences back to their
partisan identity. Let us now turn to an exploration of the relationship between issue-party
placements and sorting.
For the better part of three decades, the ANES Time-Series surveys have queried
individuals about the policy approaches associated with the Republican and Democratic
Parties. Much like the policy self-placements that comprise sorting (see Chapter 2),
respondents are asked to place where they think the parties fall on a bivalent continuum of
policy prescriptions that juxtaposes a “liberal” and “conservative” policy solution. While
these responses have been used to generate subjective impressions of party extremity (e.g.
Davis and Dunaway, 2016), they have also been treated as a form of objective political
knowledge: the parties have a quantifiable preference to a range of issues and knowing
something about these issues is indicative of a facet of political acumen or knowledge
(Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1993).
As a quantity of interest, political knowledge is a somewhat convoluted concept in
political science (Mondak, 1999, 2001). Yet, while prior work has argued for a tight
connection between party-policy knowledge and sorting (Levendusky, 2009), there is
reason to think that this type of political acumen is unevenly related to identity and issue
sorting. Converse’s (1964) classic finding that citizens use labels and groups to orient
themselves within political space, as opposed to policy information, still rings true in other
applications that test how different forms of information shape public opinion (Druckman,
Peterson, and Slothuus, 2013; Nicholson, 2012).
Nevertheless, what individuals know—or, at least, think they know—about the
parties is a key piece of working knowledge reflective of familiarity with the innerworkings and structure of the wider party system. Although I dig deeper into how different
types of group assessments shape identity sorting in Chapter 4, for now, I focus on how
party-policy knowledge affects sorting. In particular, I expect that placing Democrats to
the “left” of Republicans in policy space ought to increase policy, but not identity sorting.

Operationalizing party-policy knowledge
To construct a metric of party-policy knowledge, I utilize party placement items that
require individuals to ascertain where a given party sits on a response continuum that
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juxtaposes two countervailing policy solutions. These items include jobs, insurance,
affirmative action, defense spending, and welfare provisions policies and are coded such
that liberal policy solutions take lower and conservative solutions higher values.
Individuals receive a value of “1” if they place the Democratic Party to the left of the
Republican Party on a given item and “0” otherwise. In addition to these five items, I also
examine whether individuals correctly place Democrats to the left of Republicans on the
traditional seven-category liberal-conservative scale.

A. Correctly place Ds to left of Rs

B. Index of correct placements
30%

% of respondents

% of respondents

70%
60%
50%

40%
30%
20%

25%
20%
15%
10%

10%

5%

0%

0%

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

Number of correct placements

Source: 1984-2012 ANES Time-Series
Notes: Estimates represent the average percentage of respondents who correctly place Democratic
Party to “left” of Republican Party on five policy items and symbolic, liberal-conservative ideology.

Figure 4.5. Percentage of Respondents who correctly place Democrats to “left” of
Republicans
Figure 4.5 presents both the proportion of people who correctly place the parties
on the individual items (Panel A) and a summary index that aggregates the number of
correct placements that individuals make (Panel B). The proportion of correct placements
varies markedly across items. As Panel A indicates, individuals are far more likely to
correctly place the parties within symbolic liberal-conservative space than they are, for
example, able to correctly place the parties on the availability of health insurance. Taken

76

as a whole, Panel B indicates that individuals are quite poor at correctly recognizing
differences between the parties on multiple items. An overwhelming majority of
respondents are unable to place the parties on as many as two items and fewer than one
percent of respondents correctly place the parties on all six party-policy dyads.

Results
Table 4.3 models sorting as a function of the aforementioned comparative placements. The
first column analyzes the relationship between party-policy knowledge and partisan
sorting. As expected, placing the Democratic Party to the left of the Republican Party on
aid to blacks, defense spending, and social spending translates into a modest increase in
sorting. However, the magnitude of these effects is dwarfed by correctly placing Democrats
to the right of Republicans on the liberal-conservative ideology scale.
To ascertain whether differences in this party-policy knowledge contribute to more
or less identity relative issue sorting, I turn to Models 2 and 3. In the analysis of policy
sorting (Model 2), placing Democrats to the left of Republicans on the various policy dyads
increases sorting by an average of two points, such that, taken together, an individual that
correctly places the parties on each pairing would be about 10 points more sorted than
someone who failed to correctly link the parties to these policies at all. Notably, however,
while placement of the parties on liberal-conservative ideology produces a modest, positive
coefficient, the magnitude of this effect pales in comparison to the associated effect
observed in Model 1. This difference helps illuminate not only differences between forms
of sorting, but informational differences among these placements (ignored in earlier work).
This point is drawn into sharper relief when we examine the effects of party-policy
knowledge on identity sorting in the third model. While we observe that policy placements
are modestly related to identity sorting, the magnitude of the correct party-liberalconservative placement is substantial—more than three times as large as the associated
effect on issue sorting. Clearly, the close relationship between these placements and the
symbolic components of identity-based sorting are driving the magnitude of the effect of
liberal-conservative placements on partisan sorting. This finding that comports with the
one presented above in that identity sorting is more sensitive to an individual’s awareness
and knowledge of how “symbolic” ideological space operates.
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Table 4.3. The effect of recognizing party differences on sorting (item-by-item)

Correctly place Democratic Party to
the “left” of Republican Party on…
Job creation
Insurance
Aid to blacks
Defense spending
Social spending
Liberal-conservative ideology
Constant
R2
N

Partisan sorting
(issues + identity)
0.03
(0.01)
0.03
(0.01)
0.04**
(0.01)
0.05*
(0.02)
0.06**
(0.02)
0.14**
(0.02)
-3.02
(3.25)
0.15
23,287

Issue
sorting
0.02*
(0.01)
0.02*
(0.01)
0.02**
(0.01)
0.02*
(0.01)
0.03**
(0.01)
0.04**
(0.01)
-1.48
(1.63)
0.11
23,287

Identity
sorting
0.01
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)
0.02**
(0.01)
0.02*
(0.01)
0.03*
(0.01)
0.14**
(0.02)
-3.27
(1.63)
0.13
17,813

Source: 1984-2012 ANES Time-Series
Notes: Control variables excluded from analysis for brevity. Standard errors in parentheses have
been clustered by year; *p<0.05, **p<0.01

4.4

Sorting and group biases

Finally, having shown that compositional differences between these forms of sorting exist,
I conclude this chapter’s analyses with an exploration of how identity and policy sorting
contribute to different evaluative behaviors. Prior work shows that identity-based sorting
produces a considerable amount of partisan bias, or favoring one party toward the detriment
of the other (Mason, 2015). Yet extant work has not considered how different forms of
sorting might produce differentiated levels of intergroup bias.
Because group identification is driven by an innate desire to distinguish one’s ingroup in a positive light, group members reliably privilege and judge as superior the
members of their own group (c.f. Tajfel and Turner 1979). This pattern, however, cuts both
ways: while individuals describe their in-group as favorable and desirable, they also rate
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competing groups in a much more negative light (e.g. Iyengar, Llekes, and Sood, 2012).
To the extent that an individual’s political identities, evaluations, and emotions overlap,
these biases are presumed to grow stronger as the in-group narrows and the out-group
becomes larger (Brewer and Pierce, 2005; Roccas and Brewer, 2002).
These expectations draw on the theory of cross-pressures, or competing forces that
pull individuals in competing directions. For example, an individual might be pro-life
(right-leaning policy preference) and a member of a union (left-leaning membership)—
considerations that pull an individual’s political preferences in competing ideological
directions. The process of becoming better sorted removes these “cross-cutting cleavages”
that otherwise might mitigate social conflict (Lipset, 1960; Powell, 1976). When
preferences align and these cross-pressures are removed, individuals become less tolerant,
more biased, and display less magnanimity toward outgroups (Brewer, 1999; Roccas and
Brewer, 2002). Hence, the finding that identity sorting increases affective bias (Mason,
2015).
While much extant research is focused on how group memberships affect partisan
biases, our the unifying theme of this project is ideology. Thus, we might question whether
different forms of sorting affect ideological group biases. Specifically, does sorting on
identities produce greater bias than sorting on attitudes? I expect that, because the referents
of these assessments are the ideological groups, themselves, sorted identities should
produce significant levels of ideological bias—even in the absence of sorted attitudes.

4.4.1

Measuring ideological group affect (bias)

How individuals feel about groups reflects a dimension of the emotional attachments that
accompany group memberships. While specific group appraisals are interesting on their
own merits, psychologists are often interested in the relative nature of inter-group
assessments, or the preference gap between two competing groups (for recent examples,
see: Iyengar, Sood, and Llekes, 2012; Mason, 2015). Commonly termed “affective
polarization,” this form of social polarization reflects the extent to which an individual
emotionally favors one group over another. If an individual rates one group very warmly
(positively) and another group coolly (negatively), then the amount of bias is presumed to
be high, as the Euclidian distance between the two assessments is significant. If, on the
other hand, the individual feels equally positively, negatively, or indifferent toward two
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groups, then inter-group bias is low. Thus, this measure allows researchers to purge “the
tendency of citizens to pull their punches, or to give groups representing the legitimate
political opposition the benefit of the doubt when making evaluations” (Knight, 1983, pg.
319).
For our purposes, ideological bias is measured by asking individuals how they feel
toward the ideological groups. On a scale ranging from 0 to 100, respondents are asked to
rate whether they feel warmly (100) or coolly (0) toward “conservatives” and “liberals.”
To construct a measure of ideological bias, I simply take the absolute value of the
difference between liberal and conservative scores. I then rescale this item to range from
0, “no biases,” to 1, “maximum biases.”

Source: 1984-2012 CANES Time-Series
Notes: Graph portrays ideological group biases broken down into deciles. Biases
are the absolute difference between liberal and conservative feeling
thermometers, where value 0 conveys no affective difference toward either group,
and value 1 conveys complete one-sided preference for group.

Figure 4.6. Ideological bias toward liberals and conservatives
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Table 4.4. OLS estimates for the effects of sorting on ideological biases
(1)

(2)

(3)

-----

-----

Identity sorting

0.29**
(0.05)
-----

Issue sorting (deciles)

-----

0.48**
(0.02)
0.01**
(0.00)

0.21**
(0.04)
0.00**
(0.00)

Identity sorting ×
issue sorting

-----

-----

0.01
(0.01)
-0.05**
(0.01)
-0.00
(0.01)
0.01
(0.00)
0.00**
(0.00)
0.01
(0.01)
-0.02
(0.05)
0.13**
(0.01)
0.02
(0.01)
0.02**
(0.00)
0.00*
(0.00)
-5.90*
(2.06)
0.22
10,705

0.01
(0.01)
-0.04**
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)
0.02*
(0.01)
0.00*
(0.00)
0.01
(0.01)
-0.02
(0.03)
0.10**
(0.02)
0.01
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)
0.00*
(0.00)
-4.82*
(1.69)
0.33
8,742

0.04**
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)
-0.04**
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)
0.02*
(0.01)
0.00*
(0.00)
0.01
(0.01)
-0.02
(0.03)
0.10**
(0.02)
0.01
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)
0.00*
(0.00)
-4.38*
(1.63)
0.34
8,742

Partisan sorting
(issues + identity)

White
Black
Income
Male
Age
Old South
Political interest
Political knowledge
Education
Protestant
Year
Constant
R2
N

Source: 1984-2012 ANES Time-Series
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses have been clustered by year; *p<0.05,
**p<0.01
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Pooling ANES Time-Series surveys from 1984 to 2012, Figure 4.6 presents the
distribution of these scores. By a substantial margin, the modal category is “0.00,” which
represents inter-group indifference or a lack of ideological (affective) polarization on the
part of the respondent. Further, most respondents possess only modest bias between the
two groups. The 75th percentile of scores translates to roughly 0.50 on this index, which
conveys that only modest amounts of ideological bias are observed within the mass public.

4.4.2

Results

To provide a fuller illustration for why aggregating identity and issue-based sorting
together is problematic, I explore how the predictive capacity of these items differ in the
context of ideological group biases. Table 4 depicts three models of ideological bias. In
Model 1, ideological bias is modelled as a function of partisan sorting. Model 2 separates
the effect of sorting into the constituent issue and identity constructs, while Model 3
portrays the effect of these biases as the multiplicative function of identity and issue
sorting.
The results shown in the first column are straightforward: the more items on which
an individual is sorted, the more ideological bias we observe. Panel A in Figure 4.7
illustrates the contours of this effect. As individuals become more sorted, the extent to
which they both intensely like one ideological group and dislike the other increases
dramatically. Specifically, transitioning from being completely unsorted to fully sorted
results in an increase of almost a full standard deviation in ideological bias.
However, the exact shape of the relationship between sorting and these biases is
less straightforward when we disentangle sorting into identity and issue-based parts.
Consider the second model, which portrays ideological bias as a function of the two
separate forms of sorting. For purposes of illustration, I have recoded the issue sorting item,
which is approximately continuous across hundreds of values ranging from 0 to 1, into
deciles. While both entries produce positive coefficients, the magnitude of these effects
varies considerably. At the highest level of policy sorting, we observe that ideological bias
increases by about 10 points; conversely, at the highest level of identity sorting, where
ideological and partisan identities both overlap and are strong, ideological bias increases
by almost two full standard deviations—almost 50 points. Given the results of the first
model, it appears that the effect of aggregating these forms of sorting together is incredibly
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inefficient. Not only is the model fit in Model 2 substantially better than Model 1, but the
effect of sorting on ideological biases appears to be artificially depressed when sorting is
treated as an omnibus construct.
Model 3 takes the results of Model 2 and modifies the relationship between these
forms of sorting and ideological biases by adding in an interaction term to capture the joint
effect of issue and identity sorting on the exhibition of ideological bias. To ease in the
interpretation of this effect, Panel B in Figure 4.7 visually illustrates the effects of issue
sorting on ideological biases when identity sorting is held at minimum and maximum
values. Predictably, the relationship is a great deal more complex than the simple “additive”
approach to sorting utilized in Model 1.

Source: 1984-2012 ANES Time-Series
Notes: Estimates bracketed by 95 percent confidence intervals. Panel A corresponds to Model 1,
Table 4; Panel B corresponds to Model 3, Table 4.

Figure 4.7. The effect of sorting on ideological biases
Consider the case of a hypothetical person whose ideological identity is “slightly”
conservative, whose identifies as a “leaning” Democrat, but who possess a consistent set
of strong policy preferences that are mostly left-leaning (e.g. historically, the consummate
“Southern Democrat”). Effectively, this person scores near the minimum value on the
identity sorting scale (weak identities, low overlap), yet scores near the maximum value on
the policy sorting item (strong policy preferences correctly matched). According to the

83

partisan sorting approach, this person would have correctly matched an overwhelming
majority of their political preferences to their partisanship. Looking at the x-axis in Panel
A, Figure 4.7, the amount of ideological bias that we would expect this person to possess
should be near the upper threshold of the estimates, around, say, 0.30.
However, according to Panel B in Figure 4.7, this is not the “correct” amount of
bias that this person actually espouses. At minimal levels of identity sorting, even wellsorted policy preferences are only tenuously linked to ideological biases. This very same
person with the same configuration of identities and attitudes would score, instead, 0.15
units of ideological bias—almost 50 percent less than Model 1 predicts. In other words,
individuals do not exhibit the same levels of bias when their own group memberships are
weak and poorly synched. While this expectation is entirely consistent with social identity
theory (see Huddy, 2013 for a review), partisan sorting misrepresents the predictive
capacity of these concepts. Far from interchangeable constructs, these forms of sorting
produce fundamentally different levels of psychological affect, further demonstrating that
identity and issue sorting reflect distinct patterns of coherence among one’s political
preferences.

4.5

Sorting and behavioral motivations

Aside from differences in the effect of these facets of sorting on group biases, what role do
these forms of sorting play in relation to behavioral motivations? Do the effects of identity
and issue sorting on political participation vary? While past research shows that sorting
decreases the likelihood of casting split-tickets (Davis and Mason, 2016), it has not
examined how sorting might shape the prior decision to actually cast a vote in the first
place.
Scholars know a great deal about the correlates of casting a vote for a presidential
candidate (see Lewis-Beck et al., 2008 for a review). In particular, past research almost
uniformly observes that partisans cast votes at higher rates, participate in campaigns, and
follow politics more closely than otherwise-unaffiliated persons (Converse, et al., 1960;
Brady, Verba, and Schlozman, 1995; Lewis-Beck et al., 2008). Why? The expectation that
sorting should increase an individual’s propensity to participate draws on the expressive
functions of partisanship (e.g. Green, Palmquist, and Schickler, 2002). As I outline above
and in Chapters 2 and 3, this perspective involves treating political identities as forms of
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symbolic social identities, wherein group members are motivated to act on behalf of their
groups. Gerber, Huber, and Washington (2010), for example, use field experiments to
demonstrate a strong, causal relationship between partisan identity and turnout. Elsewhere,
Huddy, Mason, and Aaroe (2015) find strong support for an expressive interpretation of
partisanship. They demonstrate that campaign activity is a function of partisans positively
expressing their identities and a diminished role for issue stances and ideological identity.
This latter point raises an interesting question. While this research reveals the
power of partisanship in contributing to political participation, what happens when these
identities converge? Given the tension between instrumental and expressive treatments of
partisanship (Archeneaux and Vander Wielen, 2013), how do different forms of sorting
that account for these different approaches affect turnout? I expect that identity sorting
should be associated with greater turnout beyond the effect of consistent party-issue
preferences.

4.5.1

Measuring turnout

Research in the survey literature shows that more respondents say they intend to vote than
actually end up casting a ballot (e.g., Bernstein et al. 2001; Silver et al. 1986). This issue
is problematic insofar as individuals with stronger identities may feel additional social
pressure to confirm that they participated, thereby inflating the effect that we wish to detect.
Unfortunately, the CANES data do not contain validated voting records, which would help
resolve tendencies to over-report. However, given the limited availability of the necessary
survey instruments (i.e. the cohort of issue questions), the CANES provides the opportunity
to make a strict comparison of identity and issue sorting that matches the above analyses.
Here, self-reported turnout is coded 1 and otherwise 0.
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Table 4.5. The effects of sorting on turnout
Partisan sorting
(issues + identity)
Identity sorting

(1)

(2)

(3)

1.28**
(0.18)
-----

-----

-----

1.15**
(0.19)

1.99**
(0.36)

Issue sorting
(deciles)

-----

0.10**
(0.02)

0.12**
(0.02)

Identity sorting ×
issue sorting

-----

-----

0.23**
(0.09)
0.75**
(0.14)
1.42**
(0.11)
1.17**
(0.13)
-0.22**
(0.02)
0.03**
(0.00)
-0.24**
(0.09)
0.33
(0.82)
1.54**
(0.22)
0.06
(0.04)
0.00
(0.00)
-7.56
(8.94)
11,298

0.33**
(0.12)
0.67**
(0.16)
1.44**
(0.07)
1.24**
(0.18)
-0.27**
(0.05)
0.03**
(0.00)
-0.16*
(0.07)
0.14
(0.77)
1.33**
(0.21)
0.04
(0.03)
0.00
(0.01)
-3.97
(13.46)
9,047

-0.12**
(0.03)
0.33**
(0.12)
0.66**
(0.15)
1.43**
(0.07)
1.24**
(0.18)
-0.27**
(0.05)
0.03**
(0.00)
-0.17*
(0.07)
0.13
(0.77)
1.34**
(0.21)
0.04
(0.03)
0.00
(0.01)
-5.23
(13.18)
9,047

White
Black
Education
Income
Male
Age
Old South
Political interest
Political knowledge
Protestant
Year
Constant
N

Source: 1984-2012 ANES Time-Series
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses have been clustered by year; *p<0.05,
**p<0.01
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4.5.2

Results

The results presented in Table 4.5 depict the effect of sorting on self-reported turnout.
Model 1 is designed to test how partisan sorting, which includes both the issue and liberalconservative elements, affects the likelihood of casting a vote. The large positive and
statistically-significant coefficient indicates that sorting exerts the predicted effect on
turnout. Given that log-odds ratios are not readily interpretable, the first panel in Figure 4.8
illustrates the contours of this effect. Simply, as an individual correctly connects more
items to their partisanship, the likelihood of political participation increases.
However, this effect is more nuanced than we otherwise might assume. The second
model in Table 5 indicates that the effect of identity and issue sorting exert independent
effects on self-reported turnout, albeit the magnitude of these coefficients is similar. To
assess how these facets of sorting work in conjunction, Model 3 analyzes turnout as a
function of the different sorting terms, in addition to an interaction variable that captures
the effect of identity sorting contingent on issue sorting.

Source: 1984-2012 ANES Time-Series
Notes: Estimates bracketed by 95 percent confidence intervals. Panel A corresponds to Model 1,
Table 5; Panel B corresponds to Model 3, Table 5.

Figure 4.8. The effect of sorting on turnout
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The second panel in Figure 4.8 illustrates the shape of this effect. Let us consider
a few practical examples of particular configurations of identities and issues in order to
better understand these predicted values. The light-grey shaded area conveys the marginal
effect of maximum levels of identity sorting at varying deciles of issue sorting. For the
person with strong and matching political identities, having minimal levels of issuesorting—i.e. making very few and weak matches between policy and partisanship—does
not undercut the power of sorted identities. These individuals are roughly as likely to cast
a vote as those persons with strong and sorted issue preferences.
Interestingly, however, the effect of sorting on issues does matter in this setting.
Unlike the estimates presented in Figure 4.7, where issue-sorting had negligible impact on
ideological biases, here, the presence of well-sorted issue preferences is sufficient to
generate a higher likelihood of reported voting. Even when an individual’s identities are
unsorted, say, a leaner Democrat who identifies as a moderate, possessing a strong and
consistent set of issue preferences generates a modestly strong propensity for political
participation.

4.6

Discussion and conclusion

The relationship between ideology and partisanship lies at the heart of the question, “What
is sorting?” As the culmination of the distinctions broached in the previous chapters, these
analyses form the empirical backbone of the claim that Americans can, and often do, sort
independently within two distinct domains. Further, I demonstrate that artificially
constraining these political preferences into an omnibus metric—as prior research has
done—not only misrepresents the knowledge-based foundations of the ongoing sorting of
the American mass public, but that this approach risks fundamentally misspecifying the
downstream consequences of this sorting. These findings warrant three conclusions.
First, the relationship between issue and identity sorting is both modest and
positive, much like the relationship between the underlying materials that comprise these
constructs. In fact, although the correlation between forms of sorting rises and falls over
time, the general trend of the relationship between these items is positive in the aggregate.
In general, Americans exhibit greater sorting on both identities and attitudes today relative
the early 1980s. Still, given the enormous heterogeneity among the average individual’s
policy preferences, the evidence for within-subject changes in individual-level issue
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sorting over time is meager, at best. Instead, individuals are much more likely to constrain
their symbolic political identities than they are to become sophisticated, policy-matchingpartisans.
What explains this disconnect? The temporal effects at play could have something
to do with both micro- and macro-level processes. Given what we know about how
individuals answer surveys, that attitudes appear to be the manifestation of “top-of-thehead” considerations (Zaller and Feldman, 1992), it is unlikely that, barring some sort of
extreme event that placed a number of issues at the forefront of survey-takers minds, we
should observe increased sorting between two time periods. However, given the highly
symbolic and salient nature of political labels, it makes a great deal of sense that, as the
parties became more polarized from 1992 to 1996, individuals would also become reliably
better sorted. This, in turn, helps to explain the modest growth between these constructs in
the aggregate: the parties, as they have polarized, have communicated where they stand on
a variety of issues.
Relatedly, second, the results produced in this chapter offer some insight into the
core informational requirements of sorting. Understanding where the parties fit within leftright ideological space contributes to greater identity relative policy sorting; in contrast,
knowing something about the relationship between parties and their policy platforms is
related to greater issue relative identity sorting. This is a significant disconnect missed by
earlier work on sorting. As we turn to a fuller study of identity sorting in Part 2 of this
dissertation, I revisit this finding to map the exact contours of how elite cues contribute to
the convergence between Americans’ political identities. Needless to say, the conventional
wisdom regarding the connection between perceived polarization and sorting is also
plagued by these differences in the meaning and interpretation of these forms of
information.
Finally, the difference between the effects of sorting on ideological biases and
turnout portrayed in the final set of analyses is noteworthy. The prevailing metric of
partisan sorting woefully mispredicts both outcome variables. I find that maximal levels of
identity sorting at near-minimum levels of issue sorting produce just as much bias toward
ideological groups as the measure of sorting advanced by Levendusky in The Partisan Sort.
While this empirical finding is welcome in the sense that it underscores the utility of
separating issue from identity sorting, these results are normatively troubling in that the
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average citizen will exhibit prominent levels of affective biases in the absence of a
meaningful integration of policy preferences. Recalling that even middling levels of issue
sorting will produce significant group biases provided that identity sorting is high, the
emotional ties that bind individuals to their groups do, indeed, appear to be tribal. Although
this bias increases dramatically as more policy attitudes come to match one’s partisanship,
this baseline level of bias is concerning in that individuals might reliably prejudice their
ideological out-group without ever holding attitudes that are congruent to their in-group or
counter to their out-group. Further, even in the absence of matching issue-preferences,
individuals with highly-sorted identities are roughly as like to report casting a vote as those
sorted persons with consistent, matching, and strong issue preferences—confirming the
finding that these identities are raw and emotive, capable of spawning behavior even in
light of low levels of issue-based consistency.

------

Having provided both a theoretical and empirical justification for splitting partisan
sorting into separate issue and identity-based components, I now turn to an in-depth
analysis of identity sorting, which embodies the tribal (Mason, 2015) and symbolic
attachments that drive much political behavior (Achen and Bartels, 2016). In Part 2, I focus
the remainder of this dissertation on digging deeper into the foundations and consequences
of identity sorting. Although prior work on sorting provides some general insights that are
applicable to the study of the convergence between political identities, I find that the
identity sorting is not only context dependent, but that it is a direct response to a particular
form of elite cues. In turn, this sorting has two serious, downstream consequences that have
serious ramifications for American political behavior that have been insufficiently
explored. Identity sorting not only decreases individuals’ baseline commitments to
compromise as a social good, but it fundamentally alters the particular criteria that
individuals use to select elected representatives. Understanding the incivility and
intractability of modern political discourse and representation, then, requires further
analysis of the convergence between these partisan and ideological identities.
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Chapter 5: Elite Cues, Group Memberships, and Sorting

Elite Cues, Group Memberships, and Sorting
“A wise man gets more use from his enemies than a fool from his friends.”
- Baltasar Gracián, The Art of Worldly Wisdom

5.1

Introduction

The prior chapters have laid a foundation for understanding the content of sorting. I now
turn to exploring why this sorting occurs. In particular, this chapter investigates the factors
that contribute to the convergence between political identities, which are the currency of
modern politics. Let us begin with the acknowledgement that individuals are not born
partisans or ideologues. Political preferences are, to some degree, learned.68 In particular,
the political socialization literature implies that elites play a primary role in shaping
citizens’ attitudes and orientations (Gilens and Murakawa, 2002). As Downs (1957) notes,
the average person simply cannot be an expert in many areas of policy, so “he will seek
assistance from men who are experts in those fields, have the same political goals he does,
and have good judgment” (pg. 233). This cue-taking underscores the leading explanation
for the growth of sorting within the American mass public: as the political parties have
polarized, individuals receive clearer cues about the “correct” correspondence between
their partisan and ideological preferences (Fiorina and Abrams, 2008, pg. 581;
Levendusky, 2009, pg. 39).
While intuitive, this logic is flawed. First, the average citizen is neither politically
sophisticated nor logically extrapolates information across many policy domains
(Converse, 1964; Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996; Kahan and Braman, 2006). As a result,
individuals struggle to conform to Downs’ idealized notion of cue-taking, often relying,
instead, upon symbolic or group-based cues to navigate the political landscape (Bullock,
2011)—a tendency that undercuts the depiction of sorting as citizens following policy-

68

A Lockean epistemology notwithstanding, however, a growing body of work at the
intersection of neuro- and political science also demonstrates that such orientations are, at
least partially, heritable (Alford, Funk, and Hibbing, 2005; Hatemi and McDermott, 2012).
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based elite cues (e.g. Levendusky, 2009). Second, citizens’ spatial perceptions of elites are
often biased and asymmetric. Not only does the average American tend to misperceive the
extent of policy polarization (Levendusky and Malhotra, 2016), but ideological placements
of in-party and out-party elites and copartisans are not uniform (Ahler, 2014).
Consequently, these tendencies undermine the linkage between perceptions of party
polarization and sorting (e.g. Davis and Dunaway, 2016).
In this manuscript, I demonstrate that the conventional stylization of the
relationship between elite cues and sorting cannot fully account for why identity sorting
occurs. I begin by showing that the convergence between Americans’ political identities is
tenuously related to policy polarization or how individuals understand policy space. Rather,
symbolic cues within the polarized political environment are almost wholly responsible for
identity-based sorting (Study 1). Linking this finding to a social identity approach to
intergroup behavior, I then demonstrate that identity sorting is not driven by comparative
group assessments, or what is commonly termed “perceived polarization,” but by beliefs
about out-group dissimilarity and extremity (Study 2).
These findings not only require a new framework for understanding how elite cues
shape sorting, but point to a sobering conclusion. Effectively, given the social identity
foundations of sorting, it may matter little whether or not elites are objectively divided or
moderate across many issues and policy domains. Provided that political elites continue to
wage symbolic wars of ideological tribalism, this sorting—and its attendant downstream
effects like partisan bias (Mason, 2015) and electoral polarization (Davis and Mason,
2016)—show no sign of slowing.

5.2

Elite cues and sorting

The accumulated wisdom regarding the development of mass opinion points to a general
“elite cue theory,” which suggests that individuals derive their political opinions in light of
elite discourse (e.g. Key, 1966; Nie, Verba, and Petrocik, 1979; Zaller, 1992; Berinsky,
2009; Lenz, 2012; Brader, Tucker, and Duell, 2012). In the aggregate, for example,
Carmines and Stimson (1989) demonstrate that changes in party elites’ behavior toward
racial issues in the 1960s generated subsequent divisions within the mass public’s attitudes,
while the crystallization of abortion attitudes can be similarly traced to elites taking less
ambiguous positions on the issue (Adams, 1997). At the individual level, elite cues serve
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as information-laden signals that citizens use to infer what to believe and how to act (Lupia
and McCubbins, 1998; Cohen, 2003, Study 1; see also: Lau and Redlawsk, 2001).
However, while this literature seems to provide a firm foundation for the relationship
between cue-taking and sorting, in the forthcoming sections, I deconstruct the conventional
specification of this cue-taking mechanism and theorize a new social-identity driven
framework for understanding why American’s political identities have converged.

5.2.1 The conventional explanation for elite-driven sorting
With the movement of George Wallace’s conservative, working class defectors to the
Republican Party and John Anderson’s liberal Republicans to the Democratic Party, the
late 20th Century realignment of the political parties cemented into place two ideologicallycoherent parties. Whereas conflict among legislators was once multidimensional, the
prevailing cleavage within Congress now resembles a single dimension of conflict, where
Republican legislators are uniformly conservative and Democratic legislators, liberal
(McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, 2006). As these liberal-conservative divisions extended
across numerous issues, scholars predicted that the coherency of public opinion would
respond accordingly. Layman and Carsey (2002, pg. 799) write that

[i]f Democratic and Republican elites take positions on
multiple issue dimensions that are consistently liberal and
consistently conservative, respectively, then politicallyaware party identifiers will receive cues that their views
on different issue agendas should go together and they
should move toward polarized stands on each of those
dimensions.
While the extent to which these changes have polarized mass opinion is a matter
of some debate, the relationship between elite polarization and sorting rests on firmer
footing.69 Indeed, this account underscores Levendusky’s (2009, pg. 3) conceptualization
of the mechanism that constrains whether an individual’s ideological preferences are
congruent with their professed partisanship. According to this logic,
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Whether or not this has generated any meaningful, compensatory issue polarization, is
another matter, although substantial evidence suggests not (Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope,
2006; Fiorina and Abrams, 2010; Ansolabehere, Rodden, and Snyder, 2006). But increased
sorting on issues may occur even as increased extremity may not (Mason, 2015b).
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[a]s elites pull apart to the ideological poles they clarify
what it means to be a Democrat or a Republican. Ordinary
voters use these clearer cues to align their own
partisanship and ideology. Elite polarization, by
clarifying where the parties stand on the issues of the day,
causes ordinary voters to sort.
However, as it relates to the convergence between partisan and ideological
identities, this narrative hinges upon a number of idealized (and problematic) expectations.
First, it assumes that individuals are not only able to recognize salient policy differences
between political candidates or parties, but that they should be able to extrapolate that
information in meaningful ways—an assumption that rests on somewhat awkward
empirical grounds given the low levels of political knowledge and sophistication that are
characteristic of the mass public (e.g. Converse, 1964; Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996;
Kahan and Braman, 2006). Further, this account implies that the average citizen will
objectively assess the degree to which elites are polarized—i.e. that individuals’
comparative assessments of the parties are bereft of well-known biases that stem from
group memberships. These are not insignificant assumptions, and they generate two
questions that the prevailing sorting literature has not sufficiently addressed: 1) Are all cues
uniformly related to sorting?; and, 2) If not, then do group memberships shape the
informational utility of these cues?

5.2.2

Different cues, different sorting?

On a basic level, cues are simply information—yet not all information is equal. As Bullock
(2011) notes, cues may be informal and symbolic, for example, “the Democratic Party is
liberal,” or they may be explicit and particular, say, “the Democratic Party is pro-choice.”
Both statements provide information about Democrats. In the first case, knowing that the
Democratic Party is liberal may conjure up a variety of expectations about the
(stereotypical) policy positions of that party; in the latter case, the knowledge of
Democrats’ position regarding reproductive choice conveys specific information about that
single policy domain. The extent to which the above cues might resonate with citizens,
and, importantly, the extent to which they will provide the type of information necessary
to navigate the political environment, however, appears contingent upon the type of
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message and whether this information is readily or easily interpretable by the target
audience (Bullock, 2011; Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus, 2013). In particular, this
extant research generally distinguishes between symbolic and policy-based cues.70
With this in mind, let us briefly return to the Levendusky’s (2009) depiction of the
linkage between elite cues and mass sorting. In his analysis, cues are operationalized as an
index of correctly placing Democrats to the left of Republicans on a variety of items,
ranging from perspectives on government spending to the parties’ liberal-conservative
identities. As a result of aggregating these placements together, both policy and symbolic
cues are treated as functionally-equivalent in their relationship to the convergence between
partisan and ideological preferences.
On its face, this simple coding decision seems innocent enough.71 But a great deal
of evidence points to serious problems with combining these two very different types of
information. Specifically, there is significant scholarly consensus that ideological labels
and the particular attitudes that populate belief systems are not interchangeable concepts.
In fact, while most contemporary samples of American survey respondents find that
ideological self-identification within liberal-conservative space is reliably correlated with
a varied range of policy preferences—including preferences for decreased (increased)
social welfare spending, progressive (traditional) cultural-moral stances on issues like
same-sex marriage and abortion, and decreasing (increasing) the size and strength of the
military (Malka and Llekes, 2010)—extant research indicates that ideological labels and
issue-based indices of ideology are not directly analogous constructs (Conover and
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While this appears to be a firm distinction, it is true that some policy cues are more or
less “symbolic” in the sense that they are intertwined with ideological labels. I return to
this point in further detail in Study 1.
71
A derivative concern with this strategy, however, is that perceived cues are treated as
“discrete” phenomena. That is, individuals either correctly place the parties or they do not.
This decision may help to reduce some of the error variance inherent in a response-limited
continuum—is the difference between degrees of ideological extremity interpreted as
monotonic by respondents?—but it nevertheless loses valuable information about the
extent to which individuals perceive that the parties are polarized. Further, this strategy is
not particularly objective in that a respondent might place Democrats to the left of
Republicans, but still select a “conservative” response for Democrats (i.e. a response that
falls to the right of the midpoint on the associated response set). This person would be
awarded points for correctly placing Democrats to the left of Republicans, even as the
assessment is, in a sense, “wrong.”
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Feldman, 1981; Levitin and Miller, 1979; Popp and Rudolph, 2011; Devine, 2015; Mason,
2015b; Broockman, 2016).72
Relatedly, while the conventional explanation for sorting implies that all forms of
elite conflict ought to generate greater correspondence between partisan and ideological
preferences, these discrepancies imply that ordinary citizens may not derive the same
informational utility from symbolic and policy-based cues. Given the assessability and
power of symbolic cues as heuristic devices (Valentino, Huthcings, and White, 2002;
Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus, 2013), I expect that exposure to symbolic cues—e.g.
describing elite polarization in terms of liberal-conservative ideological divisions—ought
to generate greater convergence between partisan and ideological identities than policybased ones—e.g. describing party polarization within the context of the debt ceiling
crisis.73

H1: The effect of symbolic elite polarization on sorting
should be stronger than the effect of policy-based
polarization.
5.2.3

A social identity framework for understanding elite-driven sorting

The extant evidence for the linkage between elite cues and sorting comprises showing that
individuals who perceive many differences between the elites should exhibit higher levels
of sorting. The expectation outlined above, however, implies that perceptions of liberalconservative party differences (i.e. perceived symbolic polarization) should beget greater
sorting than perceiving that the parties are divided on a variety of issues (i.e. perceived
issue polarization). Yet, a second problem lurks in the specification of the relationship
between these “cues” and mass sorting.74 Given that perceptions of elite polarization are
This disconnect is further revealed in both the “symbolic-operational paradox,” which
implies that Americans’ overwhelming favor the conservative ideological label in spite of
holding policy preferences that are, on balance, liberal (Ellis and Stimson, 2012), and the
observation that individuals’ own attitudes don’t reliably cohere within a single dimension
(e.g. Lupton, Myers, and Thornton, 2015).
73
Further bolstering expectation is the finding that individuals generally ignore or discount
policy information in their political evaluations when given party labels (Rahn, 1993;
Cohen, 2003).
74
Prior research treats these assessments as more or less indicative of the overall power or
salience of elite cues, even as these assessments are not, strictly speaking, cues themselves
(c.f. Levendusky, 2009).
72
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operationalized as the simple distance between placements of the parties in ideological
space, scholars have effectively treated these assessments of polarization as unbiased
appraisals (e.g. Davis and Dunaway, 2016). This decision, however, is questionable given
the selective, motivated, and biased nature of information processing. First, partisans do
not evenly interact with informational sources (Stroud, 2010). Second, a substantial
literature on motivated reasoning indicates that individuals expend a great deal of energy
counter-arguing evidence that is incongruent to their political preferences (Taber and
Lodge, 2006; Nyhan and Reifler, 2010), which dovetails with the observation that affective
biases fundamentally shape perceptions of basic ideological proximity (Iyengar, Sood, and
Lelkes, 2012; Iyengar and Westwood, 2015).
Recent work pays closer attention to how these psychological tendencies shape
misperceptions of both mass and elite polarization. Ahler (2014) notes, for example, that
individuals often wrongly attribute elite polarization to rank-and-file ideologues, while
Levendusky and Malhotra (2016) show that individuals exaggerate the extent of mass
polarization. Further, consider the curious asymmetry in perceptions of elite ideology. As
Figure 5.1 illustrates, there is roughly a 10 point gap between the extremity of respondents’
liberal-conservative placements of the in- and out-group party. In other words, respondents
perceive the out-group party to be almost 15 percent more extreme than they perceive the
in-group party. If basic ideological placements of the parties are asymmetric, then it
logically follows that perceptions of elite polarization, or the Euclidean distance between
ideological placements of the parties, are biased downwards in the sense that, while both
parties have objectively polarized, individuals do not recognize these changes evenly. This
finding presents an obvious challenge for the conventional sorting calculus, which treats
these assessments as unbiased in their relationship to sorting.
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Notes: Individuals are asked to describe whether the parties are liberal or
conservative on seven-point scales, which are transformed to range from
0, “incorrect, extreme placement” to 1, “correct, extreme placement.”
Estimates are weighted means for respective year.
Figure 5.1. Perceived ideological extremity of parties by group
membership
Social identity theory, however, provides an alternative approach to engage these
asymmetries in relation to sorting by linking such appraisals to group memberships. If
partisanship is a particular form of social identity (Huddy, 2001; Greene, 1999), then
prototypic group members (e.g. political elites) provide the archetype to which group
members should pattern their preferences. This expectation, however, cuts both ways.
Social comparisons also produce contrast effects between groups (Campbell, 1967). Both
Turner et al.’s (1987) and Brewer’s (1991) work, for example, implies that the
categorization processes that distinguish in- from out-group membership motivate
individuals to emphasize the distinctive features of out-groups in order to establish
intergroup boundaries that separate peers from opponents.
While classic versions of social identity theory emphasize that individuals desire
to emulate in-group prototypes (e.g. Tajfel, 1959), thereby prioritizing the role of in-group
cues, more recent applications of social identity theory in political science find that outgroup cues are particularly powerful. Goren, Federico, and Kittilson (2009), for example,
show that out-group cues increase the salience of individuals’ in-group values, while
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Nicholson (2012) demonstrates that out-group cues polarize individuals’ attitudes beyond
the effect of exposure to in-group cues. What explains the power of these cues? Consider,
first, that social comparisons literally hinge on distinctiveness, necessitating an
appreciation for the features that distinguish out-groups (Brewer, 1991). Second, Tversky’s
(1977) work suggests that the illusion of out-group homogeneity—the perception that an
out-group is uniformly undesirable—emphasizes the objectionable features of out-group
members relative the attractiveness of in-group characteristics. Finally, Atkinson’s (1986,
pg. 132) work posits that group differences play an important evaluative role; because
“similarity and difference are not related by a perfect inverse function, the question arises
as to which is the more basic process. Perhaps the best way to answer this question is to
consider which is more likely to be noticed. The tentative answer would be difference since
the judgment reflects distinctive over common features.”
By extension, one productive way of thinking about how group memberships
shape perceptions of elite cues is to consider this common focus on out-group
distinctiveness. Given that optimizing distinctiveness is a core, if not primary, feature of
intergroup relations (Brewer, 1999), combined with the more general finding that negative
information is weighted more heavily than positive information (Ito et al., 1998), I expect
that sorting is actually a reactionary, identity-driven process contingent on a sensitivity to
out-group differences. When individuals perceive greater differences between themselves
and their political opposition they learn precisely what they do not believe or wish to
emulate. As Nicholson (2012, pg. 4) writes, “In an environment characterized by
intergroup disagreement, the desire to seek difference with the outgrup will likely be
strong.” Accordingly, I expect that perceived out-group ideological dissimilarity should
generate greater sorting than perceived in-group similarity or simple group differences
(what is traditionally labelled “perceived polarization”).

H2: Perceived out-group dissimilarity should generate
greater sorting than perceived in-group similarity.

5.3

Study 1: What “type” of cues cause sorting?

To investigate how elite cues shape sorting, I use an experimental design that juxtaposes
the type of cues presented to survey subjects in order to measure how different
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configurations of polarization affect sorting. The data for this experiment are drawn from
Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk (mTurk) workforce during March, 2016. While mTurk
utilizes an opt-in sampling frame, which results in a non-random sample, prior research
finds that such online convenience samples present modest problems for experimental
research (Berinksy, Huber, and Lenz, 2010).75 The resulting sample of 1,102 American
adults is young (the average age is 36 years old with a standard deviation of 12.8), educated
(modal educational attainment is a college degree), and white (78 percent of the sample).
Aggregating leaners into the partisan categories, 58 percent of subjects identify as
Democrats, 28 percent as Republicans, and 14 percent as “pure” Independents.

5.3.1

Experimental design

Using a multi-condition between-subjects design, participants were either assigned to a
“symbolic” or “policy” cue condition; subjects were then randomly presented an
illustration / vignette combination that varied only in the pictorial presentation of
polarization—the text vignettes accompanying the portrayals of polarization are identical
across the respective policy and symbolic cue treatments. In the interest of brevity, I present
contrasts between observed sorting in three conditions that utilize a common, spatial
depiction of party polarization: (1) average symbolic polarization, (2) average policy
polarization, and (3) a control group.76
Figure 5.2 illustrates two of the different substantive treatments that individuals
could receive. In the symbolic cue treatment (N = 194), the labels “liberal” and
“conservative” are used to describe divisions between the parties; meanwhile, the policy
cue treatment uses an agree-disagree format to illustrate where the two parties are divided
on the issue of the debt ceiling (N = 182). This particular policy issue was selected
purposefully. The debt ceiling has become a fulcrum in Congress in recent years, resulting
in multiple “crises” that brought the function of the federal government to a grinding and
75

In fact, in this application, the higher levels of education and political interest that are
generally associated with this worker pool actually work against observing treatment
effects insofar as sorting in the baseline control group is likely to be higher than the
average levels of sorting in the mass public—thereby decreasing the likelihood of
observing significant contrasts.
76
The remaining treatments depict polarization using different pictorial representations of
polarization; the contrasts presented here, however, are a fair representation of how extant
literature rolls elite divisions into a single dimension.
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much-publicized halt (see Jacobson [2013] for an expanded treatment regarding this issue’s
close relationship with polarization and gridlock). However, even if the debt ceiling is a
medium salience-issue among the minds of average citizens, presenting the parties as
intractably divided should still trigger sorting if mere partisan conflict provides the needed
material to cause convergence between ideological and partisan preferences.
To further minimize presentational characteristics that might act as confounds, the
“average” location of both the Democratic and Republican Parties on the linear axis that
accompanies each vignette are identical across treatments (i.e. the parties are placed at the
same location on the axis in both the policy and symbolic conditions). The sole differences
between treatments, then, are the content of the vignette and the information displayed
upon the associated axis depicting the parties as polarized. If there are observable
differences in sorting that result from exposure to these treatments, then we can be
confident that it is the content (i.e. type) of the cues and not the visual portrayal of party
polarization that drives these differences.77

5.3.2

Measurement

Dependent variable. The outcome of interest is partisan-ideological sorting. Sorting is,
ultimately, a process of categorization. In its simplest form, it merely accounts for whether
an individual’s political preferences are correctly matched: liberal (conservative)
preferences correspond to Democratic (Republican) partisanship. In past research, these
ideological preferences comprise both symbolic and policy-based preferences (e.g.
Levendusky, 2009). Yet while it may be attractive to craft an omnibus measure of sorting,
there are serious problems with this approach (see Appendix B for an expanded discussion
of this point). Instead, it seems both theoretically and empirically preferable to parcel
sorting into separate issue- and identity-based constructs. The forthcoming analyses focus
on this latter construct, partisan-ideological sorting, which captures the convergence
between political identities (c.f. Mason, 2015a; Davis and Dunaway, 2016).

77

That said, it is possible that there are variations even among policy cues as to their
symbolic informational qualities. I leave this question, however, to future research.
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A. Policy-based cue (polarization

A recent study conducted by the Center for Congressional Studies sheds new light on the policy
preferences of Congress.
Researchers found for example, that the parties are divided on the issue of public debt. Democrats
prefer to increase the debt ceiling; Republicans, on the other hand, do not support raising the debt
ceiling.
The figure above depicts the average position that Democrats and Republicans in Congress have
taken on this issue. Some legislators take more moderate positions, but, Democrats and Republicans
are clearly split on whether or not to increase the debt ceiling.

B. Symbolic cue (polarization

A recent study conducted by the Center for Congressional Studies sheds new light on the ideological
preferences of Congress.
The figure above depicts the average ideological position of Democrats and Republicans in
Congress. As you can see, the parties are divided by ideology: Democrats are liberal, and
Republicans are conservative. Although some legislators are more moderate, liberal Democrats and
conservative Republicans dominate their respective parties.
This means that Democrats and Republicans rarely agree on the right approach to a number of
different issues. Instead, Democrats prefer more liberal solutions to problems facing our country,
while Republicans prefer more conservative approaches.

Figure 5.2. Elite cues experimental treatments
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Following the measurement scheme outlined in Mason (2015a), I first calculate
the overlap between partisanship and ideological self-placement, which are both measured
using the traditional seven-category response sets that range from Democratic / liberal
identification (low values) to Republican / conservative identification (high values). The
overlap between the two items is expressed by subtracting a subject’s score on the
ideological identification item from their score on the partisanship one. Low values on the
resulting measure communicate perfect (“correct”) overlap between the two items, while
high values convey an extreme mismatch between partisanship and ideological
identification. Next, I rescale this item so that high values will be associated with greater
overlap. This score is then multiplied by the strength of both the partisan and ideological
identities (measures that are derived by folding the partisanship and ideological
identification items in half). The final index is rescaled to range from 0, incorrectly sorted
and weak identities, to 1, perfectly sorted and strong identities.
Controls. Participants’ race is broken into a series of dichotomous variables where
identification as white or black is coded 1 and otherwise 0. Age is a continuous variable
corresponding to subjects’ actual age in years. Education is a five-category item ranging
from elementary education, coded 0, to a post-graduate degree, coded 1. Male is coded 1
for men and 0 for women. Income is an ordinal variable ranging 1, “less than $10,000,” to
12, “more than $150,000).” Internet is coded 1 for individuals who consume the majority
of their news from online sources. News consumption is a seven-category item that captures
how many days a week a respondent watches, listens, or reads about the news. Finally,
political knowledge, is an index of recognition items that includes correctly identifying the
Speaker of the House, who nominates Supreme Court Justices, and which party controls
the House of Representatives during the time of data collection. This item is rescaled to
range from 0, “no correct responses,” to 1, “all correct responses.”

5.3.3

Results

To investigate whether different types of cues cause greater convergence between partisan
and ideological identities, I regress treatment assignment and a series of covariates on
partisan-ideological sorting, thereby providing a strict comparison between the effects of
policy and symbolic cues. As the coefficient entry for the policy cue treatment in Table 5.1
indicates, depicting the parties as polarized on a significant issue of public policy does little
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to increase the overlap and extremity of partisan and ideological identities. Figure 5.3
illustrates that the marginal effect of exposure to the policy cue treatment is insignificant
given that the estimate’s confidence interval closely overlaps with zero.
However, individuals in the symbolic cue treatment were more sorted than subjects
in both the control and policy cue conditions. As Figure 5.3 illustrates, presenting the
parties as being polarized within liberal-conservative ideological space generates greater
partisan-ideological sorting. Not only is this the marginal effect associated with assignment
to that condition distinguishable from zero, but the paired contrast between policy and
symbolic polarization is also significant (b = 0.07, t = 1.86). Further, the magnitude of this
difference is large; the effect of exposure to symbolic polarization, for example, is
equivalent to two full units of educational attainment.

Table 5.1. Elite cues and partisan-ideological sorting
b
0.067**
-0.004
0.096**
0.124
-0.002**
0.033**
0.110**
-0.001
-0.038
0.047
0.016**
0.219**

Symbolic cue
Policy cue
White
Black
Age
Education
Male
Income
Internet
Political knowledge
News consumption
Constatnt

s.e.
(0.039)
(0.040)
(0.040)
(0.080)
(0.001)
(0.019)
(0.032)
(0.005)
(0.036)
(0.058)
(0.008)
(0.097)

Source: Amazon mTurk sample, June, 2016
Notes: *p<0.05, **p<0.01

5.3.4

Discussion

The careful reader may ask: Why do these results differ from past research? First, it is
important to note that prior experimental research has largely concerned itself with how
polarized elites affect attitudinal consistency and simple matching of policy attitudes visà-vis partisanship (e.g. Levendusky, 2009, 2010)—not the strength of the relationship
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between partisan and ideological identification, which the metric of identity sorting used
here captures. Second, consider the informational nature of policy and symbolic cues. To
use the parlance of Ellis and Stimson (2012), policy cues provide information about the
instrumental or “operational” nature of the parties. We know, however, that the average
citizen’s own symbolic liberal-conservative identity is modestly independent of their
combined bundle of operational preferences (e.g. Conover and Feldman, 1981; Devine,
2015; Mason, 2016). In this case, merely presenting the parties as intractably polarized
does little to grease the convergence between partisanship and ideological identification,
ostensibly because 1) this policy information is more tenuously related to how individuals
conceive of the relationship between partisanship and ideology, and 2) the symbolic cue
condition literally preloads subjects with these connections by establishing the link
between liberal-conservative ideology and partisan identity.

0.15

Marginal effect

0.10
0.05
0.00
-0.05
-0.10
Symbolic cue (average) Policy cue (average)

Notes: Solid lines represent 90 percent confidence intervals; contrast
between conditions is significant (b = .07, t = 1.86).
Figure 5.3. The effect of elite cues on sorting

However, as I will show in the next study, the relationship between symbolic cues
and sorting is still more complex than this finding. In fact, there is nothing particularly
unique about polarization as an informational precursor to sorting. Instead, perceptions of
symbolic out-group extremity and dissimilarity weigh heavily on the minds of individuals;
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dovetailing with recent research that illustrates the pervasive nature of the in-group / outgroup paradigm (e.g. Nicholson, 2012; Iyengar, Sood, and Llekes, 2012), I find that greater
correspondence between partisan and ideological identities has much less to do with
comparative party differences—i.e. elite polarization—than it does with perceptions of
out-group ideological dissimilarities.

5.4

Study 2: Group memberships and sorting

In this second study, I seek to establish two novel features of the relationship between elite
cues and sorting: 1) perceptions of symbolic cues should again exert greater influence on
sorting than policy-based ones, and 2) these assessments should vary in their relationship
to sorting according to group membership.

5.4.1

Data and Measurement

The data for Study 2 are drawn from the 1972-2012 American National Elections Studies
(ANES) Time-Series surveys and 1992-1996 ANES Panel Study, respectively. The
outcome of interest in these analyses, partisan-ideological sorting, is identical to the
dependent variable utilized in Study 1. However, in these analyses, I focus not on the
effects of exposure to elite cues—what might be considered the “direct effects” of partisan
polarization—but rather the indirect effect of perceptions of these cues on sorting through
the lens of group memberships.

Symbolic group cues
The ANES surveys ask individuals to rate whether and to what extent the Democratic and
Republican Parties are either liberal or conservative. Responses to these items range from
1, “extremely liberal,” to 7, “extremely conservative.” To construct the first type of group
assessment, perceived party polarization, I subtract a respondent’s Democratic Party
ideological placement from the Republican one. As used elsewhere by Davis and Dunaway
(2016), this operation yields a variable that ranges from -6, which conveys that a
respondent perceives that the parties are fully polarized, yet completely opposite of their
“correct” ideological character (i.e. Democrats are extremely conservative / Republicans
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are extremely liberal), to 6, which conveys that the individual correctly identifies the
parties’ ideology and views this quality as extreme (i.e. Democrats are extremely liberal /
Republicans are extremely conservative). Values of or near zero, then, represent either
perceiving the parties to be moderate or perceiving the parties to be effectively
indistinguishable from each other. To ease the interpretation of this variable’s relationship
to sorting, I have rescaled it to range from 0 (perceives parties as fully polarized but
wrongly assigns ideological labels) to 1 (correctly perceives parties’ ideology and views
the two groups as maximally polarized).78
Panel A in Figure 5.4 illustrates the distribution of this variable’s scores. Roughly
10 percent of respondents incorrectly perceive the relative nature of party polarization
(scores to the left of “no difference.” The vast majority of individuals see “correct”
differences between the parties, although only about 3 percent of respondents perceive that
the parties are maximally polarized (i.e. Democrats extremely liberal and Republicans
extremely conservative).
Next, I disaggregate this “comparative” group cue into perceptions of in-party and
out-party ideological extremity according to respondent partisanship. Recalling that
individuals are asked to rate the parties on seven-point scales, ranging from liberal to
conservative, I reverse-code an individual’s Democratic Party ideological placement in
order to “match” the assessment of the Republican Party’s ideological placement insofar
as this recode ensures that higher scores on both party placements convey “correct”
perceptions of ideological extremity (i.e. Democrats are perceived to be “extremely
liberal,” and Republicans “extremely” conservative). These variables are then rescaled to
range from 0, (strong, incorrect assessments of a party’s ideological nature) to 1 (which
conveys that an individual correctly perceives that the respective party is ideologically
extreme. Recall that these values were displayed in Figure 5.1.

78

One could take the absolute value of these assessments, but this would wrongly constrain
perceptions that the parties are ideologically extreme in the incorrect direction (i.e. Dem’s
extremely conservative / Rep’s extremely liberal) with perceptions that the parties are
maximally extreme in the correct direction (i.e. Dem’s extremely liberal / Rep’s extremely
conservative).
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A. Perceived polarization

B. In-party similarity

25%

50%

20%

40%

15%

30%

10%

20%

5%

10%

0%
Dem = consrv
/ Rep = liberal

0%
No diff

Dissimilar

Dem = liberal
/ Rep = consrv

Similar

Ideological similarity between R and
in-party

Perceived polarization

C. Out-party dissimilarity
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
Similar

Dissimilar

Ideological dissimilarity between R
and out-party

Source: 1984-2012 ANES
Notes: Estimates weighted by population weights.
Figure 5.4. Perceptions of the parties

The fourth and fifth forms of group cues reflect the perceived distance between an
individual’s own ideological self-placement and the corresponding placement of the inparty, the party to which the respondent belongs, and out-party, the party with which an
individual does not identify. In other words, these variables not only account for the
perceived ideological character and extremity of a particular party, but how these qualities
relate to the respondent’s own ideological identity. Perceived in-party similarity is created
by subtracting the ideological placement of an individual’s party from her own ideological
self-placement and taking the absolute value of the resulting score. I then rescale this item
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so that larger values will represent greater similarity. Values on this variable range from 0
(maximum ideological differences between the self and in-group) to 1 (which conveys no
differences between self and group ideological placements). According to Panel B in
Figure 5.4, most respondents believe that their in-party shares their own sense of
ideological self-placement. Almost 70 percent of individuals fall into one of the two highest
categories on this item.
Perceived out-party dissimilarity is constructed by subtracting the ideological
placement of an individual’s out-party from their own self-placement and taking the
absolute value of the resulting score. This transformation is necessary to ensure that
Republican and Democrat identifiers’ scores exist within common space and yields a
variable that, after rescaling, ranges from 0 (no differences between self and out-group
ideology) to 1 (maximum differences between self and group ideology). Panel C in Figure
5.4 illustrates that the spread of values on this item is approximately normal, with fewer
than five percent of all partisans perceiving maximum ideological differences between their
and the out-party’s liberal-conservative placement.
Policy-based cues
Beginning in the mid-1980s, the ANES began asking respondents about their perceptions
of the parties’ issue positions on a number of policy items. Upon being given sevencategory continua that juxtapose a “liberal” and “conservative” solution to these particular
policy issues, individuals are asked to place where they think the parties’ approaches to
these issues fit within these bivalent response sets. I first average together individuals’
Democratic Party policy placements across the five items that are routinely included on
Time-Series surveys (health insurance, provision of jobs, aid to minorities, spending on
government services, and spending on defense). I then do the same for the Republican Party
policy placements, and, finally, for each respondent. In effect, the resulting variables
represent a “latent” approximation of the perceived “liberal” or “conservative” nature of
the policy preferences of both the parties and the respondent, which resemble, at least in
their underlying measurement structure, the symbolic assessments outlined above.79
79

Although prior research is not bullish about the limited dimensionality of individuallevel preferences (Johnston and Feldman, 2014; Lupton, Meyers, and Thornton, 2015), I
am not strictly interested in whether this latent score is “ideological,” in the usual sense
(i.e. whether a respondent’s ideology is necessarily structured within a liberal-conservative
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Following the approach outlined in the previous section, I then create a number of
different cues based off of these indices. Because the perceived policy placements fit within
the same seven-category scale as liberal-conservative ideology, the actual construction of
these variables follows the exact same template detailed in the preceding section. Thus, the
five items derived from the policy placements include: 1) perceived policy polarization, 2)
in-party policy extremity, 3) out-party policy extremity, 4) perceived in-party policy
similarity, and 5) perceived out-party policy dissimilarity.80

Controls
A number of control variables are employed. In light of the legacy of the Southern
realignment, I include a dichotomous variable, Old South, for persons who reside in states
that were originally included in the Confederacy. A respondent’s age is measured in years,
ranging from 17 to 99. Educational attainment conveys the highest level of schooling a
respondent has undertaken and takes the form of a seven-part ordinal scale ranging from 0,
“grade school,” to 1, “graduate degree.” The degree to which persons are interested in
politics is coded 0 for “not much,” 1 for “some,” and 2 for “a lot.” Because religion is
deeply intertwined with political convictions (Patrikios, 2008), I provide two variables that
differentiate between religious identification and religiosity: 1) Protestant is coded 1 for
individuals who identify as members of that group and otherwise 0, and 2) frequency of
church attendance is coded as an ordinal scale ranging from 0, “never,” to 1 “attends
multiple times a week.”81 Racial identification as white or black is coded 1 for identifying
oneself as a member of that group and 0 for otherwise. Finally, although it is virtually
impossible to find acceptable “political knowledge” items that are common across both
early and recent ANES surveys, I utilize knowledge of House majority party as a proxy for
this concept.

dimension). Instead, I’m only interested in the relative distance between this score and the
scores given to the parties, allowing me to remain agnostic about the underlying constraint
observed across attitudes. If there is multidimensionality within these preferences, then we
should observe great fluctuations in the relative in-group / out-group (dis)similarity scores.
80
For brevity, the depiction of the distribution of these items is available in the Appendix
(Figure B2).
81
While it would be ideal to employ a better measure of religious conservatism,
unfortunately, the data do not provide any common metric by which to measure this
consideration over the time frame utilized.
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5.4.2

Results

Table 5.2 reports the results of a series of analyses that model identity sorting as a function
of different configurations of the group assessments specified above. Model 1 employs the
standard predictor of sorting, perceived party polarization (prior works often uses the terms
“differences,” “polarization,” and “cues” interchangeably), with one caveat—these
assessments have been broken down into symbolic- and issue-based components. The
difference in the magnitude of the coefficients produced by these two items is startling.
Correctly perceiving that the Democrats are very liberal and Republicans are very
conservative—that the parties are, in effect, maximally polarized—exerts almost triple the
effect on sorting relative perceiving the parties are fully polarized across a series of policy
issues. These results handsomely match the findings uncovered in Study 1; the information
derived from elite cues is not uniformly related to the convergence between political
identities.82
How do group memberships mediate the relationship between assessments (cues)
and sorting? Turning to Model 2, I disaggregate perceptions of both symbolic and policybased polarization by a respondent’s group membership. Two conclusions are apparent.
First, the effect of symbolic group assessments on sorting is again comparatively larger
than the associated effects of policy-based assessments. Second, I uncover modest evidence
that indicates that the relationship of these perceptions to sorting is differentiated by group
membership. Consider a Democratic-identifier who perceives that Republicans are
“extremely conservative” and Democrats are “extremely liberal,” numerically the most
“extreme” perceptions associated with each party. Perceiving that an out-group is
maximally-extreme results in a change in sorting that is roughly 30 percent larger than
concomitant assessments regarding perceived in-party extremity.

82

One potential criticism that readers familiar with this research may raise is that these
effects are a function of a different choice of dependent variable than the one used in prior
research (e.g. Levendusky, 2009). I address this concern in Appendix A5. Essentially,
policy cues predict issue-based sorting, while symbolic cues predict identity-based sorting.
Lumping these forms of sorting and cues together obscures these important differences.
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Table 5.2. Elite cues and Partisan-Ideological Sorting
(1)

(2)

(3)

-----

-----

In-party extremity

0.17**
(0.01)
-----

-----

Out-party extremity

-----

In-party similarity

-----

0.17**
(0.02)
0.22**
(0.04)
-----

Out-party dissimilarity

-----

-----

-----

-----

In-party extremity

0.06*
(0.02)
-----

-----

Out-party extremity

-----

In-party similarity

-----

0.05*
(0.02)
0.07*
(0.03)
-----

Out-party dissimilarity

-----

-----

0.02
(0.04)
0.04**
(0.00)
0.02**
(0.01)
-2.21*
(1.02)
0.13
20,458

0.02
(0.04)
0.03**
(0.01)
0.05**
(0.01)
-4.11**
(1.23)
0.14
8,393

Symbolic assessments
Perceived polarization

Policy assessments
Perceived polarization

Controls
Political interest
Political knowledge
protestant
Constant
R2
N

----0.17**
(0.03)
0.65**
(0.03)

-----0.04
(0.02)
0.02
(0.02)
0.02
(0.02)
0.00
(0.00)
0.03**
(0.00)
0.62
(1.29)
0.50
8,330

Source: 1972-2012 ANES Time-Series Surveys
Notes: † Additional controls include race, age, gender, household income, and
year counter (full models are available in the Appendix. Analyses employ robust
standard errors, clustered by year. *p<0.05, **p<0.01

112

However, the true power of group memberships is further revealed when we
account for how these memberships mediate perceived party (dis)similarities. In Model 3,
I convert the simple measures of ideological extremity into items that account for
ideological group placements vis-à-vis the respondent’s own ideological moorings—
variables that instead reflect how ideologically (dis)similar a group is compared to the
respondent. As expected, the effect of perceived out-group dissimilarity on sorting far
surpasses the magnitude of perceived in-group similarity. In other words, it’s not so much
that individuals observe their preferred in-group archetypes and sort accordingly, but that
out-group information provides a particularly stark and powerful cue. When individuals
recognize that the opposing party is ideologically different from their own identity, they
are much more likely exhibit robust levels of sorting than even when they perceive that
their own party is a perfect ideological fit.

Source: 1972-2012 ANES Time-Series
Notes: Originating regressions can be obtained in Appendix, but modeling conforms to
the analyses presented in Table 2. Solid vertical bands convey 95 percent confidence
intervals. Point estimates for in-group similarity correspond to moving from minimul to
maximum overlap between in-group and respondent self-placement in liberal-conservative
space. Point estimates for out-group dissimilarity convey moving from maximum to
minium overlap between out-group and respondent self-placement in liberal-conservative
space.
Figure 5.5. The effect of liberal-conservative party placements on sorting, conditional on
group membership
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Figure 5.5 illustrates the contours of these findings by plotting the coefficient
estimates associated with in-party similarity and out-party dissimilarity over time. Unlike
the pooled coefficient estimates presented in Table 2, each point estimate is derived from
fitting a model to the data from the respective year in which it was collected. Aside from
the observation that in-group assessments are a much weaker correlate of sorting than outgroup ones (in fact, the confidence intervals of the estimates associated with perceived ingroup similarity are insignificant more often than not), I find that the magnitude of the
effect depicted in the second panel increase significantly over time. This observation tracks
the real change in Dw-Nominate estimates that indicate that the objective level of elite
polarization has dramatically increased during this window of time. Thus, not only is a
sensitivity to out-group cues associated with a higher propensity to exhibit sorted political
identities, but the magnitude of this effect has appreciably evolved over time. As elites
have become objectively divided, so too has the strength of the relationship between
subjective assessments and sorting increased.

Table 5.3. The Effect of Changes in Group Perceptions on Sorting
Change in PIDIdeological Sorting
(1)
∆ Party Polarization

(2)
0.025

0.097*
(0.037)
------

∆ In-Party Similarity
∆ Out-Party Dissimilarity
Constant

-----0.039
(0.044)
0.03
319

R2
N

(0.040)
0.141**
(0.039)
0.181**
(0.043)
0.063
(0.042)
0.19
306

Source: 1992-1996 ANES Panel Study
Notes: Coefficient estimates are changes in values on variable from 1992
to 1996, where positive values on all entries are coded to reflect an
“increase” in respective item. Analyses weighted using full sample weights.
*p <0.05, **p < 0.01; Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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To corroborate these findings, I investigate panel data from the 1992-1996 ANES
Panel Study. Although these data were gathered over only a moderate duration of time,
resampling the same respondents presents the opportunity to analyze whether explicit
changes in group perceptions are related to changes in sorting. Table 3 presents a series of
models that depict sorting as a function of perceived party differences (symbolic
polarization) and assessments broken down by group membership. Recalling that these
variables each originally range from 0 to 1, the coefficients presented in each model
represent the effect of changing from a value of 0 in 1992 to a value of 1 in 1996. Thus, in
Model 1, if an individual perceived no ideological differences between the parties in 1992
but perceived maximum differences in 1996, then the result would be a change in roughly
10 points of additional partisan-ideological sorting, all else equal. In Model 2, however,
these assessments do not exert a significant effect on sorting. Instead, changes in perceived
out-group dissimilarity are the strongest correlate of partisan-ideological sorting; the
coefficient for changes in these symbolic assessments is double the coefficient of perceived
party polarization in Model 1 and larger than the coefficient representing changes in
perceived in-group similarity.

5.4.3

Discussion

These analyses indicate that perceptions of between-group differences, what is commonly
termed “perceived polarization,” reveal only a partial portrait of how “elite cues” influence
the convergence between ideological and partisan identities. Although a growing body of
work reveals that individuals’ assessments of political groups are biased (Ahler, 2014;
Levendusky and Mahlhotra, 2016) and that group memberships shape political attitudes
(Nicholson, 2012), this study is the first to explore the consequences of how group
memberships filter information through the ubiquitous “perceptual screen” of partisan
memberships in the context of sorting. While the observation that perceived out-group
ideological dissimilarities drive sorting is novel, this finding fits within the expectations of
self-categorization and social comparison theories of intergroup behavior (Shaw and
Costanzo, 1982; Park and Rothbart, 1982), which suggest that comparisons between the
self and reference groups shape conformity among preferences whereas the recognition of
between-group differences may not (e.g. Hogg, 1996; Turner et al., 1987). Individuals do
not assess partisan (social) groups in a vacuum; instead, the judgments they make about
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ideological extremity are a partial function of their awareness of their own ideological
identity.
These results produce an important revision to extant work on sorting, and one that
has far-reaching consequences for models of behavior that employ spatial analysis of
ideology: perceived symbolic—not policy—cues facilitate the convergence between
political identities. This distinction is a vital one. Prior research treats the recognition of
party differences within liberal-conservative and policy space as if these domains share
such commonalities that these cues can be aggregated together. Yet, descriptively, this
assumption is tenuous. Recalling that dissimilarity scores range from 0 (no differences) to
1 (maximum differences), individuals perceive far greater out-group symbolic ideological
differences (x = 0.47) than they do concomitant policy differences (x = 0.29). Thus, not
only are party placements within ideological space biased by group membership, but
individuals are either not as well-equipped to navigate policy relative symbolic ideological
space or else they derive fundamentally different types of actionable information from
these cues (or, perhaps both). These results imply that, even as the parties have become
objectively divided across a wide variety of issues, awareness of those divisions matters
comparatively little in the calculus of sorting. Provided that individuals perceive stark
symbolic differences between the parties, partisan-ideological sorting may occur
independent of these policy-based cues.

5.5

Conclusion

The two studies presented in this manuscript reveal that the linkage between elite cues and
sorting must be reconstructed. In Study 1, I show that the prevailing linkage between elites
and sorting rests critically on the type of elite cues (information) presented to subjects.
Merely communicating that the parties are polarized does little to improve the extent to
which political identities are sorted. Instead, symbolic polarization is a necessary and
sufficient cause of partisan-ideological sorting.
Study 2 builds on this finding, showing how perceptions of these cues are then
shaped by group memberships, offering a social identity-driven theory of sorting. Here, I
demonstrated that perceptions of between-party differences—what scholars commonly call
“perceived polarization”—exert much less impact on sorting than do perceived out-group
dissimilarities. Specifically, the absolute perceived policy gap between the parties does not
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drive identity-based sorting nearly as much as symbolic ideological differences between
an individual and an out-group party. Why are individuals more likely to conform to the
political characteristics of their in-group when they perceive that their political opponents
deviate from their own group’s preferences? Self-categorization theory conveys that
contextual comparisons between reference groups and the individual are efficient means
for processing information quickly (Atkinson, 1986). Given the desire for positive social
distinction (Turner et al., 1987) and the evaluative importance of group differences (Taylor,
1981), Gracián’s admonition in the epigraph to heed one’s enemies proves prescient:
sorting is the distilled endpoint of social pressures from out-group sources.
Normatively, these findings are not a cause for optimism. In fact, Studies 1 and 2
imply that policy moderation by party elites would do little to curb partisan-ideological
sorting within the mass public. Even if cross-cutting issues perturbed the uni-dimensional
policy space that currently characterizes Congressional polarization, the symbolic nature
of partisan conflict has become such an ingrained feature of the political landscape that
identity-based sorting may be orthogonal to most policy debate. Future work on sorting,
then, would do well to consider whether certain types of issues have the power to inhibit
or exacerbate the convergence of these identities.
At any rate, these findings suggest that spatial models of politics, which rely on
the assumption that individuals understand policy space and connect this information to
their own preferences, must wrestle with the relatively weak relationship between policy
information and the convergence between political identities demonstrated here. Although
political commentators lament that candidates ought to focus on the issue facing ordinary
Americans, these findings indicate that some divisive issues like federal spending and
affirmative action generate little identity-based sorting. This, in turn, implies that political
elites should concentrate on highly stylized approaches to campaigning, which may
undercut the substantive discourse that elections should encourage. However, as long as
party elites have an incentive to employ symbolic rhetoric—and the public buys the
demand that symbolic ideological purity is the litmus test for electoral acceptability—the
ongoing convergence between partisan and ideological identities within the mass public
will only accelerate.
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Chapter 6: Identity Sorting and Compromise
Politics is the art of the possible, the attainable – the art of the next best.
-Otto von Bismarck
"In Utopia, I'd like to see compromise but with the political environment that
is going on now, that's impossible. It's a stand on principle and I don't give
an inch.“
-Clinton voter (Wilmington, NC)83

6.1

Introduction

Having discussed how identity sorting occurs, we now turn to why it matters. Over the
previous decade has been growing interest in the existence of “affective polarization,” or
the type of social polarization that is embodied in a distrust, dislike, and disenfranchisement
of an opposition party (e.g. Iyengar, Llekes, and Sood, 2012; Mason, 2015). In particular,
an important facet of this type of emotional distaste for one’s opponents is manifested in
individuals’ orientations toward working closely with the other team—in other words, how
individuals think about compromise. In this chapter, I explore how identity sorting affects
this vital facet of democratic exchange.

------

Politics is often described using game metaphors. Legislators and candidates are
described as players, parties as teams, and participants as fans (c.f. Green, Palmquist, and
Schickler, 2002)—even the coverage of elections is presented using frames that are used
to describe sporting events (Lawrence, 2000). Nevertheless, the utility of this analogy is
weaker beyond the immediate electoral context. While the outcomes of sporting contests
are discrete and final, outcomes in politics are less simple. Elections may determine
winners and losers, but policymaking requires members from both groups to shed those
labels as they work together to successfully pass legislation.
Compromise, however, is increasingly viewed as capitulation rather than an ideal
feature of deliberative political exchange. Recent examples of interparty intransigence are
83

http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/politicsgovernment/election/article112777613.html
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replete in American politics, ranging from the one-sided passage of the Affordable Care
Act in 2010, to the government shutdown over the federal budget in 2013, to the Senate’s
inability to hold hearings to fill the Supreme Court vacancy generated by Antonin Scalia’s
death in 2016. In fact, while Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) may have
admitted in a 2015 interview that “…nobody is a dictator here. We can’t do things, one
party only, in a time of divided government,” bipartisanship is increasingly rare (Mann and
Ornstein, 2012; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, 2006).84
Relative the behavior of their elected officeholders, the American people fare only
marginally better in their desire for and willingness to accept political compromise. In fact,
while the mass public pays modest lip-service to the notion that political leaders shouldn’t
always get everything they want, citizens often believe that their “side” is entitled to an
enormous amount of political deference (Pew, 2014). In other words, when it comes to
compromising in practice—or, when individuals are required to belly-up to the bargaining
table to make hard choices—they are much less likely to cede resources to their political
opponents than they are in principle. Thus, citizens rarely prefer “neutral” or “moderate”
policy solutions (Ahler and Broockman, 2016), much less politicians who are willing to
make concessions (Harbridge, Malhotra, and Harrison, 2014; Grossman and Hopkins,
2015; Ryan, 2015).
Why do individuals resist compromise? In this manuscript, I explore how the
extent to which individuals’ political identities are sorted affects the value that individuals
place on compromise. I show that when partisan and ideological identities overlap, citizens
are less likely support legislators who compromise, with one important qualification: this
effect is isolated to persons with right-, but not left-leaning identities. However, when we
transition to exploring the extent to which individuals are willing to cede ground to their
political opponents in order to achieve their desired ends, the textured nature of this effect
disappears. Even in the absence of a consistent set of ideological values, sorted persons are
less willing to broker negotiated solutions to problems (in fact, there is some evidence that
those citizens with left-leaning identities are even more unwilling to engage in such
bargaining).

December 20, 2015. CNN’s State of the Union with Jake Tapper.
http://cnnpressroom.blogs.cnn.com/2015/12/20/mcconnell-well-its-pretty-clear-fromwhat-hillary-clinton-said-last-night-that-she-thinks-things-with-isis-are-just-fine/
84
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These findings highlight the curious disconnect between a commitment to abstract
principles and episodic behavior demonstrated elsewhere (Sears and Citrin, 1982; Winter
and Mouritzen, 2001; Ellis and Stimson, 2012; Harbridge, Malhotra, and Harrison, 2014).
Simply, when push comes to shove, most people are willing to renege on their commitment
to the abstract value of compromise and, instead, will directly punish the out-group party.
Thus, while many Americans consent to compromise in principle, in practice, their
behavior suggests a stiff resistance to bargaining with their political counterparts exists.

6.2

Compromise and its correlates

All governments must wrestle with the problem of distilling the competing preferences of
its citizens into tangible policy outputs. If representatives must balance majoritarian
policymaking rules with policy options that faithfully adhere to their constituency’s
desires, then some type of bipartisan negotiation is usually required to resolve these
competing demands. Habermas (1994, pg. 5) describes the place of compromise within
liberalism thusly:
[C]ompromises make up the bulk of political processes.
Under conditions of religious, or in any way cultural and
societal pluralism, politically relevant goals are often
selected by interests and value orientations that are by no
means constitutive for the identity of the community at
large.
As such, compromise embodies a practical resolution to conflict as “an agreement in which
all sides sacrifice something in order to improve on the status quo from their perspective,
and in which sacrifices are at least partly determined by the other side’s will” (Gutmann
and Thompson, 2013, pg. 10).
While some political compromises are, of course, undesirable in that they may
violate a community’s standards, the positive value of compromise is that it offers a
meaningful political alternative to improve upon the prevailing status quo. Thus, not only
does a general resistance to compromise implausibly presume that such change is
uniformly undesirable,85 but it implies that bargaining in return for concessions is
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Contestation, in fact, is a vibrant component to democracy—at least as important to
democratic health as “consensus” (Tilly and Tarrow, 2006; Mill, 1977).
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objectionable, which ultimately privileges the status quo in a way that is incompatible with
both liberal and conservative approaches to policy problems.86 Further, resistance to
compromise undermines the shared trust and respect that are needed to effectively pursue
self-governance, where such respect is vital in that it 1) buoys peaceable interactions even
in the face of irresolvable moral disagreement and 2) embodies the type of cooperation
necessary to engage in democratic exchange (Gutmann and Thompson, 2013).87
If compromise is valuable for both pragmatic and ethical reasons, then why are
individuals unwilling to pursue it? Consider first the relationship between values and
compromise. If compromise requires citizens to default on some of their strongly-held
principles to find a consensual agreement, then it makes sense that individuals would resist
this type of bargaining because it ostensibly violates these core values. George H.W.
Bush’s aborted campaign promise to resist raising taxes in 1988, for example, was not only
met by deep dismay from his supporters, but contributed to weak support during his
reelection campaign. More recently, the success of the Tea Party during the 2010 midterm
elections showcased how violators of party principles were dramatically punished at the
polls. Simply, individuals resist reneging on their values and punish those who do.
Recent research suggests that moral values, a subset of value dispositions that are
not necessarily filtered through a cost-benefit framework (Tetlock et al. 2000; Bennis,
Medin, and Bartels, 2010), are particularly binding in relation to compromise. Ryan (2015)
demonstrates that these attitudes fundamentally reorient how individuals approach political
choices. Instead of approaching choice as utility maximizers, priming moral considerations
causes individuals to instead adhere to strict rules. In turn, this reduces the likelihood that
citizens prefer compromise.
A second facet of social-psychological explanations for compromise is rooted in
non-cognitive aspects of information-processing. Given the ubiquity and power of
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Consider a tax policy that is not ideal for large swaths of a mass public. If altering that
policy benefited constituencies for both parties, yet one party refuses to compromise on
even slight alterations to that policy because in so doing they either lose some measure of
leverage or violate second-order intellectual preferences, both constituencies suffer as the
status quo prevails.
87
As Gutmann and Thompson (2010, footnote 25) note, framing compromise’s value in
terms of mutual respect helps to redress some of the criticism that a wholly “pragmatic”
approach to compromise ignores the moral constraints that are imposed on the boundaries
of acceptable compromise.
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emotions like fear, anxiety, and hope, it is possible that these affective responses shape
whether and how individuals acquiesce to mutually-beneficial (and mutually-costly) policy
solutions. The relationship between fear and compromise, however, is complex. While fear
related to the wellbeing of one’s group may be related to a decrease in the propensity to
engage in compromise (Bar-Tal, 2001), fear of personal safety is less clearly-related to the
extent to which an individual will compromise (Maoz and McCauley, 2005).88
In contrast to these explanations, realist theories of group interactions argue that
compromise is closely related to power inequalities and, by extension, threat. Drawing
from research on interstate relations (Posen, 1993) and organization development
(Bazerman and Neale, 1992), this approach assumes that group behavior is not so much a
function of emotions, but is instead governed by the extent to which an in-group feels
threatened by an out-group.89 In this telling, negotiation breaks down when group members
view mutual decision-making as a zero-sum game—or a scenario in which one side wins
only when the other side loses (Thompson, 1995). Research indicates, for example, that
perceptions of threat increase political intolerance towards out-groups (Marcus et al., 1995)
and punitive and aggressive behaviors toward out-groups (Huddy et al., 2005), which, in
turn, decreases more moderate political outcomes (Gordon and Arian, 2001).
While this framework helps explain intergroup behavior in severe ethnic conflicts,
it also characterizes the nature of political exchange in American politics. Consider a recent
editorial appearing in the New York Times, which likened Republicans’ and Democrats’
“zero-sum thinking” to the sectarian conflict between the two branches of Islam. “Because
whether you’re talking about Shiites and Sunnis—or Iranians and Saudis, Israelis and
Palestinians, Turks and Kurds—a simply binary rule dominates their politics: “I am strong,
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Extending the textured nature of the relationship between fear and compromise,
Spanovic et al. (2010) find that the status of conflict moderates the effects of fear on
compromise: when a conflict is ongoing, fear decreases compromise, while feelings of
fearfulness during the resolution of a conflict often portend greater compromise. As
Halperin, Porat, and Wohl (2013, pg. 810) write, such “collective angst has
pluripotentiality—it undermines willingness to compromise in some contexts, but will
facilitate it in others.”
89
The hard distinction between this approach to compromise and an emotion-based one is
rooted in the longstanding differentiation between cognition and affect within social
psychology. Whereas a realist perspective stylizes threat as a form of cognitive assessment,
fear is instead conceptualized as a reaction to such perceptions of threat (Lazarus, 1991;
Maoz and McCauley, 2005).
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why should I compromise? I am weak, how can I compromise?...Are we all just Shiites
and Sunnis now?”90 While partisan politics in America are not wholly comparable to such
sectarian conflict, recent work shows that partisan memberships are similarly binding.
Citizens have difficulty in overcoming partisan biases in evaluating the desirability of
public policy (Harbridge, Malhotra, and Harrison, 2014).
Taken as a whole, these are plausible explanations for why individuals might shun
political compromise. However, this extant research on compromise has not yet grappled
with how the ongoing sorting of the mass public has affected these orientations. Drawing
explicitly on the group-based nature of party politics, I argue that as individuals’ political
identities align, their willingness to voice that compromise is desirable and select
legislators who engage in political bargaining ought to decrease. Detailing this theoretical
linkage is the task to which I now turn.

6.3

Sorting and compromise

Social identities are powerful associations that involve the incorporation of a particular
group membership into an individual’s self-concept. Tajfel (1981, pg. 255) describes these
identities as the combination of objective group membership combined with the subjective
“value and emotional significance attached to [such] membership.” Driven by a need for
positive distinctiveness, social identities encourage individuals to favorably prioritize ingroup over out-group members in order to protect their group’s status.
Political identities fit this description (Huddy, Mason, and Aaore, 2015). Not only
do partisans intensely favor group members over non-group members (Mason, 2015), but
partisan identification strongly biases how individuals interpret information (e.g. Bartels,
2002; Leeper, 2014; Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus, 2013; Iyengar and Westwood,
2014; Davis, 2016). Much like the passionate fans who cheer their favorite team in the heat
of a competition, partisans’ internalized sense of partisan identity is intimately related to
their group’s victories and defeats; it is personal, rooted deeply within an individual’s
subconscious (Theodoridis, 2013).
In a similar respect, ideological or “liberal-conservative” identity also reflects
these qualities. While ideology is often conceptualized in terms of individuals’ policy
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http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/31/opinion/win-lose-but-no-compromise.html?_r=1
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preferences, a growing body of research treats liberal-conservative identification as a form
of social identity (Malka and Llekes, 2010; Devine, 2015; Mason, 2016). Like partisanship,
ideological identity corresponds to a group-based understanding of politics and strongly
reflects affective, symbolic attachments to the liberal and conservative labels (Conover and
Feldman, 1981; Zschirnt, 2011). Simply, self-identification as an ideologue constitutes a
social identity insofar as an individual’s self-perception as an ideologue is “experienced as
a point of similarity with other in-group members and as a point of collective difference
with out-group members” (Malka and Llekes, 2010, p. 160).
Given that the mere categorization of oneself as a group-member generates
intergroup prejudice that reshapes economic exchange (Tajfel, 1970), political
compromise, which hinges at least minimally on some degree of material, psychological,
or status loss, ought to be sensitive to the strength of the underlying identities that structure
intergroup relations. But while research has examined the relationship between
compromise and partisanship (Harbridge, Malhotra, and Harrison, 2014), political
identities (partisanship, ideological identification) do not exist independent of each other.
What happens to individuals’ attitudes toward compromise, then, when these identities
converge? That is to say, how does sorting between partisanship and ideological
identification affect citizens’ willingness to compromise?
6.3.1

Behavioral consequences of sorting

Most individuals possess multiple group identities, which variously affect a range of
assessments and behaviors (Deaux, 1996; Brewer and Pierce, 2005). For example,
individuals may evaluate out-group members on the basis of one dominant membership
(Macrae, Bodenhausen, and Milne, 1995), evaluate individuals as a function of some
additive combination of their memberships (Brown and Turner, 1979), or even evaluate
others based on a “compound category with emergent properties that are not predicted from
the contributing categories separately” (Roccas and Brewer, 2002, pg. 88). Of the different
permutations that an individual’s identities may take when combined, this latter compound
category—what Roccas and Brewer term “intersected identities”—represents an
arrangement of social identities where an individual simultaneously self-categorizes with
more than one social identity, yet maintains a single supraordinate sense of an in-group /
out-group distinction based on the intersection of those constituent identities.
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Prior work on partisan-ideological sorting, or the overlap between partisan and
ideological identities, indicates that the convergence of these group memberships most
clearly reflects intersected social identities in that the in-group / out-group distinctions that
characterize each individual identity are magnified when they are combined. For example,
Mason (2015, 2016) finds that greater overlap between political identities is responsible
for increased forms of social polarization, where strongly sorted individuals are more likely
to possess affective bias toward out-group members. Elsewhere, Davis and Mason (2015)
show that these biases have pervasive behavioral ramifications: as individuals become
more sorted over time, they are less likely to support candidates of opposing parties (i.e.
split their ticket).
If a lone social identity is sufficient to accentuate out-group memberships, then the
combinatory nature of identity sorting ought to enhance biases toward out-group members.
In the context of bargaining, which requires a willingness to release psychological or
material group resources, such sorting should effectively narrow one’s in-group while
simultaneously enlarging the out-group—in effect, generating behavioral rigidity and a
disregard for actions that would lead to a potential loss of material or social status.
Specifically, by amplifying the importance and salience of one’s interlinked group
memberships, such sorting ought to decrease an individual’s preference for representatives
that will barter with out-group members.
H1: As the correspondence between an individual’s partisan and
ideological identities increases, their willingness to compromise should
decrease.

6.3.2

Differential effects?

The argument offered in the previous section indicates that sorting, in general, should be
sufficient to reduce individuals’ propensity to compromise. Yet, based on the underlying
nature of particular political attachments, it may be the case that the effects of sorting are
contingent upon the groups with which individuals identify. Consider the different
motivations and compositional qualities of the Republican and Democratic Parties. The
Republican Party has been described as unitary and hierarchical, where purity, deference,
and loyalty to the party are prioritized and members are bound together by common
ideological principles. In contrast, the Democratic Party is both pluralistic and polycentric,
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comprised of a coalition of constituencies with varying social, economic, and political
demands (Freeman, 1986). Thus, while “Republicans face an enduring internal tension
between adherence to doctrine and the inevitable concession or failures inherent in
governing—a conflict that is exacerbated by the presence of an influential cadre of
movement leaders devoted to publicly policing ideological orthodoxy,” Democrats,
alternatively, “lack a powerful internal movement designed to impose ideological
discipline on elected officials, which gives Democratic officeholders more freedom to
maneuver pragmatically…” (Grossman and Hopkins, 2015, pg. 120).
These characteristics are important because they have produced sharply divergent
approaches to policymaking. Whereas both parties have objectively polarized (e.g.
McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, 2006), which ought to generally reduce baseline rates of
legislative cooperation for all elected officials, the Republican Party has especially teetered
toward “near-automatic obstruction of initiatives proposed by the opposition” (Grossman
and Hopkins, 2015, pg. 12). These are significant and salient cues, or informational signals
that flow from elites to the public that might structure how members of these different
groups approach compromise.
These institutional differences, however, do not exist in a vacuum. In fact, these
divergent organizational approaches dovetail with other less political—though perhaps
more fundamental—differences in how ideologues view reality. While conservatives and
liberals possess distinct approaches to questions of morality (e.g. Haidt, 2009), Hibbing,
Smith and Alford (2014) contend that the central organizational principle that underscores
differences in everything from artistic tastes to the psychological desire for closure and
from sensitivity to disgust to information-seeking behaviors is conservatives’ physiological
and psychological tendency toward negativity. Specifically, “compared with liberals,
conservatives tend to register greater physiological responses to such stimuli and also to
devote more psychological resources to them” (297). If emotional and cognitive rigidity
are congenital features of conservative identification, then the combination of conservatism
with Republicanism, a party affiliation marked by a recent, yet distinct resistance to
political negotiation, may moderate the effect of sorting on compromise. Thus, I expect
that the negative effect of sorting on compromise ought to be particularly strong for those
persons with right-leaning identities.
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H2: Higher levels of sorting among those with right-leaning identities
should reduce a preference for compromise more than those with leftleaning ones.

6.4

Data

To test these hypotheses, I draw on two datasets: the 2012 American National Election
Studies’ Evaluations of Government survey (ANES EoG) and the Pew Research Center’s
2014 Political Polarization and Typology survey (Pew PPT).

6.4.1

Operationalizing compromise

There are a variety of ways one might think about individuals’ preferences toward
compromise. One productive way to conceptualize these orientations is to distinguish
between attitudes about compromise as a “normative” or “social” good, what we might
term preferences toward compromise in principle, and attitudes toward the distribution or
allocation of resources relating to actual political bargaining, what I frame as compromise
in practice.
I begin with the concept of compromise in principle, or the value that respondents
assign to the importance of political compromise. Appearing on the ANES EoG, this
question taps whether individuals are willing to consent to the idea that compromise is a
valuable trait for elected officials to exhibit. Specifically, do respondents prefer a leader
who sticks to their principles regardless of outcomes or someone who will compromise to
change the status quo? Responses to this question are coded 0 for “wants leader who sticks
to principles” and 1 for “wants leader who compromises.”
In contrast to valuing compromise in principle, one practical way of thinking about
compromise is to consider how much deference any one side should receive in a policy
debate. Because successful policymaking often requires leveraging certain resources or
favors in order to receive desirable concessions, we can assess the propensity of individuals
to engage in practical instances of compromise by examining respondents’ attitudes toward
their willingness to cede ground to their opponents. Specifically, the Pew PPT survey asks
individuals what the distribution of sacrifice should look like when political leaders engage
in policymaking: “When Barack Obama and Republican leaders differ over the most
important issues facing the country, where should things end up?” Responses to this item
range from 0, “Barack Obama gets all demands” to 100 “Republicans get all demands.”
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The value 50, then, represents an equal distribution of the demands that both “sides” get
during negotiations.
I create a metric that reflects orientations toward practical instances of compromise
by folding responses on the above variable at the value “50”.” Values on this new variable
range from 0, or a preference for “pure compromise” where both sides yield equally, to 50,
or a preference for uncompromising politics where one side receives all demands. As
individuals transition from 0 to 50, the extent to which they believe that one side should
receive total deference in the policymaking process increases. Thus, larger values can be
interpreted by an aversion to an even trade or a general resistance to compromise.
6.4.2

Identity sorting

Prior research operationalizes identity sorting by measuring the overlap between
ideological and partisan identification and then multiplying the resulting value by the
strength of those identities (Mason, 2015; Davis and Dunaway, 2016). Liberalconservative and partisan identification both range from left- (1) to right-leaning
orientations (7). By subtracting and taking the absolute value of one self-placement
(ideology) from the other (partisanship), we can derive a measure of overlap where lower
values convey perfect overlap and high values significant discordance between identities.
To make better sense of this item, the overlap between identities is then reverse-coded so
that larger (smaller) values represent greater (less) overlap. To this score I add the value
(1) and then multiply it by folded measures of partisan and liberal-conservative strength.
The final variable is then rescaled to range from 0, “low overlap, weak (cross-cutting)
identities,” to 1, “perfect overlap, strong identities.”

6.4.3

Control variables

There are a number of covariates that might explain individuals’ orientations toward
compromise for which we ought to account. One way of thinking about a resistance to
compromise includes the extent to which individuals possess a coherent worldview. When
it was first released to the general public, the Pew PPT survey received notable attention
in the popular press for a series of graphics that showed how the mass public’s values
orientations had become more consistent over time. Information on ten issues were
collected, including respondents opinions on government regulation, waste, how
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government cares for the poor and needy, affirmative action, corporate profits,
environmental policy, the size of the military, and same-sex marriage. Using these items, I
construct a measure of partisan value-consistency, wherein individuals receive a value of
1 on a given item if their expressed opinion matches their party’s and 0 otherwise.91 These
items are then averaged into an additive index whose values range from 0, or “no values
that match party,” to 1 “all values match party.” Because values on this variable can take
an extremely wide range of theoretical values, this variable is rescaled into quartiles, such
that value-consistency increases with each quartile, which take the values 1-4.92
A number of additional characteristics may also shape compromise. First,
individuals with high levels of political knowledge may be more likely to understand that
politics often requires compromise to achieve one’s ends. In the ANES EoG survey,
political knowledge comprises an additive index of correctly identifying the Prime Minister
of England, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, and the area in which the US government spends the least amount of
money. In the Pew PPT survey, a political knowledge index accounts for correctly
identifying which party enjoys House and Senate majorities, as well as which party prefers
tax increases. The resulting indices are coded consistently such that they range from 0, “no
correct answers,” to 1, “correctly answers all knowledge items.”
Similar to the relationship between political knowledge and compromise, we might
expect news consumption and political interest to be related to compromise insofar as those
persons who pay greater attention to political events may be more likely to perceive that
compromise is a social good. The former item is simply the number of days that a
respondent watches or reads the news, ranging from 1 to 7, while the latter variable ranges
from 0, “not very interested,” to 1, “very interested.”
A recent study of compromise also demonstrates its close relationship with moral
values. Ryan (2015) shows how preferences grounded in strong moral convictions are
much less malleable when it comes to compromising. In the ANES EoG survey,
respondents are asked to what degree their attitudes on their self-professed most important
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In effect, this is more or less a stylization of sorting among values / attitudes.
This is done because the variable, while more or less continuous, is not really “ordinal.”
However, this coding scheme is just as easily reworked into “deciles,” which do not affect
the results derived from the analyses below.
92
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issue is rooted in moral values. Responses range from 1 “not at all,” to 5, “a great deal.”
Related to these values, I also control, where possible, for individuals’ religious identities.
Individuals who consider themselves Evangelicals are coded 1 and otherwise 0. So, too,
are those who identify as religiously secular or religious liberal.
Finally, I control for a number of standard demographic covariates. Respondents
who identify as white or black are coded 1 and otherwise 0. Age ranges from a minimum
value of 17 to 97 years old. Education is coded somewhat differently across surveys, but
values on this item are always recoded to rage from 0, “lowest category of educational
attainment,” to 1, “highest completed degree.”

6.5

Results

The models presented in Table 6.1 depict the relationship between sorting and an
individual’s propensity to prefer an elected official who either sticks with their principles
or compromises to achieve their goals. I find that, for both referents (legislator, president),
analysis of the full sample does not produce a significant coefficient estimate for identity
sorting. Instead, the effect of sorting on the likelihood that an individual will value elected
officials who compromise is isolated to those persons with right-leaning identities.93
Translating the coefficient estimate for sorting from a log-odds ratio to a predicted value,
the transition from minimum to maximum values of sorting results in roughly a 20
percentage point reduction in the probability that a respondent prefers compromise to
sticking to one’s principles. Although the average person is likely to prefer representatives
who compromise rather than stick to their principles (y = 60%), greater convergence
between right-leaning identities confers that, on balance, the highly sorted conservativeRepublican will prefer elected representatives who do not compromise.

93

Splitting the sample into these two groups makes immediate comparisons easier.
However, models that include an interaction term between group type and sorting are
available in the appendix. These analyses indicate that these differences are persist at the
conventional thresholds of statistical significance.
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Table 6.1. The effect of sorting on preference for elected officials who compromise
Would you prefer a ___ who sticks to his or her principles
no matter what, or who compromises to get things done?
Representative in U.S. Congress

Sorting
Political knowledge
News consumption
Education
Religious ID:
Evangelical
Religious ID: Secular
Religious ID: Liberal
Moral values
Tea Party Member
White
Black
Male
Constant
N

U.S. President

Left

Right

Left

Right

0.85
(0.55)
1.06*
(0.51)
0.06
(0.05)
0.58**
(0.15)

-0.80*
(0.42)
-0.01
(0.41)
0.12**
(0.05)
0.19
(0.12)

0.22
(0.48)
0.73*
(0.45)
0.02
(0.05)
0.36*
(0.14)

-0.79*
(0.42)
0.39
(0.41)
0.10*
(0.05)
0.12
(0.12)

0.93
(0.57)
0.69
(1.15)
-0.35
(0.45)
-0.14
(0.10)
0.00
(0.00)
0.84*
(0.36)
0.99
(0.51)
0.02
(0.29)
-1.83**
(0.62)
548

-1.21**
(0.30)
0.30
(1.64)
3.61**
(1.23)
-0.22**
(0.08)
-0.12
(0.37)
0.36
(0.38)
0.00
(0.00)
-0.14
(0.23)
0.23
(0.59)
535

0.35
(0.49)
0.00
(0.00)
-0.50
(0.42)
-0.01
(0.09)
0.46
(1.60)
1.06**
(0.32)
1.15*
(0.46)
0.21
(0.26)
-1.45*
(0.56)
543

-1.15**
(0.29)
-0.99
(1.52)
0.77
(1.29)
-0.17*
(0.08)
-0.42
(0.37)
0.64
(0.38)
0.00
(0.00)
-0.09
(0.23)
-0.03
(0.59)
535

Source: 2012 ANES Evaluations of Government Survey
Notes: Coefficient estimates convey log-odds ratios; standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05,
**p<0.01
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Curiously, the split-models also indicate that the effects of certain control variables
contrast across those persons with left- and right-leaning identities. Respondents who
belong to left-leaning groups with higher levels of political knowledge and education are
17 and 28 percentage points more likely to value compromise, while evangelicals
belonging to right-leaning groups are about 11 points more likely to prefer resolute and
uncompromising elected officials. For those respondents that strongly link their moral
values to issues of personal import, the likelihood of valuing an elected official who will
compromise decreases modestly by about 5 percentage points.
The evidence presented in these analyses indicates that identity sorting exerts a
textured effect on individuals’ orientations toward compromise as a social good. 94
However, when it comes to the practical business of politics—that is, when individuals are
actually required to acknowledge the extent to which they are willing to forego resources
to achieve their preferred political goals—do we observe that the contours of this effect
persist? In effect, no.
Turning to the analyses presented in Table 6.2, I explore a unique question within
the Pew PPT survey that asks individuals just how much they think different groups should
compromise when bargaining. By transforming values on this item so that low values (0)
reflect that neither side should receive a disproportionate amount of demands when
working toward solutions to important policy issues and high values (50) a preference for
one side to receive all of their demands, we are left with a variable that conveys the amount
of group-bias in policymaking preferences. Beginning first with the full sample, we see
that identity sorting is positively related to group biases. As individuals’ partisan and
ideological identities converge, they are more likely to believe that their in-group should
receive more of its demands.

94

In the Appendix, I provide a supplementary analysis of a sample collected from
Amazon’s mTurk worker pool that controls for additional covariates like out-party fear,
out-party affect, need for cognition, and personality traits associated with orientations
toward compromise. The results are robust: even controlling for these additional
explanations, sorting exerts a strong effect on orientations toward compromise.
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Table 6.2. Who gets what? Compromise in practice
Full
sample
Sorting
Values (quartiles)
Sorting x values
Political interest
Knowledge
Age
Education
Black
White
Income
Male
Constant
R2
N

Left

Right

16.84** 23.42**
(2.82)
(3.72)
0.50
0.04
(0.57)
(0.84)
---------

9.96**
(3.50)
0.28
(0.86)
-----

3.24
(2.02)
1.86
(2.25)
-1.79
(2.83)
-1.10
(2.39)
2.22
(2.49)
-2.63
(1.76)
-1.86
(2.01)
0.58
(1.07)
6.82**
(2.49)
0.09
1,167

-0.92
(3.30)
4.17
(3.59)
-11.96*
(4.97)
-1.18
(3.90)
-9.24
(5.35)
0.05
(2.83)
-2.70
(3.09)
3.41*
(1.48)
10.75*
(4.23)
0.08
447

4.98
(3.09)
-0.47
(3.44)
3.84
(3.91)
-1.26
(3.41)
2.61
(2.86)
-1.83
(2.32)
-0.06
(2.82)
-0.55
(1.60)
4.82
(3.46)
0.12
617

Full
sample
18.31**
(7.02)
0.63
(0.78)
-0.53
(2.26)
3.26
(2.01)
1.88
(2.25)
-1.82
(2.83)
-1.09
(2.39)
2.17
(2.49)
-2.64
(1.76)
-1.89
(2.01)
0.57
(1.07)
6.52*
(2.73)
0.09
1,167

Source: 2014 Pew Polarization survey
Notes: Robust standard errors presented in parentheses; *p<0.05, **p<0.01
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When Barack Obama and Republican leaders differ over the most
important issues facing the country, where should things end up?

Source: 2014 Pew Polarization survey
Notes: Dependent variable ranges from 0, which conveys neutral responses or “a
point of compromise,” to 50, which conveys that respondent believes that their
side should “get everything they want.” (2) Estimates derived from interaction
model available in Appendix.

Figure 6.1. The effects of sorting on compromise by type of identity
However, while we might expect those persons with right-leaning identities to
possess greater in-group biases than those with left-leaning identities, the data reveal
precisely the opposite pattern. As the coefficients for the split-samples indicate, persons
with left-leaning identities are more likely to believe that their group should get all of its
demands relative those persons with right-leaning identities. Moreover, the difference is
statistically significant, as Figure 6.1 indicates. Transitioning from unsorted to sorted
identities, respondents’ with left-leaning identities levels of group-bias are more than 50
percent larger than those persons with right-leaning ones.95
95

Since the split-sample presentation of these coefficients does not provide for a strict
empirical test of the difference between estimates, the projections illustrated in Figure 6.1
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How do we square this evidence with the results that indicate that sorting among
those belonging to the left has no effect on abstract commitments to compromise? In light
of this evidence, does the finding presented in Figure 6.1 mean that citizens who belong to
left-leaning groups are disingenuous about their “true” orientations regarding compromise?
Could it be that in spite of a generalized commitment to compromise in principle these
citizens are secretly harboring nefarious attitudes toward working with the other political
team?
Not necessarily. It could be the case that there are social desirability or selfmoderation pressures at play, where those with left-leaning identities are conforming to
group-centric pressures of appearing like good, open-minded, and democratic citizens.
Alternatively, perhaps people with left-leaning identities do truly value compromise in the
abstract more than their peers with right-leaning identities, but, given party-based cues
stemming from the refusal of Congressional Republicans to work with President Obama
on various issues ranging from the federal budget to the Affordable Care Act, those among
the left are simply less willing to engage in balanced policy arrangements that put them at
a disadvantage (see: Grossman and Hopkins [2015] for an expanded discussion of this
point).
The differential nature of this effect aside, the ubiquitous tendency to see one’s
group “win” helps explain the general shape of this effect. Given the pressures stemming
from the perceived potential damages related to compromise—i.e. some type of loss
function that operates using the logic “if you give someone an inch, then they’ll take it a
mile”—a reluctance to remain even mildly deferential to one’s opponents is not irrational.
In the end, although there is some evidence of a stronger commitment to compromise in
principle by members of left-leaning groups, the convergence of political identities
produces a general reluctance to act in ways that are ultimately contrary to the best material
and psychological interests of one’s group.
To test whether the relationship between sorting and compromise is further
textured by the extent to which individuals profess coherent preferences, I interact sorting
with the measure of values-consistency. This interaction effect is analyzed in the fourth
column in Table 2. As the coefficient estimate for this interaction indicates, the effect of
are drawn from an interaction term between partisan identification and sorting, available
in the Appendix.
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sorting does not vary across different levels of value-consistency (b = -0.53, SE = 2.26).
Figure 6.2 helps ease the interpretation of this effect, portraying minimum and maximum
levels of sorting across quartiles of values consistency.96
As the large confidence bands indicate, the point estimates overlap considerably
and are indistinguishable from each other. In other words, individuals who have well-sorted
identities and possess highly-consistent values orientations are no more or less likely to
cede resources to their political opponents than those persons with overlapping political
identities who possess a weak grasp of how political values cohere with those identities.
Perhaps this is unremarkable given Converse’s (1964) finding that individuals utilize group
cues to navigate the political landscape, but the fact that such “baseless” sorting exerts a a
similar effect on compromise relative the highly sophisticated helps explain the general
erosion in political debate. Simply put, even if citizens are unable to think about politics in
a sophisticated manner (i.e. most of the mass public), sorting enhances the distinctions
between in- and out-groups, which, by extension, significantly reduces the likelihood of
intergroup cooperation (i.e. compromise).

96

Supplementary analysis indicates that this transforming values consistency from the
original range of values to quartiles does little to change the substantive shape of this nonsignificant effect. Simply put, as individuals transition from low to high values on sorting,
the marginal effect of sorting on compromise does not vary as a function of value
consistency.
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When Barack Obama and Republican leaders differ over the most
important issues facing the country, where should things end up?

Source: 2014 Pew Polarization survey
Notes: Dependent variable ranges from 0, which conveys neutral responses or “a
point of compromise,” to 50, which conveys that respondent believes that their
side should “get everything they want.” (2) Estimates derived from interaction
model available in Appendix.

Figure 6.2. The effect of sorting on compromise, contingent on value
consistency

6.6

Summary and conclusion

Referring to his Republican counterparts, Senator Harry Reid (D-NV) once argued that
“…with a bully, you cannot let them slap you around. Because if they slap you around
today, they slap you 5 or 6 times tomorrow.” This type of attitude premises that interparty
policymaking requires a type of firm irresoluteness; that, in the face of undesirable or
suboptimal outcomes, one ought to fight tooth and nail to prevent the passage of
undesirable policy, embodying an unwillingness to pursue what Bismarck famously termed
“the next best” solution. This strategy has been the defining feature of Congress over the
last decade (Binder, 2014), and, with the transition to a unified executive and legislature in
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2017, the status of interparty cooperation continues to look bleak. “The pessimistic
scenario,” argued one panelist in a preelection forum, “is scorched earth from day one.”97
Elites’ tendencies to avoid compromise are not wholly divorced from the practical
preferences of the American mass public—preferences which are exacerbated by the
ongoing sorting of citizens’ political identities. For those among the right, such sorting
drastically reduces commitments to compromise as a normative good.98 And, while
Democrats fare slightly better in the positivity of their commitment to the ideal of
compromise, in practice, the convergence between their partisan and ideological identities
significantly reduces their willingness to cede resources to their political opponents. When
push-comes-to-shove, group members with overlapping identities are all more likely to
eschew even distributions of deference in the bargaining process.
This disconnect between a commitment to compromise in principle and a general
resistance to compromise in practice can be explained by some of the limitations to
rationality that economists and psychologists observe. Beginning with the notion that the
incentive, much less capacity, to obtain information is limited, people are generally poor
at deciphering the implications or calculating the consequences of their choices. Combined
with the finding that individuals do not neatly rank their goals (Winter and Mouritzen,
2001) and tend toward ambivalence (e.g. Zaller, 1992), a person faced with making a
generalized judgment about the value of compromise as a social good is likely to divorce
the meaning of this abstract democratic value from the implications of what compromise
means in practice.
Perhaps most troubling, however, is that sorting exerts this effect on compromise
independent of respondent sophistication—cross-pressures, or discordant values that ought

97

The remarks came from a panel hosted by the Institute of International Finance in
Washington, D.C. (see: www.marketwatch.com/story/scorched-earth-might-be-all-thatsleft-in-washington-after-this-election-2016-10-08).
98
In part, this finding can be explained by virtue of Republicans’ highly confrontational
approach to governance that maximizes political conflict between Democrats and the
GOP’s tendency to expunge moderates and party apostates. Yet there are also practical,
philosophical reasons for why those among the “right” might be less likely to acquiesce to
compromise than those on the “left.” If the underlying tension between these groups is
related to the role of the state, then any individual compromise means inevitably
contributing to the expansion of the state. In that case, it may be highly rational for those
among the right to resist such compromise if compromise inevitably leads to expansion.
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to destabilize goal-directed behaviors (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, 1954), have
virtually no effect on the relationship between identity convergence and orientations towar
practical instances of compromise. This does not bode well for the future of inter-party
exchange. Given the increase in sorting over time (Levendusky, 2009; Davis and Dunaway,
2016), it is highly unlikely that Americans will come together to broker bipartisan solutions
to the major issues of the day. Future research should continue to probe the nature of these
attitudes and under what conditions even the highly-sorted are willing to pursue policy that
benefits, at minimum, pluralities of Americans.
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Chapter 7: Sorting and Electoral Choice
The notion that elections are decided by voters carefully weighing competing
candidates’ stands on major issues reflects a strong faith in American political
culture that citizens can control their government from the voting booth. We call
it the “folk theory” of democracy…But that ideal makes sense, descriptively and
normatively, only if citizens understand politics in terms of issues and ideologies
and use their votes to convey clear policy signals that then determine the course
of public policy.
Achen and Bartels, The New York Times99

7.1

Introduction

Traditional models of elections presume that citizens’ preferences and candidates’
platforms can be arrayed in common ideological space (Downs, 1957). Bafumi and Herron
(2010, p. 521), write “If we conceptualize legislators as having ideal points that drive their
roll call voting choices, then we should think similarly about voters…[these] ideal points
can be compared in a proximate sense.” As it relates to the vote choice, this logic demands
that: 1) As candidates take liberal or conservative stances, voters presumably translate
those messages into ideological space, which, 2) they navigate using some sort of utility
maximization function whereby they select candidates according to the benefits they derive
from their choice.
Yet, the manner in which prospective voters conceptualize their preferences within
ideological space, much less how they understand where candidates fit within this
unidimensional portrayal of politics, is a matter of some debate (e.g. Lewis and King,
1999). At their core, these questions trouble the selection rules that voters allegedly use in
translating their ideological preferences into vote choice, the subject of enduring debate
between scholars advocating proximity (e.g. Downs, 1957; Grofman, 2004) and directional
theories of voting (e.g. Rabinowitz and Macdonald, 1989). While a growing body of
research attempts to resolve these seemingly incompatible approaches to candidate
selection (e.g. Tomz and Van Houweling, 2008; Claassen, 2009), these competing theories
share an important theoretical and, by extension, empirical foundation in that this research
uniformly relies on citizens’ evaluations of both their own and candidates’ policy

99

https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/23/opinion/campaign-stops/do-sanders-supportersfavor-his-policies.html
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preferences—thereby effectively divorcing the role of symbolic ideology from candidate
selection.100
In this chapter, I revisit the spatial logic of vote choice to explore 1) how identitybased sorting affects prospective voters’ impression of shared ideological proximity with
political candidates, and 2) how this sorting, in turn, affects individuals’ electoral choices
vis-à-vis issue-based proximity. I uncover little evidence that sorting biases how
individuals think about candidate positioning within ideological space. However, I find
that sorting exerts a curious effect on choice: while high levels of overlap between political
identities increases the likelihood that individuals will choose the candidate that they
perceive best resembles their ideological prototype, sorting actually decreases the
likelihood that individuals will select the candidate whose objective ideological character
is closest to their own policy preferences. In effect, then, identity sorting pushes voters to
the ideological “extremes,” even when the distribution of their policy preferences reveals
that they are better matched to more “moderate” candidates.
Applying these insights to real instances of vote choice, I use the 2008 ANES
Time-Series survey to test whether policy proximity with an in-party candidate or sorting
are stronger predictors of casting an in-party vote for president. I show that, while policy
proximity shapes partisan defection, even modest levels of identity-based sorting are
sufficient to motivate group-conforming behavior. In other words, cross-pressures among
one’s political identities generate greater instability in behavior than a poorly-matched
system of attitudes.
In part, these findings not only offer insight into why sorted voters are less likely
to split their ballots between candidates of opposing parties (e.g. Davis and Mason, 2016),
but help resolve some of the tension in the debate over whether voters utilize directional or
proximity selection criteria. Simply put, identity sorting biases an individual’s
understanding of ideological space in such a way that a more extreme candidate is favored

100

A recent working paper by Tausanovitch and Warshaw (n.d.) is emblematic of this
point: the authors show that symbolic ideology more or less tracks with mean ideal points
generated from policy positions. Yet, whether or not symbolic ideology functions in a
predictive manner similar to policy-based ideology is something of an open question.
Given the evidence presented in previous chapters that shows these constructs exert
differentiated behavior, it is reasonable to question their role vis-à-vis selection rules.
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over other, more issue-proximate candidates, shifting citizens from proximity to directional
voters—effectively decoupling policy considerations from the vote choice. In turn, sorted
voters may contribute to polarized legislative politics: while the average citizen often
possesses a mixture of countervailing views, identity sorting pushes potential voters to act
in ways that run counter to the heterogeneity (and even moderation) that characterizes those
persons’ attitudes. In this way, the vote choice of highly-sorted voters satisfies their strong
emotional ties to their political groups by casting votes for consistent ideologues.

7.2

Preferences and evaluations within spatial politics

The spatial theory of elections begins with the premise that candidates’ policy positions
and voters’ policy preferences can be ordered within a common, unidimensional left-right
continuum (Downs, 1957). Consider, for the purpose of illustration, the matter of income
taxes. When conceptualizing how individuals approach this issue, it is common to
dichotomize the responses to tax policy into whether individuals believe that increasing
taxes on certain categories of income is an appropriate method of raising government
funds—what is traditionally considered a “liberal” approach—or whether increasing such
taxes is an objectionable action—what is commonly termed a “conservative” approach.
Thus, we can measure the degree to which an individual is “liberal” or “conservative” on
this issue (and many others) by providing a survey item that juxtaposes these two
approaches within a numbered, but bounded continuum.
The prevailing logic that underscores most models of vote choice assumes that the
mathematical computation of scores assigned to a given set of many policy positions can
be arrayed within this liberal-conservative axis for both candidates and voters (e.g.
Rabinowitz and Macdonald, 1989; Rogowski, 2014; Tausanovitch and Warshaw, 2014).
By summing and averaging an individual’s preferences together, the resulting value
equates to their “ideal point”—or the placement within this dimensional space that reflects
the distilled character of their indexed preferences.101 In turn, how individuals select a
101

There are at least two issues with this approach, one of which I will discuss at length
below (whether or not individuals’ latent preferences are empirically “unidimensional”)
and the other which I will discuss here. Problematically, as recent research shows,
computational indexing of responses treats a person with strong countervailing preferences
as a moderate. This approach may not be ideal insofar as this person is not moderate in the
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candidate is related to the ordering of candidates within this space in relation to the
prospective voter’s own ideal point. Two explanations for the subsequent vote decision
rely on different utility maximization functions that might be applied by voters: proximity
and directional selection rules.102
According to the proximity model of choice, prospective voters ought to prefer
candidates that are nearest their own placement within this left-right policy space. As
candidates deviate from the voter’s ideal point, the likelihood that that candidate will
pursue policy that reflects an individual’s preferences decreases, thereby rendering that
candidate less desirable. Thus, the candidate that is closest to an individual’s preferences
ought to receive that person’s vote (Hinich and Enelow, 1984).
In contrast to this approach, the directional model of voting simplifies the logic of
selection by discretizing the choices involved into “sides.” Instead of locational proximity
governing choice, prospective voters prefer candidates that take strong positions in the
general direction of their preferences because these candidates are both more reliable and
committed to the voter’s political cause or side. Thus, ideological extremity in a candidate
maximizes the prospective voter’s utility (Rabinowitz and Macdonald, 1989). Accordingly,
voters should shun more moderate candidates and prefer, instead, extreme ones who belong
to the voter’s “team.”
The common thread linking both of these approaches is that prospective voters are
not only required to possess principled attitudes that translate into valid self-placements,
but that prospective voters understand and evaluate information about candidates in

technical understanding of moderate-as-neutral (Broockman, 2016). As such, the
prevailing stylization of ideal points can throw off some of the predictions of models that
assume this person derives more utility from a pure moderate than a candidate that supports
the more important of the two extreme positions that the individual holds. In that case, the
individual might derive more utility by prioritizing one extreme issue over the other and
casting a vote for a candidate that will at least pursue that preference, as opposed to a
moderate candidate that will support neither extreme opinion. As Ahler and Brookman
(unpublished manuscript, pg. 4) note, citizens are not only “less likely to support moderate
policies than politicians,” but “[c]itizens also do not reliably prefer politicians who support
moderate policies.”
102
A third notable selection criteria includes discounting, where “voters discount campaign
pledges and judge each candidate based on the policies they expect the government to adopt
if the candidate wins office (Tomz and Van Houweling, 2008, pg. 303).
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uniform ways.103 While the first requirement is difficult but perhaps not unrealistic (e.g.
Zaller and Feldman, 1992),104 the second one is perhaps more problematic in that
perceptions of political actors are inevitably tinged with affect related to group
memberships.105 These assumptions present the following problem: if survey respondents
are not supplied with continua that prima facie place candidates within policy space—
informational conditions that exhibit a troubling lack of external validity—then how do
individuals evaluate and, ultimately, select political candidates when they are provided the
type of simple policy information that is often transmitted in political campaigns
advertisements?106 Do their group memberships bias their concomitant candidate
evaluations and, in turn, shape the proximity-based “fit” of their selections?

7.3

How identity sorting shapes evaluations and choice

A growing body of research indicates that individuals are not agnostic information
processors. Recent work shows that group memberships bias information processing
(Nyhan and Reifler, 2010), perceptions of social groups (Alher and Sood, 2016), copartisan
extremity (Ahler, 2014), and party placements (Chapter 4). As such, if citizens do not
accurately, or, for that matter, reliably perceive where candidates fit within ideological
space, then these tendencies ought to have consequences for conclusions drawn about the
selection rules that prospective voters use to choose candidates.
This expectation dovetails with a more general disconnect within the spatial work
on political choice insofar as—while scholars denote that there are sincere differences
between policy- and identity-based ideology (Malka and Llekes, 2010; Ellis and Stimson,
103

A tertiary concern to which I will return to later involves the linkage between policy (or
“operational,” in the parlance of Ellis and Stimson, [2012]) and symbolic space.
104
However, it is worth noting that the requirement that these attitudes, in turn, can be
transposed into one-dimensional policy space is a condition that is often unmet (Feldman
and Johnston, 2014; Lupton, Myers, and Thornton, 2015),
105
Indeed Lewis and King (1999, pg. 22, emphasis mine) note that “the contributors to the
literature on directional versus proximity voting are fighing over two central political
science issues: our understanding of a basic feature of the political world—how voters
make decisions—and a prominat aspect of our data collection strategies—how randomly
chosen respondents answer imprescisely worded survey questions.”
106
At its core, this question regards how individuals both understand the relationship
between policy-based messaging and the liberal-conservative space and, in turn, how they
weight or translate that information into actionable decisional criteria. Studies 1 and 2
attempt to flesh out this distinction.
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2012)—these differences have not been fully grappled with in the stylization of electoral
choice. For instance, do perceptions regarding policy-based fit determine vote choice? Or
is it something about liberal-conservative identity and, by extension, the extent to which
that identity conforms to partisanship that pushes or drives how individuals resolve the
tension of choosing between political candidates? Put another way, are individuals rational
economizers of instrumental preferences or do they experience candidate choice as a social
expression of their preferences?
In a recent working paper, Ahler and Broockman (n.d.) find that the relationship
between policy information and candidate preference is nuanced. If citizens are a mixedbag of countervailing preferences, they reason, then surely their candidate preferences
ought to follow suit. In point of fact, the opposite seems to be true: while these prospective
voters are computationally-moderate in the sense that the combination of their issue
preferences offsets the directionality of their policy attitudes, these citizens actually prefer
candidates that are, on balance, extreme. Why? Their answer to this disconnect seems to
be related to how individuals connect individual policy preferences to candidates’ policy
stances. According to their argument, these computationally-moderate voters may actually
prefer candidates who match a subset of their policy preferences that are otherwise
extreme. In that case, proximity-based logic mis-estimates how those voters approach their
choices.107
Consider, too, the research on “correct” voting (Lau and Redlawsk, 1997). This
research is a variation on proximity voting insofar as it computes a matrix of an individual’s
preferences and beliefs to establish their ideal political profile and contrasts it with a
number of candidates in a laboratory conceit. If an individual selects the candidate who
best approximates their own preferences, then the voter is assumed to have selected
correctly.
Absent from much of this discussion, however, is an explicit role for identity, much
less the convergence between political identities. I expect that accounting for the
integration of symbolic identities ought to affect the calculus of electoral choice, and, in

There is also the dimension of issue “importance.” It may be the case, for example,
that ideal points hold less relevance for the vote choice vis-à-vis the importance of
particular issues. Consider the one-issue abortion voter who reliably casts a vote for a
pro-life candidates, other policy-preferences notwithstanding.
107
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particular, explain why voters may eschew issue-proximate candidates in favor of more
“extreme” ones. Given that sorting narrows in-group and expands out-group boundaries,
individuals who are highly-sorted may engage in a biased sense of who “best” represents
their interests. In a sense, the highly sorted voter may discount proximity-based policy
considerations and instead vote in ways that correspond to the strength of their identities.
As such, greater sorting ought not only bias “correct” voting, if we conceive that “best”
equates to most issue-proximate, but may generate a preference for more ideologicallyextreme candidates—in effect, decoupling policy fit from representative preferences.
Simply put, given recent findings that highlight the expressive nature of partisanship
(Huddy, Mason, and Aaroe, 2015), I expect that sorting—independent policy-based
proximity—should structure electoral choice.

7.4

Study 1: Candidates, policy ideal points, and sorting

To test explore the relationship among sorting, the fit between citizens’ and candidates’
policy preferences, and vote choice, I developed and implemented a survey-based
instrument that captures how people connect explicit policy information to candidate
choice. This pilot study was fielded at a large public university in the Southern United
States during the spring of 2016. The survey sample consists of students who were awarded
nominal extra credit for their participation, and is younger, whiter, more affluent, and more
educated relative the general population (as is customary with such convenience samples).
Representativeness notwithstanding, psychology research has traditionally utilized similar
nonprobability samples to explore decision making. In particular, Krupnikov and Levine
(2014) demonstrate that student samples generate similar estimates to representative adult
samples gathered using probabilistic sampling methods.

7.4.1

Survey design

Individuals were first given a set of randomly-ordered policy questions on which they were
asked to select their preferred solution to different social and economic problems. Next,
they answered questions about their ideological and partisan affiliation. Subjects were then
given four vignettes in random order describing fictitious candidates running in a local
primary race. After reading about each candidate’s issue positions, individuals were asked
to make an assessment regarding whether they perceived that the candidate was a liberal
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or conservative. Finally, subjects were presented with all four candidates and their policy
descriptions, the information displayed in Table 7.1, and asked to select the candidate for
which they felt most inclined to vote.

Table 7.1. Description of candidates
Candidate A
 Government should drastically cut spending and
balance budget.
 Same-sex marriage and civil unions are wrong.
 We need to fight to overturn Roe v. Wade;
abortion should never be legal.
 The federal government has no place in creating
jobs; if we remove restrictions on the private
sector, then the economy will recover.

Candidate B
 The government can play a role in helping
provide jobs for ordinary Americans.
 Civil unions are appropriate, but same-sex
marriage is wrong.
 We should limit abortion to only those
instances where the life of the mother is in
danger or in rare circumstances such as rape or
incest.
 The present level of government spending is
about where it should be. I would neither
increase nor decrease federal spending.

Candidate C
 The government may help in job creation, but the
private sector is more important in creating jobs.
 Marriage is a right that all people should benefit
from.
 Abortion should be a woman’s choice, but not
past the third trimester.
 We should increase federal spending, but we
need to make sure we don’t saddle future
generations with too much debt

Candidate D
 We should continue to greatly increase federal
spending.
 Individuals should have the right to marry
whomever they choose, regardless of gender.
 A woman’s right to choose is important.
Abortion shouldn’t be restricted.
 The government should provide many
opportunities to provide work for unemployed
Americans.

Notes: Treatment order is randomly assigned; after reading through each vignette, subjects were
asked to assess how liberal or conservative the candidate sounded.

Table 7.1 details information about the policy positions taken by each particular
candidate. The same four issues were included in each vignette, including government
spending, the permissibility of same-sex marriage, regulations governing abortion, and,
finally, the government’s role in providing jobs for the public. The particular stances within
each given policy domain match stereotypical positions taken by real officials, and the
numerical value associated with that position’s “objective” placement in liberalconservative space is denoted by the value in parentheses (this numerical information was
not given to subjects, but informs the reader of whether the position is “liberal,” low values,
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or “conservative,” high values).108 Averaging the values associated with the policy
positions together, it is possible to place each respective candidate in liberal-conservative
ideological space. These indexed ideal points, or the objective ideology of the various
candidates, are represented by the light-grey dots in Figure 7.1. Candidates A and B are
stereotypical ideologues insofar as their policy positions are uniformly extreme and
correctly sorted. Candidates B and C are more moderate candidates who possess a mixture
of mostly consistent, though weak, policy prescriptions.

Notes: Objective placement derived from an average of the issue positions
presented in Table 1. Perceived placement conveys the estimated liberalconservative placement made by respondent after reading vignette associated with
respective candidate; solid lines represent 95 percent confidence interval bands.

Figure 7.1. Objective candidate placements relative subjects’ placements
7.4.2

Measures

The solid point estimates depicted in Figure 7.1 represent perceived candidate ideology
and convey the subjective assessments that respondents made after reading about each
candidate’s policy positions. These estimates, bracketed by 95 percent confidence
intervals, track reasonably well with the objective nature of the more “moderate”
candidates. However, it is interesting to note that subjects under-estimated the extremity of
the two more extreme candidates by modest margins, who were perceived to be both less
liberal and conservative than their objective placements in ideological space.109 Curiously,

108

Admittedly, assigning numerical values is something of a subjective judgment; that said,
respondent placements track well with this coding decision’s logic.
109
In part this may be a function of respondents realizing that the issues presented to them
are only a select few of many possible policies. Perhaps, then, respondents undersell their
impressions of extremity without this additional context.
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as Figure 7.2 illustrates, the well-sorted are not necessarily more adept or biased regarding
these assessments. The well-sorted may be more slightly more “precise” in their estimation
of the candidates’ ideological profiles, as indicated by the smaller confidence interval
bands bracketing some of the estimates, but the differences between these assessments do
not significantly differ across the first or fourth quartiles of sorting.

Notes: Point estimates convey the liberal-conservative placement made by subject after reading
vignette describing candidate’s issue positions. Values on y-axis range from 1 (extremely liberal) to
7 (extremely conservative). Brackets around estimates convey 95 percent confidence interval bands.
X-axis presents first (minimum) and fifth (maximum) quintile of sorting scores. Candidate A’s
objective placement was at value 1; Candidate B’s objective placement in space was at value 3;
Candidate C’s objective placement 4.25; Candidate D’s objective placement was at 7.

Figure 7.2. Subjective candidate placements by subjects’ sorting
Contrasting these subjective assessments with the objective ideal points of each
respective candidate, I then created individual metrics of incorrectness of candidate
placement. This variable conveys the absolute difference between an individual’s
perception of a candidate’s liberal-conservative policy profile and the objective nature of
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that candidate in ideological space. If individuals are systematically-biased in the manner
in which they make these assessments, then the ability to make “more correct” assessments
may decrease the likelihood that an individual will choose a non-proximate candidate.
In addition to their assessments of candidate ideology, individuals were asked
about four policy items at the outset of the questionnaire from which we can construct a
respondent’s policy preferences. Using the traditional question format popularized by the
American National Election Studies (and as described in Chapter 2), responses to these
questions take the form of seven-category ordinal scales, where a liberal policy solution is
juxtaposed with a conservative one. However, because the same-sex marriage and abortion
items have discrete response categories (it does not necessarily make sense to juxtapose a
pro-life and pro-choice response within this response set binary), values were assigned to
the substantive response categories to maintain numerical parity with the seven-category
items. The questions were as follows:
1. Government spending. Some people think that the government should provide
fewer services even in areas such as health and education in order to reduce
spending. Suppose these people are at one end of a scale at point 1. Other people
feel it is important for the government to provide many more services even if it
means an increase in spending. Suppose these people are at the other end, at point
7. Where would you place yourself?
2. Government and welfare. Some people feel the government in Washington should
see to it that every person has a job and a good standard of living. Suppose these
people are at one end of a scale, at point 1. Others think the government should
just let each person get ahead on their own. Suppose these people are at the other
end, at point 7. Where would you place yourself?
3. Same-sex marriage. Recently, the question of same-sex marriage has been an issue
that has generated enormous public debate. Please select from among the following
responses the position that best characterizes how you feel about same-sex
marriage: Individuals should be free to marry whomever they choose (1); Civil
unions are appropriate, but marriage benefits should not be extended to same-sex
couples (4); Or, same-sex marriage is wrong and should be illegal (7).
4. Abortion access. There has been some discussion about abortion during recent
years. Please select the response that best characterizes your views on abortion: By
law, a woman should always have access to an abortion (1); The law should permit
abortion, but only prior to the third trimester (3); The law should permit abortion
only in cases of rape, incest, or when a woman's life is in danger (5); Or, by law
abortion should never be permitted (7).
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Next, I calculated latent ideological profiles for each subject by taking the average
of the values associated with their responses. While the literature on mass ideology is not
bullish on the notion that individuals possess unidimensional policy preferences (Feldman
and Johnston, 2014; Kinder and Kalmoe, forthcoming), the literature on vote choice has
traditionally utilized this parsimonious, one-dimensional treatment of policy preferences
(e.g. Tausanovitch and Warshaw, 2014; see Ahler and Broockman, n.d. for a recent
review). To reduce concern about the tension regarding whether mass opinion is
unidimensional, that is, whether it is empirically justifiable to arrange an individual’s
preferences within liberal-conservative space, the four policy items used here were chosen
for their saliency. Politicians frequently invoke these four issues during electoral
campaigns, and it is not unreasonable to assume that individuals ought to connect these
items to left-right space (indeed, they certainly do so for the candidate assessments). In this
case, I find that a principal components factor analysis indicates that the four policy items
load reasonably well onto a single factor, bolstering the justification for treating the
combination of these preferences as a form of liberal-conservative ideology.110
With this information in hand, I then calculate the proximity of vote selection. This
variable reflects the distance between a respondent’s policy-based ideology and that of the
candidate for which they voted. This item ranges from 1 to 4, where lower values indicate
better or “closer” fit between candidate-respondent policy ideology. Table 7.2 reveals that
more than half of the respondents selected the most optimal candidate—i.e. the candidate
closest to the respondent’s own indexed ideological preferences. Roughly 30 percent of
individuals selected the next closest candidate in space, while only about 15 percent of
respondents selected a candidate that was third-furthest from the own policy ideal point.
To test how ideology affects directional voting, two additional variables were
created. First, extreme candidates are those candidates located at the two ideological poles.
A vote for candidates A or D is coded 1, while a vote for one of the more moderate
candidates B or C is coded 0. To test the comparative effect of policy- relative identitybased ideology on this item, a variable capturing policy extremity is operationalized by
110

The four items produce an Eigenvalue of 1.87, with factor loadings of at least 0.66 for
all items. For a small sample of undergraduate students (n = 260), this is impressive.
However, it’s worth noting that most explorations of spatial voting take for granted the
notion that mass policy-preferences can be categorized within liberal-conservative space
(for good or ill).
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folding the metric of policy ideology at its midpoint and taking the absolute value, where
values of 0 (minimum) correspond to moderate attitudes and values of 4 (maximum)
convey consistent, extreme attitudes.

Table 7.2. Candidate choice: Distance between candidate-subject
preferences
Idealness of
candidate selection
by policy proximity

52.00%

Avg. distance between
respondent and
candidate ideology
0.35

nd

30.80%

1.31

3rd

15.20%

2.22

2.00%

3.65

1st (best)
2

th

4 (worst)

Percent of
subjects

100.0%
Notes: Candidate selection categories determined by taking the absolute value of
the difference between candidate and subject policy ideology. Category best
corresponds to scenario in which subject chose the candidate whose policy
platform was objectively closest to the subject’s own policy preferences;
similarly, category worst corresponds to selecting candidate whose policy
platform is furthest from subject’s own preferences. Total subjects = 250.

Finally, information regarding a number of control variables was collected. Male
is coded 1 for persons identifying as a man and 0 otherwise. Respondents who identified
as white were coded 1 and otherwise, 0. News consumption is an ordinal variable that
ranges from 1 to 7 and conveys how many days a week a respondent watched, read, or
listened to the news. Political knowledge is an index of correctly identifying which party
controlled the House and Senate at the time of the survey, in addition to correctly
identifying the political branch that appoints federal judges. The variable ranges from 0,
no correct answers, to 1, answered every question correctly.
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Table 7.3. The effect of sorting on selecting the most objectively-proximate candidate

Sorting
Policy strength /
consistency
Sorting x policy strength

Select most objectivelyproximate candidate
(low values = more
proximate)

Select candidate
perceived to be closest
(low values = more
proximate)

Select most
objectivelyproximate
candidate

1.30**

-1.05**

1.69*

(0.37)

(0.33)

(0.70)

-0.12

-0.07

0.34

(0.39)

(0.33)

(0.70)

-----

------

-0.80
(1.07)

Incorrectness of Cand A
placement

0.09

0.22

0.09

(0.15)

(0.17)

(0.15)

0.11

0.11

0.11

(0.21)

(0.22)

(0.21)

0.05

0.15

0.06

(0.12)

(0.14)

(0.12)

0.24

-0.01

0.23

(0.18)

(0.16)

(0.18)

0.22

-0.73*

0.21

(0.38)

(0.35)

(0.37)

-0.29

0.19

-0.28

(0.27)

(0.25)

(0.27)

-0.13*

0.06

-0.13*

(0.06)

(0.06)

(0.06)

-0.30

-1.00*

-0.32

(0.48)

(0.49)

(0.48)

1st cutpoint

0.19

-1.55**

0.37

(0.54)

(0.55)

(0.60)

2nd cutpoint

1.64**

-0.23

1.83**

(0.54)

(0.53)

(0.60)

3.24**

0.48

3.43**

(0.63)

(0.53)

(0.68)

254

254

254

Incorrectness of Cand B
placement
Incorrectness of Cand C
placement
Incorrectness of Cand D
placement
Male
White
News consumption
Political knowledge

3rd cutpoint
N

Source: Sample of LSU undergrads, Spring 2016
Notes: *p<0.05, **p<0.01
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7.4.3

Results

Beginning with the first column presented in Table 7.3, I model whether a respondent cast
a vote for the most ideal or policy-proximate candidate. Recalling that the outcome variable
ranges from 1, most issue-proximate, to 4, furthest candidate from the respondent’s ideal
point, the estimates constitute log-odds ratios of the effect of a given covariate on the
idealness of choice. The results indicate that any systematic bias in the way that individuals
understand where candidates fit within policy space is unrelated to vote choice (the series
of four items capturing the difference between perceived and objective candidate ideology,
“incorrectness of candidate [a-d]”). Further, I find that consistent, strong policy
preferences do not shape candidate selection.
Moving to the coefficient for sorting, I find that the relationship between sorting
and candidate selection is strong and positive. As individuals become better sorted, the
likelihood of selecting the candidate closest to their policy preferences decreases. To
illustrate the contours of the effect of sorting, Figure 7.3 plots point estimates for those
persons with the weakest and strongest levels of sorting. Here, the y-axis conveys the
probability of casting a particular vote; the optimality of that choice depicted along the xaxis. Two observations are warranted. First, the likelihood of casting a vote for a candidate
that is proximate to an individual’s bundle of policy preferences is modest for all
respondents. However, those persons with weak, cross-cutting identities are more much
likely to select candidates that are more proximate to their own policy preferences in three
of four categories of candidate optimality.
Interestingly, however, there is some evidence that, while policy-based fit
decreases as sorting increases, individuals actually perceive that their candidate selections
are the best fit to their overarching preferences. Consider Model 2 in Table 3, which models
candidate selection based on perceived distance between a given candidate’s liberalconservative placement and the individual’s own ideological self-placement—in effect, the
optimality of perceived ideological proximity. Here, the coefficient produced for the
sorting term is actually negative and significant. As individuals become better sorted, the
likelihood that they select a candidate that they think is closest to their own identity
increases substantially. Thus, sorting increases the perceived liberal-conservative fit with
a candidate even as it renders individuals less likely to select the candidate most proximate
to their policy-based preferences.
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Notes: Y-axis conveys probability of candidate selection. X-axis values are
candidates who, in descending order, represent best-to-worst fit between selected
candidate’s policy profile vis-à-vis subject’s policy preferences. Vertical lines
bracketing point estimates depict 95 percent confidence intervals. Point estimates
for “min” and “max” are 1st and 5th quartiles of sorting, respectively. Solid red
line is fitted marginal effect averaged across candidates.

Figure 7.3. Marginal Effect of sorting on candidate selection optimality
On the whole, these results indicate that higher levels of sorting predictably bias
individuals toward “less-optimal” candidates—presumably turning the highly sorted into
what are traditionally understood as “directional” voters.111 Further, Model 3 bears this
conclusion out: the marginal effect of casting a vote for the candidate most proximate to

111

While it is tempting to ask whether this finding is normatively troubling, posing this
question implicitly assumes that individuals ought to vote according to their aggregated
instrumental policy preferences. If this result conveys anything, then it may be the
realization that voters do not strictly reason using policy-based criteria to differentiate
among candidates. Recent research, in fact, suggests that voting is a distinctly expressive
act (e.g. Huddy, Mason, and Aaroe, 2015). In that case, policy proximity is a probably a
second-order concern. If true, then treating a voter with highly-sorted identities and mixedattitude as somehow voting against their preferences is wrongheaded.
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the individual’s policy-based preferences is not contingent on the interaction between
strength / consistency of preferences and sorting. Even at minimal levels of policy-based
consistency, identity-based sorting is sufficient to decrease the likelihood that an individual
chooses a candidate who best-reflects their underlying policy preferences.

7.5

Study 2: Policy proximity, sorting, and vote choice in the 2008

presidential election
Study 1 shows that, when given information regarding the policy platforms of multiple
candidates, the highly-sorted, prospective voter tends to prefer more extreme candidates,
even when their policy preferences convey they are matched to more moderate candidates.
Having explored the relationship between sorting and choice in a multicandidate (primary)
setting, I now turn to testing the insights derived from Study 1 in the context of a real-world
election. While arranging candidates and voters in policy space and testing the comparative
fit of vote choice is trickier in this application in that partisans reliably vote for their own
candidate, the 2008 ANES Time-Series survey fields a number of questions suitable for
comparing how perceived proximity to a presidential candidate and sorting affects the
likelihood of casting an in-party vote. I expect that, while policy-based fit ought to predict
lower rates of defection, the effect of sorting on vote choice should be appreciably
stronger.112

7.5.1

Measures

The dependent variable in the following analyses is cast in-party vote. I take the vote choice
variable provided by the ANES and transform it so that an individual who identifies as a
Republican and voted for McCain is coded 1 and otherwise 0 (i.e. Obama or third-party
vote). I then do the same for Democrats who voted for Obama, coded 1, and otherwise 0.
Thus, any person who casts a vote for their party’s candidate, about 60 percent of all

Why in-party voting? This variable is ideal because sorting is not a “directional”
variable; rather it is a measure of the strength / overlap between political identities. In
effect, it is nonsensical to model choice between the two candidates as a simply a function
of sorting.
112
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respondents, is coded 1 and those persons who either voted for a third- or out-party
candidate, coded 0.
To construct a measure of policy similarity with an in-party candidate, I first
construct a measure of a respondent’s own policy ideology. To do so, I utilized responses
to eight, seven-category policy placements. These include attitudes toward whether the
government should financially assist minorities, provide health insurance and jobs, ought
to prioritize environmental protections, women’s role in the home, abortion, defense
spending, and general government spending. On each item, a liberal and conservative
approach is juxtaposed at the values 1 and 7, respectively, with a midpoint that reflects
some sort of moderate tradeoff between the two perspectives at the value 4. Individual
responses are aggregated and averaged together to generate an “ideal” point in liberalconservative policy space.
Next, I construct a similar metric of policy-based ideology for the Republican
(McCain) and Democratic (Obama) candidates. Individuals were asked where they would
place both candidates on the same items as above. Using the condensed 3-category
partisanship variable, I create a metric of in-party policy ideology by assigning Democratic
identifiers the indexed Obama placements and those who identified as Republican the
McCain placements. In-party policy similarity is generated by taking the absolute value of
the respondent’s ideological ideal point from their ideal point of their party’s candidate. I
then reverse-code and rescale that item so that higher values (1) convey perfect overlap
and lower values no overlap between a respondent’s policy profile and their party’s
perceived placement (0). Figure 7.4 illustrates the distribution of these values, and it is
clear that most individuals perceive modest levels of policy-based similarity with their
party’s candidate.
In addition to this distance-based measure of proximity, I also create a
dichotomous variable that accounts for whether the out-party candidate’s ideological
profile was actually closer to an individual’s policy-based ideology score. To generate this
item, I assigned the value 1 to those partisans whose out-party candidate’s perceived
ideology score was closer to their own score and otherwise 0. Interestingly, more than 15
percent of respondents actually placed the out-party candidate nearer to their policy-based
preferences than their in-party candidate.
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Source: 2008 ANES Time-Series
Notes: X-axis conveys overlap between respondent policy-based ideology and
perceived in-group candidate’s policy ideology, multiplied by the strength of
both items. Value 1 conveys perfect overlap between respondent and in-party
candidate.

Figure 7.4. In-party policy similarity
Political knowledge comprises correctly identifying political leaders and the party
that controlled the House of Representatives. Respondents were asked whether they knew
what office a stated individual held (e.g. John Roberts, in which case the correct response
was “Chief Justice of Supreme Court”) and whether Democrats or Republicans were the
majority party in the House. Responses are averaged into an index that ranges from 0, “no
correct answers,” to 1, “all correct answers.”
An individual’s level of formal education ranges from “some elementary”
schooling, coded 1, to “advanced degree,” coded 7. News consumption is an ordinal
variable that conveys how many days that an individual admits to watching some form of
news on television. Respondent race is broken down into two dichotomous variables for
white and black, where identification with a racial group is coded 1 and otherwise 0. Age
is a continuous variable that ranges from a low of 17 years to 90 years. Finally, respondent
gender is coded 1 for male and 0 for persons identifying as a woman.
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Table 7.4. Effect of sorting and policy similarity on in-party vote choice

Sorting
In-party policy similarity
Sorting × policy similarity

(1)

(2)

(3)

2.63**

0.47

2.90**

(0.47)

(1.82)

(0.55)

1.58**

0.87

1.56**

(0.53)

(0.76)

(0.52)

-----

2.73

-----

(2.30)
Out-party candidate closest to R
Sorting × out-party candidate

-1.15**

-1.17**

-0.87**

(0.23)

(0.23)

(0.33)

-----

-----

-1.35
(1.10)

Knowledge
Education
News consumption
White
Black
Age
Male
Constant
N

-0.19

-0.19

-0.18

(0.32)

(0.32)

(0.32)

0.27**

0.27**

0.27**

(0.06)

(0.06)

(0.06)

0.10**

0.10**

0.10**

(0.04)

(0.04)

(0.04)

0.21

0.19

0.18

(0.27)

(0.27)

(0.27)

0.77*

0.76*

0.76*

(0.32)

(0.32)

(0.31)

0.00

0.00

0.00

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

-0.10

-0.10

-0.11

(0.18)

(0.18)

(0.18)

-2.51**

-1.92*

-2.53**

(0.71)

(0.88)

(0.71)

1,172

1,172

1,172

Source: 2008 American National Election Studies
Notes: Dependent variable is whether or not respondent cast vote for in-party candidate (i.e.
Democrat voted for Obama, Republican for McCain). Coefficient entries represent log-odds ratios;
*p<0.05; **p0.01
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7.5.2

Results

Table 7.4 depicts the results of three analyses, which model a preference for an in-party
candidate as a function of sorting, in-party policy similarity, whether an out-party candidate
was more issue-proximate to a respondent, and a series of controls. Beginning with Model
1, the coefficient for the effect of sorting on casting an in-party vote is positive and large
in magnitude. As individuals’ partisan and ideological identities converge, the likelihood
of casting a vote for an out-party candidate decreases, binding prospective voters to their
group’s presidential candidate. Yet, while sorting removes the cross-pressures that
destabilize goal-directed behaviors (e.g. Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, 1954; Davis
and Mason, 2015), the contours of this effect are more nuanced than the log-odds estimates
convey.

Source: 2008 ANES Time-Series
Notes: Values on y-axis convey probability of casting vote for in-party candidate. Dotted lines
represent 95 percent confidence interval bands.

Figure 7.5. Effect of sorting on probability of selecting in-party candidate
To demonstrate the contours of the effect of sorting on choice, Panel A in Figure
7.5 illustrates the probability of casting an in-party vote at different level s of identity
sorting. For those individuals who score near the minimum values on identity sorting (e.g.
respondents who identify as a weak Democrat / weak conservative), the likelihood of
casting an in-party vote is roughly 50 percent. For these voters, the ties that bind them to a
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particular candidate from the party with which they nominally associate are weak enough
to allow for defection. Transitioning to modest levels of identity sorting at the value 0.5
(e.g. respondents who identify as Republican / weak conservative), some of these crosspressures disappear. Here, the probability of casting an in-party vote increases
tremendously to about 85 percent—a change in roughly 30 percentage points. Even a
modest increase in sorting, then, is enough to bind these individuals to their groups’
candidate.
Consider, however, the difference in predicted in-party voting between a
Republican identifier with a weak conservative identity (moderate sorting) and a strong
Republican who identifies as extremely conservative (maximum sorting). The predicted
change in the likelihood of casting an in-party vote over this range of values is roughly 60
percent less than the change in in-party voting between minimum and moderate levels of
sorting. Two conclusions are warranted. First, low levels of identity convergence are
related to behavioral instability. When individuals are modestly attached to one group, but
are pulled in a competing direction by another, they are less likely to behave in ways that
are consistent with either identity. However, these results indicate that it takes only the
most minimal of changes in sorting to shift citizens toward engaging in goal-directed
behaviors. Thus, moderate levels of overlap between consistent identities are sufficient to
generate behavioral conformity with one’s group (e.g. in-party voting).
Moving next to the effect of in-party similarity on casting an in-party vote, the
coefficient entry for this variable is positive and moderately strong. This coefficient
indicates that when individuals perceive that their policy preferences are near to the inparty candidate, the likelihood of casting an in-party vote increases. However, when we
translate these estimates into predicted probabilities of casting an in-party vote, a caveat is
warranted. Note that, in Panel B in Figure 7.5, the confidence interval bands for the effect
of in-party policy similarity on vote choice are extremely wide. Recalling that this variable
ranges from values 0 to 1, it is difficult to tell whether or not minimal levels of policy
similarity (0.0) are distinguishable from modest ones (0.5). In fact, it seems that the effect
of policy similarity on in-party vote choice is only appreciably distinct at the upper range
of values (0.75 to 1.0).
The final covariate of interest in this first model is the item that captures whether
a voter’s policy preferences were actually closer to the out-party relative in-party candidate.
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This dichotomous variable takes the value 1 when an individual’s policy preferences are
closer to the perceived policy placement of the out-party candidate. As expected, the
coefficient associated with this variable is both negative and significant. Individuals who
are closer in proximity to the out-party candidate are about 22 percentage points less likely
to cast an in-party vote. While the magnitude of this effect is not as large as the coefficient
for sorting, this finding indicates that attitudinal cross-pressures do nevertheless play a role
in choice by reducing the propensity that a person who perceives that an alternative is closer
to their own bundle of policy preferences.
In light of the latter two findings, a natural extension of this modeling is to inquire
into whether or not the effect of sorting on choice is conditional on these two variables.
Specifically, do the effects of sorting on casting a vote for an in-party candidate vary as a
function of the extent to which a person is proximate to their party’s candidate? Put another
way, do attitudinal cross-pressures reduce the binding nature of identity sorting?
Models 2 and 3 in Table 4 analyze vote choice accounting for interaction terms
that test for these relationships. Beginning with Model 2, the coefficient representing the
interaction term between sorting and in-party policy similarity is large and robust, but
indistinguishable from zero. In Figure 7.6, I illustrate this shape of this effect. Here, the
point estimates convey the marginal effect of changing from minimum to maximum values
on the policy-similarity item at varying levels of identity sorting. The grey shaded areas
indicate the 95 percent confidence interval bands surrounding these estimates, which
completely envelop the threshold of 0 (indicating the statistical insignificance of this effect.
Simply, the effect of sorting on casting an in-party vote does not vary as individuals become
more or less proximate to their candidate.
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Source: 2008 ANES Time-Series
Notes: Dotted line conveys difference between minimum and maximum levels
of policy similarity on probability of casting vote for in-party candidate at
varying levels of sorting. Shaded grey area conveys 95 percent confidence
interval.

Figure 7.6. The marignal effect of low- relative high-policy similarty
with in-party candidate

Similarly, in Model 3, the coefficient for the interaction term between sorting and
proximity to an out-party candidate also fails to reach conventional levels of significance.
In this case, the effect of sorting on casting an in-party vote does not vary among those
persons who are closer or further from the out-party candidate. In practical terms, this
implies that while an individual’s policy preferences might be closer to those of an outparty candidate, the binding nature of sorting can overcome these attitudinal crosspressures. Provided that an individual’s identities are sufficiently strong and overlapping,
the likelihood that they will cast a vote for their party’s candidate is still very high, even
when they may be closer in ideological proximity to a different candidate.
The prevailing logic of electoral choice stipulates that voters review candidates
and evaluate their platforms (issues) and then select the candidate who best embodies their
preferences. Looking at the 2008 Presidential election, I find modest evidence that
perceived proximity to a candidate’s issue platform affects whether an individual will
defect from their in-group candidate. However, these findings also point to the conclusion
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that individuals experience vote choice as a social expression of their preferences. At
modest levels of overlap between political identities, there is a high likelihood that
individuals will conform to the “correct” behavior of casting a vote for their in-party
candidate. The literature on choice has traditionally assumed that issue-based cross
pressures will perturb this goal-directed behavior. Yet I show that even when such tensions
exist, the strength of political identities and, importantly, their interrelationship is sufficient
to offset the negative effects of these issue-based concerns.

7.6

Conclusion

Much is frequently made of whether or not individuals “vote against their interests.” In a
popular, though later criticized book What’s the Matter with Kansas?, Thomas Frank
argues that the white working class in America, which, presumably, has a more leftwardoriented “ideal point” than citizens of other groups, has been increasingly moved rightward
by the Republican Party. As a result, these millions of voters are presumably voting against
their economic interests by casting votes for Republican candidates who will undercut their
economic wellbeing. Bartel’s (2006) pointed critique of this narrative aside, Frank’s
argument fails to account for the power of social and political identities. Even if voters had
policy ideal points that betrayed their material interests, they might nevertheless vote in
line with their preferences insofar as electoral choice is a social or expressive behavior.
When individuals sufficiently feel like a part of a political group—when their partisan and
ideological identities converge—then they are acting in a rational manner by satisfying or
conforming to these group goals. Indeed, this point is complimented by work on “correct
voting” (Lau and Redlawsk, 1997), which explores whether or not individuals make
decisions that best-reflect their “true” or latent preferences.
This question has again sprung forth recently. In the latest iteration of this scenario,
the 2016 election of Donald J. Trump to the United States Presidency was met with
widespread confusion. If Donald Trump flouted the rule of law, undermined the desirability
of a free press, attacked women and minorities, railed against a popular healthcare law, and
promised to build a wall across the southern United States, then why would so many people
who directly opposed those various platform planks ignore the implications of those polices
and, instead, cast a vote for him?
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The results of this chapter indicate that, while policy preferences are clearly related
to choice, individuals do not necessarily approach elections as policy-maximizers.
Identities don’t function as a running tally of positive and negative policy considerations.
Instead, these group memberships compel individuals to act in ways that conform to the
interests of their group, even when their own interests and preferences might otherwise
push citizens to vote for candidates that more closely approximate their attitudes. At its
core, this finding speaks to the tensions between the proximity and directional theories of
voting. As sorting increases, it seems to be the case that individuals with strong and
consistent identities will prefer politically extreme candidates, even when their own policy
preferences are otherwise mixed. In effect, then, sorting appears to decouple policy-based
proximity from the vote choice.
On the one hand, this type of behavior is rational and expected. A rich literature in
social psychology finds that individuals conform to group behaviors and interests even
when their personal beliefs oppose those actions. On the other hand, the normative
consequences of this behavior are probably a cause for concern. When individuals satisfice
their political identities at the expense of cross-cutting issue preferences, then they may
prefer candidates whose modus operandi is counter to many of their sincere beliefs.
Consider the alarm conveyed by participants in a focus group of Trump voters polled by a
well-known special interests group. “I guess I’ve been living in a bubble,” one respondent
remarked. “If he does sign this into law [proposed healthcare restrictions], then it’s gonna
cause more disruption in our society,” communicated another. Yet these concerns, which
would have been raised in the pre-election period to astute observers, did not trouble these
prospective voters.
The power of sorted identities is significant. Even if individuals have not become
appreciably more extreme in their attitudes over time, modest levels of sorting are
sufficient to shift the criterion for choice from proximity to directional selection rules. As
such, it is this linkage that may overwhelmingly responsible for pushing politics into
uncivil and polarized territory. The politicians who are elected may not be the ones that
citizens need, but they certainly are the ones that they want.
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Chapter 8: Conclusion: Sorted? Polarized? Who Cares, Anyways?
Polarization is about more than just sorting, but sorting is polarization anyway
Noel, Mischiefs of Faction113

A core finding within social psychology research reveals that individuals struggle to
maintain competing or disconfirming beliefs—that people often seek to reduce the mental
stress or discomfort that possessing contradictory beliefs, ideas, and values generates. In
other words, the average person does not deal well with cognitive dissonance (Festinger,
1957). Research in political science has been slower to account for this finding, but work
shows that individuals update their evaluative preferences to conform to their political
choices (Caplan, 2001; Mullainathan and Washington, 2009; McGregor, 2013) and resist
information that disconfirms their prior beliefs (Nyhan and Reifler, 2010). On the one hand,
it is curious that ideologues often hold countervailing and contradictory views (Claussen,
Tucker, and Smith, 2015; Ellis and Stimson, 2012). Yet, on the other hand, perhaps this
inconsistency is unsurprising given the evidence that systematic constraint within citizens’
belief systems is low (Converse, 2000).
The concept of sorting, as presented in this dissertation, reflects an alternative
approach to understanding the cohesion and consistency of individuals’ preferences and
provides insight into two important debates within the broader study of political opinion,
generally, and mass polarization, specifically. The first, to which I allude above, regards
the coherency of mass opinion and turns on whether or not the relationship between an
individuals’ beliefs and partisanship are systematically constrained. The second involves
the extent to which Americans’ preferences have become more or less extreme over time—
whether sorting is a feature or derivative of what is colloquially called “polarization.”
Beginning with the first sentiment, if partisanship functions as the fundamental
lens through which individuals assess and navigate the political environment, then it
provides a yardstick by which to gauge the consistency of public opinion without placing
an undue informational burden on the average citizen, whose knowledge of current events
and grasp on political minutia is poor. Low levels of political acumen notwithstanding,
113

http://www.mischiefsoffaction.com/2014/06/polarization-is-about-more-than-just.html
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partisanship functions as a useful backdrop against which the coherency of social,
economic, and political preferences can be judged.
The findings presented in Chapters 2 and 3 address the ongoing, and, frankly, oftmisunderstood, debate regarding whether or not the mass public is “polarized.” If sorting
is polarization, then this polarization is oversold in both its scope and practical effects.
Compositionally, if we treated sorting only as a form of matching between ideology and
partisanship, then the extent of that matching has more or less hit a ceiling—even as elite
polarization continues to accelerate, matching among these preferences has not kept pace.
Based on existing party sorting research, this finding is unexpected. Elite polarization may
clarify where the parties stand, but, if individuals are unable or disinclined to understand
what these divisions mean, then matching between partisanship and ideology predictably
stagnates over the period of time between Levendusky’s work in The Partisan Sort and the
2012 election.114
The reality is that, while some amount of matching exists among issue preferences
and sorting, the subsequent, substantive effect of that issue sorting on political behavior is
relatively modest compared to that of identity sorting. Individuals who possess maximal
levels of issue-based sorting are less likely to hold biased evaluations of political groups
and engage in political participation compared to those persons with sorted identities. In
this respect, the long-standing quest to understand the dimensionality of public opinion
may miss the elephant in the room that such constraint is beside the point. Provided that
individuals’ identities are sufficiently sorted, they satisfy a minimum condition of practical
constraint: insofar as the convergence between political identities constitutes the removal
of cross-pressures that generate instability in evaluative and behavioral outcomes.
Second, the epigraph above is pithy, though a point of serious debate. Sorting—as
it has been defined in the singular unifying text on the subject—is functionally treated as
separate from polarization (Levendusky, 2009). Matching is separate from distribution.
But sorting, as defined here, is part and parcel “polarization” in that it accounts for
matching and extremity. If readers take one thing away from this work, then let it be this:
matching is a minimalist treatment of the degree to which two quantities are related; a far
more useful—theoretically, empirically, and analytically—approach is to allow sorting to
114
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account for the full breadth of the underlying survey response. In that case, Noel is correct
in his assessment that “sorting is polarization, anyway.” But be that as it may, based on the
public opinion analyzed throughout Chapters 3 and 4, it would seem that the mass public
is only modestly sorted, much less “polarized.” While the variance on individual survey
items may have decreased over time, it is inaccurate to paint the mass public’s
configuration of ideology vis-à-vis partisanship as extreme.
Beyond exploring the compositional nature of partisan sorting, this dissertation
also answered questions about the foundations and consequences of the identity sorting. In
Chapter 4, I showed that the conventional wisdom regarding the foundations of sorting—
that the correlation between partisanship and ideology within the mass public is a direct
response to elite polarization—is flawed in two important ways. First, the type of
polarization to which individuals respond matters. Using an original experiment, I showed
that exposure to policy-based polarization has a negligible effect on the extent to which
individuals’ political identities converge; instead, symbolic elite cues are the primary
antecedent of sorting. Second, because perceptions of elite cues are inherently shaped by
group memberships, I showed that sorting is almost wholly a function of perceptions of
out-group extremity and dissimilarity rather than perceived polarization.
These findings support a social identity-informed theory of sorting. Although
Greene’s (1999, 2000, 2002) pioneering work on partisanship persuasively argued that
counting oneself a member of the Democratic or Republican Parties constitutes a form of
social identity, this perspective has been slower to trickle into the larger behavioral milieu
(most recently, Huddy, Mason, and Aaroe [2015]). Be that as it may, given that identitybased sorting embodies the convergence between two social identities, these findings
constitute much-needed evidence that ties the relationship between symbolic political
identities to symbolic, group-based cues.
In Chapter 5, I explore how the convergence between individuals’ partisan and
ideological identities affects their propensity to value compromise. I find that citizens with
sorted identities are less likely to voice normative support for compromise, with one
important caveat: this effect is isolated among those with right- but not left-leaning
identities. These differences disappear, however, when respondents are queried about the
specific extent to which one’s “side” deserves greater deference in the policymaking
process. Here, sorting drastically reduces the extent to which individuals are willing to cede
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resources to one’s out-group—even for those persons who lack a consistent framework of
interconnected ideological values. In sum, this disconnect is emblematic of the tension
between abstract principles and episodic behavior that scholars have observed regarding
attitudes toward public goods. While individuals idealize compromise as a democratic
value, sorting reduces one’s propensity to accommodate out-group demands.
These findings are not particularly encouraging. A willingness to value and pursue
compromise is necessary for the sustainability of democratic governance. The
brinksmanship that characterizes elite communication and behavior in Congress now
seems to characterize intergroup relations within the mass public. Sorting exacerbates
intergroup exchange by binding individuals to their political teams. If citizens are to live
peaceably, then sorting may undercut some of the normative barriers that prevent illtreatment and facilitate improving the status quo.
Finally, in Chapter 6, I show how sorting shapes vote choice. Traditional models
of electoral choice are predicated upon parsimonious and optimistic, though perhaps
unrealistic, assumptions regarding how citizens translate and understand complex policy
information. While policy preferences are undoubtedly related to choice, individuals do
not necessarily approach elections as policy-maximizers. Instead, these group
memberships compel individuals to conceptualize choice as an expression of their
symbolic identities. At its core, this finding speaks to the tensions between the proximity
and directional theories of voting. As sorting increases, it seems to be the case that
individuals with strong and consistent identities will prefer politically extreme candidates,
even when their own policy preferences are otherwise mixed. In effect, then, sorting
appears to decouple policy-based proximity from the vote choice.
These findings have implications for prevailing explanations of elite polarization.
This research presumes that, in order for the mass public to be responsible for elite
polarization, the citizenry would need to exhibit extreme orientations that were temporally
prior to legislative extremity. Given that the existence of mass polarization is mixed at best
(Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope, 2006), the mass public is more or less let off the proverbial
hook as it relates to responsibility for elite polarization (Barber and McCarty, 2013).
However, the findings presented in Chapter 6 indicate that individuals who exhibit modest
levels of identity sorting prefer, on balance, more extreme representatives. In other words,
attitudinal extremity notwithstanding, sorted individuals may exacerbate legislative
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polarization by helping to elect more extreme officials, even when they possess a
heterogeneous mix of policy preferences that are better matched to less well-sorted and
extreme representatives.
Moving forward, there remain questions unaddressed by this project for which
future work might consider. First, the role that the media plays in shaping sorting within
the campaign context is unclear. Campaign research indicates that these events boil down
to effectively communicating information to (Drew and Weaver, 2006; Dimitrova et al.,
2014) and provoking emotional responses from prospective voters (Redlawsk, Civettini
and Lau, 2007). While past research has shown that campaigns can have an exogenous
effect on partisanship (Gerber, Huber, and Washington, 2010), whether or not campaigns
trigger convergence between political identities remains an open question. If the
informational prerequisites of identity sorting are relatively minor, however, then we ought
to see greater convergence between political identities throughout the course of a
campaign.
So, too, is information-gathering behavior’s relationship to sorting unclear.
Arceneaux and Johnson’s (2013) work demonstrates that a media-rich environment
complicates how individuals access information germane to political evaluations and
decision-making. While traditional (Sunstein, 2001) and social media (Conover et. al.,
2012) usage are related to increased polarization, past research on sorting has not
developed a cohesive framework for understanding how iterative exposure to these news
sources affect sorting. Davis and Dunaway (2016) find that the raw availability of media
has only a minor effect on sorting in the aggregate, but future work would do well to
examine the microfoundations of the usage of media vis-à-vis sorting.
Third, the emotional (affective) and cognitive foundations of sorting have not been
sufficiently examined. Consider the large literature that links emotions to informationseeking behavior. Within the Affective Intelligence literature (e.g. Marcus, Neuman, and
Mackuen, 2000), fear plays a special role in motivating an active search for information
and, potentially, a reconsideration of one’s prior beliefs. In this vein, fearful citizens may,
in turn, be more likely to match their ideological preferences to their partisan ones in
response to such anxiety. If anxiety is resolved by assuaging one’s doubts—and,
importantly, if individuals are fundamentally motivated to reduce cognitive dissonance
(e.g. Caplan, 2001; Nyhan and Reifler, 2010)—then anxious citizens ought to be more
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likely to exhibit greater comity between their ideological and partisan preferences. Future
research on sorting should account for the role of such emotions.
These extensions notwithstanding, this dissertation argues for greater theoretical
and empirical precision in understanding the convergence between ideology and
partisanship within the mass public. In particular, the relationship between liberalconservative and partisan identification is a dance that has significant consequences for the
character of the larger party system. Given the negative repercussions that well-matched
and strong political identities generate—and an incentive structure that trades on this
symbolic, but simple information—campaigns and political leaders alike are faced with a
perverse incentive to play upon these psychological group attachments. Ultimately,
understanding the compositional structure of this facet of sorting provides insight into why
American political discourse has become increasingly uncivil and intemperate despite
meaningful changes in the constraint of public opinion over time.
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Appendices
Appendix A – Chapter 4
1

Description of controls

The analyses in Chapter 3 employ a number of controls. White and Black respondents are
coded 1 and otherwise 0. Male is coded 1 for a respondent who identifies as a man and 0
for respondents who identify as a woman. Respondents residing in states that comprise the
Old South, or those persons living in states that were a part of the original Confederacy,
are coded 1 and otherwise 0.
Education is coded differently for the CANES Time-Series than it is for the
standalone 2012 ANES Time-Series survey. In the CANES, education is coded as a sixpart item that ranges from 0, “some elementary education” to 1 “graduate degree.” In the
2012 iteration, education is measured using a finer-grade instrument that ranges from the
grade that a respondent finished all the way through earning a doctorate degree. This
generates sixteen separate categories, which are rescaled to range from 0 to 1.
Political interest is measured as a three-category item in the CANES, where
individuals are asked how much they are interested in elections. Respondents who reply
“not much interested” are coded 0, while those who are “somewhat” and “very much
interested” are coded 0.5 and 1.0, respectively. In the 2012 CANES Time-Series survey,
individuals are asked how often they pay attention to politics and elections. Reponses take
one of five categories that vary from “Never,” coded 0, to “Always,” coded 1.
Finally, political knowledge is operationalized in the CANES as whether a
respondent correctly identifies the majority party in the House of Representatives, coded
1, and otherwise, coded 0. In the 2012 ANES Time-Series survey, knowledge is
operationalized as an index of whether a respondent correctly identifies the majority party
in the House, the Vice President, and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Respondents
who offer no correct answers are coded 0, while correctly identifying all three items yields
a score of 1.115

115

The reason for different political knowledge items is related to the absence of common
and consistent knowledge items in the individual Time-Series surveys dating back to 1984.
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Appendix B – Chapter 5
1

Study 1 measurement details

Table B1. Descriptive statistics for Study 1
Variable
Conditions
Symbolic – avg polarization
Policy – avg polarization
Symbolic – distribution
polarization
Policy – distribution polarization
Symbolic – text polar (no graphic)
Control condition
Controls
White
Black
Age
Education
Male
Income
Internet
Knowledge
News consumption (frequency)

# of
Obs

Mean

194
182

---------

---------

0
0

1
1

178
202
190
156

-----------------

-----------------

0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1

1102
1102
1099
1100
1078

0.784029
0.048094
36.71156
3.549091
0.512987

0.411681
0.214063
12.83805
0.875482
0.500063

0
0
18
1
0

1
1
100
5
1

1100
1102
1102

5.607273
0.647913
0.533424

3.040572
0.477838
0.235632

1
0
0

12
1
1

Source: 2016 Amazon.com mTurk sample
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Std.
Min
Deviation value

Max
value

350
300
250

N

200
150
100
50
0
0.00 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.12 0.16 0.19 0.20 0.28 0.31 0.53 0.62 1.00

Notes: Higher rates of sorting are observed in the mTurk sample relative
what we would expect in a more demographically-representative sample
(the sample here is disproportionately young, educated, and politically
knowledgeable, all of which are related to increased propensities of
sorting). Still, this does not present a problem for the task at hand, per se,
because we are only interested in relative sorting rates across conditions
and whether exposure to elite cues affects sorting. That we actually
observe more sorting, in general, makes observing treatment effects
slightly more difficult given the higher baseline rate of sorting.
Figure B1. Distribution of sorting scores in Study 1
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Table B2. Partisan-ideological sorting as a function of elite cues (Study 1)
Conditions
b
s.e.
Symbolic – avg polarization
0.064
0.038
Policy – avg polarization
-0.010
0.040
Symbolic – distribution polarization
0.013
0.040
Policy – distribution polarization
-0.002
0.039
Symbolic – text polar (no graphic)
0.061
0.039
Controls
White
0.065
0.029
Black
0.095
0.061
Age
-0.001
0.001
Education
0.018
0.013
Male
0.086
0.022
Income
0.001
0.004
Internet
-0.038
0.024
Knowledge
0.072
0.040
News consumption (frequency)
0.013
0.005
Constant
0.223
0.072
Notes: Analyses use robust standard errors; italicized coefficients / standard errors
represent p<0.05, bolded coefficients p<0.01
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0.15

Marginal effect

0.10

0.05

0.00

-0.05

-0.10
Symbolic cue
(average)

Symbolic cue
(distribution)

Symbolic cue
(text-only)

Policy cue
(average)

Policy cue
(distribution)

Notes: Marginal effect estimates correspond to Table A2.
Figure B2. Partisan-ideological sorting across elite polarization conditions
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2

Study 2 measurement details

Table B3. Summary statistics for Study 2
# of
Obs

Mean

28892

0.248506

0.230018

0

1

29621
27127
26758
23382

0.660152
0.632396
0.698697
0.811806

0.207602
0.233434
0.253707
0.172437

0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1

23123

0.435124

0.254177

0

1

Policy-based placements
Perceived policy differences
In-party policy extremity
Out-party policy extremity
In-party policy similarities
Out-party policy dissimilarities

31627
28643
11922
28544
14369

0.563603
0.54956
0.583276
0.812512
0.292866

0.139762
0.181085
0.19185
0.166
0.220631

0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1

Controls
White ID
Black ID
Hh Income
Male
Age
Old South
Political interest
Knowledge of House majority
Protestant ID
Year counter

55674
55674
50338
55674
53455
55674
50815
55674
55674
55674

0.818157
0.112198
0.472474
0.448051
45.40993
0.276162
0.503093
0.424292
0.60989
1982.409

0.385719
0.315612
0.286912
0.497299
17.25246
0.447102
0.377545
0.494239
0.487779
18.07997

0
0
0
0
17
0
0
0
0
1948

1
1
1
1
99
1
1
1
1
2012

Variable
Dependent variable
Partisan-ideological sorting
Symbolic placements
Perceived party differences
In-party ideological extremity
Out-party ideological extremity
In-party ideological similarity
Out-party ideological
dissimilarity

Std.
Min
Deviation value

Source: CANES Time-Series
Notes: Data weighted by sample weights provided by ANES
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Max
value

Coding information and Distribution of sorting scores
Identity-based sorting comprises the overlap between partisan and ideological selfplacements, in addition to the strength of those identities. Specifically, we might pursue
the following operationalization:

Generate “Overlap of IDs” = | PID – IDEO| + 1

[1]

Reverse code “Overlap” so that high values convey more overlap

[2]

Fold PID and IDEO to create measures of “strength”

[3]

Multiply three items together: Overlap × PID strength × IDEO strength

[4]

Resulting scores rescaled to range from 0 “no overlap, weak IDs” to 1, “perfect overlap,
strong IDs”

16
14
12

Percent

10
8
6
4
2

1.00

0.62

0.53

0.31

0.28

0.20

0.19

0.16

0.12

0.09

0.08

0.05

0.00

0

Source: CANES Time-Series, 1972-2012
Notes: Data weighted by sample weights provided by ANES
Figure B3. Identity-based sorting in the CANES Time-Series
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Figure B4. Policy-based assessments disaggregated by group membership
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Table B4. Sorting and group assessments (Table 2 in manuscript)
(1)

(2)

(3)

0.33**
(0.02)

-----

-----

In-party ideological
extremity

-----

0.17**
(0.02)

-----

Out-party ideological
extremity

-----

0.22**
(0.04)

-----

In-party ideological
similarity

-----

-----

0.17**
(0.03)

Out-party ideological
dissimilarity

-----

-----

0.65**
(0.03)

0.12*
(0.04)
-----

-----

-----

0.05*
(0.02)

-----

-----

Symbolic assessments
Perceived ideological
differences

Policy-based
assessments
Perceived policy
differences
In-party policy extremity
Out-party policy
extremity

-----

In-party policy similarity

-----

0.07*
(0.03)
-----

Out-party policy
dissimilarity

-----

-----

0.02
(0.02)

0.02**
(0.00)
0.02*
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)
-0.00
(0.00)

0.01
(0.01)
-0.01
(0.03)
0.01
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)

-0.01
(0.01)
0.00
(0.03)
-0.02
(0.01)
-0.00
(0.01)

Controls
White
Black
Hh income
Male
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-0.04
(0.02)

Table B4 continued…

Age
Old South
Political interest
Know House majority
Protestant
Year counter
Constant
R2
N

(1)
0.00
(0.00)
-0.01**
(0.00)
0.02
(0.04)
0.04**
(0.00)
0.02**
(0.01)
0.00*
(0.00)
-2.44*
(1.01)
0.13
20,458

Source: 1972-2012 ANES Time-Series
Notes: Analysis matches “Table 2” in the main manuscript.
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(4)
0.00*
(0.00)
-0.00
(0.01)
0.02
(0.04)
0.03**
(0.01)
0.05**
(0.01)
0.00**
(0.00)
-4.11**
(1.23)
0.14
8,393

(7)
0.00
(0.00)
-0.01*
(0.00)
0.02
(0.02)
0.00
(0.00)
0.03**
(0.00)
-0.00
(0.00)
0.62
(1.29)
0.50
8,330

A closer examination of the differences of group assessments across forms of sorting
The associated manuscript argues that group cues are not evenly related to identity-based sorting.
One potential objective to the validity of the conclusions drawn from these analyses is that I have
“moved the goal posts” by exchanging the omnibus measure of sorting employed in The Partisan
Sort with an identity-based one. Table A5-1 replicates Levendusky’s (2009) original analyses by
regressing his measure of “awareness of elite differences,” which aggregates policy and identitybased cues together, on his measure of sorting. This dependent variable is a form of sorting that 1)
aggregates policy preferences and symbolic identities together, and 2) only captures “matching”
between and not the strength of the constituent ideology / partisanship parts. I juxtapose this
analysis by breaking down this omnibus measure of sorting into policy- and identity-based
components. As I would expect, the awareness of group differences is not evenly related to these
constituent components.
Transitioning to the next set of analyses in Table B3, I break down these cues into their
respective group “types” to examine how these various assessments differentially affect symbolic
and policy sorting (the analyses in the main body of the associated manuscript do not include this
comparative analysis). Two conclusions are immediate. First, symbolic assessments exert an
extremely strong effect on partisan-ideological (identity) sorting, while policy-based assessments
exert a severely muted effect. Conversely, symbolic assessments contribute little to policy-based
sorting, while policy-based assessments are strong correlates of policy-based sorting. Combining
these items together in an omnibus metric “group assessments,” however, totally obscures these
differences. Clearly, the relationship of group assessments vis-à-vis sorting is predicated upon these
nuances, which prior research has not explored.
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Table B5. Comparing the effects of elite cues on different forms of sorting

Awareness of elite
differences (policy &
symbolic cues)
White
Black
Hh income
Male
Age
Old South
Interest
Know House majority
Protestant
Year
Constant
R2
N
Notes: *p<0.05, **p<0.01

Levendusky

Issue sorting

Identity sorting

0.33**
(0.04)
0.01
(0.01)
0.06**
(0.02)
0.05**
(0.01)
0.00
(0.00)
-0.00
(0.00)
-0.02**
(0.01)
0.02
(0.05)
0.05**
(0.01)
0.03*
(0.01)
0.00*
(0.00)
-3.76*
(1.50)
0.12
23,140

0.15**
(0.02)
-0.01*
(0.00)
0.07**
(0.01)
-0.01
(0.01)
-0.01**
(0.00)
0.00*
(0.00)
-0.01
(0.00)
0.02
(0.03)
0.01**
(0.00)
0.01
(0.01)
-0.00
(0.00)
0.29
(0.73)
0.08
23,140

0.26**
(0.03)
0.02**
(0.00)
0.02
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)
-0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
-0.01**
(0.00)
0.02
(0.04)
0.04**
(0.01)
0.02**
(0.01)
0.00*
(0.00)
-2.78*
(1.30)
0.12
20,458
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Table B6. Disaggregating the effects of group assessments on various forms of sorting
Levendusky sorting
Symbolic assessments
Perceived polarization

Issue sorting

Identity sorting

(1)

(2)

(1)

(2)

(1)

(2)

0.17**

------

0.06**

------

0.17**

------

(0.01)

(0.01)

In-party similarity

------

0.21**

Out-party dissimilarity

------

0.36**

(0.01)

------

0.10**

------

0.14**

(0.03)

------

0.17**

------

0.65**

(0.02)

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.02)

(0.03)

Policy assessments
Perceived policy differences

0.16*

------

(0.06)
In-party similarity

------

0.11**

-0.10

------

(0.06)
Out-party dissimilarity

------

------

(0.04)

0.48**

0.06*

-0.21**

------

(0.03)
------

(0.06)

------

(0.02)

0.39**

-0.04
(0.02)

------

(0.03)

0.02
(0.02)

Controls
White

0.01
(0.01)

(0.01)

Black

0.06**

-0.05**

(0.02)

(0.02)

0.05**

0.07**

Income
Male
Age
Old South
Interest

0.00

-0.01*

-0.00

0.02**

-0.01

(0.00)

(0.01)

(0.00)

(0.01)

0.06**

-0.03*

0.02*

0.00

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.03)

-0.01

-0.00

0.01

-0.02

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

0.00

0.03**

-0.01**

-0.01

-0.00

-0.00

(0.00)

(0.01)

(0.00)

(0.01)

(0.00)

(0.01)

-0.00

0.00

0.00*

0.00

0.00

0.00

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

-0.02**

0.01

-0.01

-0.00

-0.01**

-0.01*

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

0.02

0.01

0.02

0.02

0.02

0.02

(0.05)

(0.01)

(0.03)

(0.01)

(0.04)

(0.02)

0.05**

0.02**

0.01**

-0.00

0.04**

0.00

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

Protestant

0.03*

0.03**

0.01

0.02**

0.02**

0.03**

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.00)

(0.01)

(0.00)

Year

0.00**

0.00**

0.00

0.00**

0.00*

-0.00

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

-3.70*

-3.68**

0.03

-1.25*

-2.21*

0.62

Knows House majority

Constant

(1.33)

(0.73)

(0.64)

(0.43)

(1.02)

(1.29)

R2

0.12

0.45

0.08

0.41

0.13

0.50

N

23,140

8,330

23,140

8,330

20,458

8,330

Source: 1972-2012 ANES Time Series
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Table B7. Modelling for Figure 5
In-party similarity
Out-party differences
White
Black
Income
Male
Age
Old South
Interest
Know House majority
Protestant
Constant

1972

1976

1978

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

0.03

0.07*

0.06*

0.07

0.07

0.13**

0.07*

0.03

0.01

0.06

0.05

0.15**

(0.02)

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.04)

(0.04)

(0.04)

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.04)

(0.04)

0.52**

0.56**

0.55**

0.49**

0.59**

0.49**

0.53**

0.56**

0.58**

0.56**

0.66**

0.61**

(0.02)

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.02)

(0.03)

(0.03)

-0.00

0.02

-0.04

-0.01

0.03

0.01

-0.00

0.04*

0.01

0.01

0.02

0.03*

(0.03)

(0.02)

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.02)

0.06

0.06

-0.05

0.01

-0.02

-0.02

-0.01

0.00

-0.02

-0.00

-0.00

-0.03

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.04)

(0.04)

(0.04)

(0.02)

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.03)

(0.03)

0.01

-0.01

-0.02

0.00

0.01

0.01

0.00

-0.02

-0.02

0.02

-0.01

-0.01

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.03)

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.02)

0.01

-0.00

0.02

0.03*

-0.01

0.01

0.01

-0.00

-0.01

0.01

0.02

0.01

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

0.00*

0.00

0.00

0.00

-0.00

-0.00

-0.00

0.00**

-0.00

0.00

-0.00*

-0.00

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

-0.00

-0.00

0.00

-0.01

-0.00

-0.01

-0.02*

0.00

0.00

-0.00

0.01

-0.01

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.02)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

0.03**

0.03

0.03

0.03

0.06**

0.05**

0.03*

0.05*

0.03*

0.04**

0.07**

0.05**

(0.01)

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.01)

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.01)

(0.02)

(0.02)

0.01

0.01

0.01

0.03

0.04**

0.00

0.02

0.00

0.04**

0.00

-0.00

0.01

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.02)

(0.01)

0.01

0.01

0.02*

0.00

0.02

0.01

0.00

0.02

0.02

0.02*

-0.00

0.03**

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

-0.02

-0.10**

-0.01

-0.06

-0.10

-0.08*

-0.03

-0.10**

-0.00

-0.09**

-0.06

-0.16**

(0.04)

(0.04)

(0.04)

(0.05)

(0.05)

(0.04)

(0.04)

(0.04)

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.04)

(0.04)

R2

0.44

0.44

0.41

0.38

0.43

0.39

0.40

0.42

0.45

0.43

0.53

0.51

N

1,213

1,118

1,120

734

692

1,203

1,238

1,089

1,044

1,429

1,107

1,104
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Table B. Modelling for Figure 5 continued….
In-party
similarity
Out-party
differences
White
Black
Income

1998

2000

2004

2008

2012

0.10*

-0.02

0.12*

0.12**

0.21**

(0.05)

(0.06)

(0.05)

(0.05)

(0.02)

0.58**

0.55**

0.63**

0.67**

0.67**

(0.03)

(0.05)

(0.04)

(0.04)

(0.02)

-0.03

0.00

-0.00

-0.02

-0.02

(0.02)

(0.03)

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.01)

-0.05

-0.07

-0.09**

-0.06*

-0.05**

(0.04)

(0.04)

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.02)

0.03

-0.08*

0.06**

0.09**

-0.04**

(0.02)

(0.04)

(0.02)

(0.03)

(0.01)

-0.02

-0.01

-0.00

-0.03*

-0.01

(0.01)

(0.02)

(0.01)

(0.02)

(0.01)

-0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

-0.00

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

-0.01

-0.02

0.01

-0.00

-0.01

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.01)

0.04*

0.09**

-0.03

0.09**

-0.06**

(0.02)

(0.03)

(0.02)

(0.03)

(0.01)

0.02

0.01

0.03

-0.02

-0.01

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.01)

(0.02)

(0.01)

-0.00

0.03

0.04**

0.06**

0.01

(0.01)

(0.02)

(0.01)

(0.02)

(0.01)

-0.03

0.06

-0.17**

-0.24**

-0.13**

(0.04)

(0.06)

(0.05)

(0.05)

(0.03)

R2

0.42

0.38

0.50

0.54

0.51

N

813

423

741

655

4,394

Male
Age
Old South
Interest
Know House
majority
Protestant
Constant
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Appendix C – Chapter 6
Figure C1. Probability of selecting elected official who will compromise among persons
with right-leaning identities.
A. Representative

B. President

Source: ANES Evaluations of Government Survey
Notes: Estimates correspond to Table 1 in Chapter 5
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Figure C2. The effect of sorting on willingness to negotiate by value consistency

Notes: Figure depicts the significance test between low- and high-value consistency across
gradations of sorting. Clearly, given the large overlap in the shaded area (95 percent confidence
intervals) with the value 0, the difference between estimates at varying levels of values consistency
is insignificant.
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Appendix D – IRB approvals
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